Fw: [extropy-chat] Essay on Physical Immortality

[Mark Walker]

----- Original Message -----
From: "Robert J. Bradbury"
>
> I'm going to raise this topic in my comments to him -- it twists
> extensively in which rights trump other rights.  For example being
> forced to have and care for an unwanted child may significantly
> damage the futures of both the child and mother.  Or giving
> the child up for adoption may produce similar results.  But
> all of this has probably been extensively examined in the abortion
> debates.
>
> IMO, the key question may revolve around -- when precisely does one
> have a "future"?  A human fetus or an infant have no capability for
> self-enabled survival without depending upon their society or
> parent(s).  This is in contrast to many newborn animals
> have a reasonable chance at survival (having a future)
> from the time they are born/hatched/etc.
>
Marquis thinks that individuals have a future-like-ours once they are a
zygote. He is NOT saying that they are a person, only that the fetus has a
future-like-ours. I don't think the capacity for self-enabled survival is
key since then it would be morally permissible to kill adults or children
who do not possess self-enabled survival. That said, clearly the value of
the fetus' future must be weighed against the value of women to do in and to
their body what they want. Perhaps ectogenesis will allow us to sidestep the
whole abortion debate.


> There is also the fundamental problem that given cloning technology,
> many of the cells in your body have the potential for producing
> another human being.  So the cells of your stomach, intestine,
> skin, etc. (e.g. cells with any turnover) are effectively
> performing abortions on a daily basis.
>
Yes, this brings up the question of how far one should count something as
having a future-like-ours. Should we lament the lost future-like-ours of
sperm in a condom? (Marquis says no).


> > Not addressing the moral permissibility of using life extension
> > technology is a major hole in your argument in my view.  It cannot be
> > morally not permitted to stop others from doing that which is not
> > morally permitted if that act in question has serious repurcussions on
> > others.
>
> This gets into how philosophers and ethicists debate these
> topics.  Its been more than a decade since I've studied these
> so my memory may be a bit fuzzy -- but it comes down to
> cases where one is morally obligated not to interfere and
> cases where one is morally obligated to take action.  Mark
> is dealing just with the first and not with the second.
> To deal with the second effectively one has to argue strongly
> for something like a socialistic or communistic environment
> or programming all humans to be completely altruistic, etc.
> That is a much harder argument to make (and would certainly
> cause a number of people on this list to get really PO :-)).
>

This is the sort of distinction I am trying to draw. Suppose you ask a group
of people whether abortion is morally permissible and you get a 50/50
divide. Now ask the same group whether it is morally permissible to deny
access to abortions through public policy or other means. Now you'll get
something like an 80/20 split with the same group with the 80 believing that
it is not permissible to prevent access. So although there is an even split
on the "theoretical" question the pro-abortion debate wins on the
"practical" question. It would be nice to win on both accounts but I only
address the "practical" question. I think we have a real chance of getting
an even better split than the abortion debate if we can show that preventing
access to radical life extension technology is morally equivalent to denying
access to "traditional" life extension technology like blood transfusions.
This is of course the point of a value of a future-like-ours.

> > I am sorry I commented before reading.  The general question could be
> > much better addressed than by using some specious abortion argument.
> > Please try again.
>
> I think Mark only uses the abortion argument in passing -- simply pointing
> out there is a value to "future life" -- be it for a fetus, an infant,
> a normal human, or a human with an extended life.
>
Exactly.

> What is missing (from my perspective as an extropian) is any
> comment (from what I have read thus far) on the fact that there
> may be an inherent value (and right to preserve) to accumulated
> information/knowledge.  I.e. the past of a 1000 year old
> individual is greater than the past of a 100 y.o. individual
> is greater than the past of a 3 month old fetus.  At an
> extremely gross level Extropians (vs. say transhumanists)
> might argue that there is a very concrete scale in terms
> of the value of information or experience content and so
> one adjusts the "right to life" based on that.  Of course
> after one grants that one immediately gets into a discussion
> of the actual extropic value of the information.  I think
> this gets into areas related to what one thinks when one
> cleans ones closet or ones garage.  What is *really* worth
> something?
>
>
I agree this is worth exploring. I briefly in hint at this near the end
where I talk about an obligation to immortality. If we suppose that
knowledge and achievement of goals have intrinsic worth (as do many
"perfectionist" ethicists), and one's ability to realize these values
increases with age then we have an argument for a (prima facie) duty to
immortality.

Cheers,

Mark

Mark Walker, PhD
Research Associate, Philosophy, Trinity College
University of Toronto
Room 214  Gerald Larkin Building
15 Devonshire Place
Toronto
M5S 1H8
www.permanentend.org