Fw: [extropy-chat] Essay on Physical Immortality

Samantha Atkins samantha at objectent.com
Mon Jan 5 08:28:46 UTC 2004


On Sun, 4 Jan 2004 13:00:50 -0800 (PST)
"Robert J. Bradbury" <bradbury at aeiveos.com> wrote:

> 
> On Sun, 4 Jan 2004, Samantha Atkins wrote:
> 
> > I agree with some of Hubert's points.  I would also remove the notion
> > that abortion is morally impermissable as that begs a few questions and
> > throws a controversy in that is not necessary to your point.
> 
> Well this isn't really Mark's point -- he is simply pointing out that if
> the objection to preventing access to life extending technologies
> is based on the right to a future -- then abortion is going to
> come up in the minds of critics.

The abortion argument, or one variant of an answer, was used as the spine of the argument presented from what I saw.  Using a somewhat strained argument about a different manner in an even more strained way doesn't seem optimal.

> 
> I'm going to raise this topic in my comments to him -- it twists
> extensively in which rights trump other rights.  For example being
> forced to have and care for an unwanted child may significantly
> damage the futures of both the child and mother.  Or giving
> the child up for adoption may produce similar results.  But
> all of this has probably been extensively examined in the abortion
> debates.
>

A foetus IS NOT a child.  Ridding oneself of a biological accident before it is a human being with rights in order to have reasonable control of one's own life and wellbeing is not a case of the mother's rights trumping the "child"'s rights.  There is not child.  This is the specious and weak form of the argument in its original context of abortion.  
 
> IMO, the key question may revolve around -- when precisely does one
> have a "future"?  A human fetus or an infant have no capability for
> self-enabled survival without depending upon their society or
> parent(s).  This is in contrast to many newborn animals
> have a reasonable chance at survival (having a future)
> from the time they are born/hatched/etc.
> 

Confusing an infant with a fetus gives plenty of ammunition to the opposition.  Why do this?

> There is also the fundamental problem that given cloning technology,
> many of the cells in your body have the potential for producing
> another human being.  So the cells of your stomach, intestine,
> skin, etc. (e.g. cells with any turnover) are effectively
> performing abortions on a daily basis.
>

Yeah, by the above logic.  Which underlines just how bogus it is.
 
> > Not addressing the moral permissibility of using life extension
> > technology is a major hole in your argument in my view.  It cannot be
> > morally not permitted to stop others from doing that which is not
> > morally permitted if that act in question has serious repurcussions on
> > others.
> 
> This gets into how philosophers and ethicists debate these
> topics.  Its been more than a decade since I've studied these
> so my memory may be a bit fuzzy -- but it comes down to
> cases where one is morally obligated not to interfere and
> cases where one is morally obligated to take action.  Mark
> is dealing just with the first and not with the second.
> To deal with the second effectively one has to argue strongly
> for something like a socialistic or communistic environment
> or programming all humans to be completely altruistic, etc.
> That is a much harder argument to make (and would certainly
> cause a number of people on this list to get really PO :-)).
>

I don't really see what that has to do with this topic.  Please explain.
 
> > I am sorry I commented before reading.  The general question could be
> > much better addressed than by using some specious abortion argument.
> > Please try again.
> 
> I think Mark only uses the abortion argument in passing -- simply pointing
> out there is a value to "future life" -- be it for a fetus, an infant,
> a normal human, or a human with an extended life.
>

If he uses a fetus in this category then he has punched a huge and unnecessary hole in his argument.  "Future life" is not the issue with life-extension.  It is continuing existing life or more precisely, avoiding death indefinitely.  No one complains about some life-saving therapy generally.  I think it is much more fruitful to go at the subject along these lines than on some weaker and dangerous right to "future life". 
 
> What is missing (from my perspective as an extropian) is any
> comment (from what I have read thus far) on the fact that there
> may be an inherent value (and right to preserve) to accumulated
> information/knowledge.  I.e. the past of a 1000 year old
> individual is greater than the past of a 100 y.o. individual
> is greater than the past of a 3 month old fetus.  At an
> extremely gross level Extropians (vs. say transhumanists)
> might argue that there is a very concrete scale in terms
> of the value of information or experience content and so
> one adjusts the "right to life" based on that.  Of course
> after one grants that one immediately gets into a discussion
> of the actual extropic value of the information.  I think
> this gets into areas related to what one thinks when one
> cleans ones closet or ones garage.  What is *really* worth
> something?
> 

True.  But I think you have the seed of something quite important.  Human society loses a lot through death and that at a very early age.  We lose a lot of skills, knowledge and experience and not just through death but through bodily and mental deterioration starting all too young.  This is a real loss to all of us.  We do not capture well the knowledge of one generation and it is not taken up well by the next.  Having people live much longer means that knowledge would be accumulated and refined longer by each individual thus enriching us all.

-s



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