A view on cryonics (was Re: [extropy-chat] Bad Forecasts!)

[Rafal Smigrodzki]

Brett Paatsch wrote:

>
>I don't think my identity is a matter of taste, its a matter of
>fact. You as an other may present to me as a pattern but I
>don't present to myself as a pattern. 
>  
>
### There are many categories of objects, whose identity is commonly 
interpreted in different ways: e.g. sculptures are treated as unique 
objects, but art prints can be produced in large series. Thus, for the 
art connoisseur, the copy of a famous sculpture is only a copy, but 
every print from the original artist's print series is an original. The 
identity of a bank account is defined by the routing and account 
numbers, not the physical location of the stored data. Thus, the concept 
of "identity" is in fact a whole slew of related but distinct concepts, 
with different properties and referents.

I accept that your (Brett Paatch's) identity is what you say, since this 
is what is produced by the processes in your brain (and my meta-rule for 
such definitions is that they are produced by the brains in a 
self-referential manner) . It's a fact, albeit a fact pertaining only to 
Brett Paatsch. Now, my own, Rafal's  identity is defined differently. It 
is also a fact. Although the definitions are different, they are not 
contradictory - they apply to different objects, just like the varied 
definitions of an "original" in the art world. Even though your 
definition of self is different from mine (not even analogous), I do not 
think you are mistaken - merely different. Do you see the point? I don't 
think you are mistaken, not mistaken about yourself, but you are 
mistaken where you believe me to be mistaken about myself.

In other words, you are a universalist, believing that a single 
definition of self (your own) is the only correct one ("all members of 
the species homo sapiens have their sense of self....."), while I am a 
pluralist, letting everyone decide where their own (and only their own) 
identities lie.

Thus, for me they are indeed a matter of taste, unless somebody with 
enough enforcing power decrees a single definition to apply to various 
persons.

You can conceive of others being different in their thinking from you, 
and yet not mistaken, can't you? I find it to be a useful ability.

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>But you ITs do postulate that you can exist as disembodied
>information don't you?
>
### What do you mean by "disembodied"? If you mean "not in a human body 
but in a different material substrate with sufficient 
information-processing capability", then yes, this is what I believe is 
possible, and it is fully compatible with current scientific views. If 
you mean "functioning without any material substrate", then no, of 
course not.
---------------------------

> 
>
>  
>
>>The IT belief is merely my *decision* to be satisfied with certain
>>physically feasible states of  the world (future world states which
>>contain sentient structures largely identical to my present mental
>>setup, or structures derivable from this setup by volitional means),
>>and to value all such states equally, whether the future structures
>>appear by physical continuity with my current physical manifestation,
>>or by means of information transfer. The only difference between 
>>you and me is that you are dissatisfied with states which contain
>>only the IT-derived structures - so it's a matter of attitude, not a
>>belief about material facts.
>>    
>>
>
>I think the difference between us is that you think that you can in 
>some sense survive as a sort of disembodied pattern despite the
>fact that all the cells that make you up are destroyed in order to
>determine that pattern. 
> 
>  
>
### Let me ask you something: do you think that it could be in principle 
possible to analyze the material structure of your brain, and use the 
information to make a brain which would behave in a way consistent 
(similar enough) with you (e.g. identify pictures of your mother as "My 
mother", or on seeing things you like say it likes them, etc.etc.)?

If  you think this is principally impossible, you would need to give 
some physical explanation why. But, if you agree that a sufficiently 
advanced technology could produce such a brain, then you cannot say we 
disagree about facts. Both you and me would agree that it is physically 
possible to make copies of our brains that would act similarly to the 
originals. The only difference is that I am sufficiently satisfied 
with/enthusiastic about the prospect of having such a copy in the future 
that I am willing to pay for cryonics (and yes, I even value this 
situation equally with "survival" by spatiotemporal continuity of 
cells), while a copy of you would not elicit sufficient interest from you.

-----------------------------------------

>>A question of value, not fact.
>>    
>>
>
>That I exist as a biological being is a fact. That you do probably
>is also a fact. 
>  
>
### Oh, sure, both of us have biological sides. Yet, we also have 
IT-aspects, which I value, and you don't.

------------------------------

>
>Thats not a very scientific thing to say. How could you possible know
>that all academic detractors views come purely form ignorance? 
>  
>
### I have not seen a single, coherent, scientific dismissal of 
cryonics, despite reading on the subject for some time. All of them are 
either silly one-liner quips ("you can't turn a hamburger into a cow"), 
or pure expressions of faith ("it simply can't work"). Never any 
numbers, any technical analysis. Therefore, I am justified in treating 
scientific detractors of cryonics as ignorant, since if they knew any 
scientific arguments, they would have used them.

------------------------------------

>How could you even be sure that you know who all the academic
>detractors are?
>
### I didn't use the universal quantifier. I only said "I can assure you 
that the confidence of academic detractors of cryonics comes purely from 
ignorance", which doesn't exclude the possibility that a few know what 
they are talking about it, but so far failed to publish it. But, if you 
know any single, published, peer-reviewed dismissal of cryonics, give me 
the link.
-----------------------

>If you do have a precise notion of how it could work step by step
>then, if your notion is internally inconsistent I could possibly point
>that out to you. If its not internally inconsistent and its step by 
>step - perhaps you'd have persuaded me.
>
>If you can't say what cryonics is for you, and outline a path at
>least as good as Ralph Merkle in his paper then it might be that
>I can't find an internal contradiction for you because your idea
>is not developed enough to be demonstrably wrong.
>  
>
### Well, here is how I imagine cryonics might work for me:

Cryonic vitrification very soon after death (a few hours, hopefully a 
few minutes) will preserve the brain structure down to the level of 
synapses, with intact synaptic protein levels (which define the synaptic 
strength), and the levels of other proteins, including transcription 
factors in the nucleus, and most RNA and protein in the cytoplasm and 
the ECM. In other words, AFAIK the only things that are lost are the 
momentary concentrations of ions and the resulting short-time-frame 
electric excitation patterns, which are not important for long-term and 
medium term memories.

After a period of storage, a laser tissue machining device coupled to a 
multi-head near-field scanning confocal microscope array will evaporate 
layers of tissue, while the surface will be washed with a mixture of 
antibody stains (with quantum-dot labeling) for every single molecular 
species identified in the decades of my suspension as being important 
for the behavioral manifestations of consciousness. This will allow 3-D 
reconstruction of the whole brain connection pattern including the 
synaptic strengths (not possible using the microtome because of tissue 
deformation, but doable using laser machining).

All the above steps use existing technologies, and reasonable extensions 
of them (e.g. the antibodies to all important molecules are not yet 
available, but will be once the molecules are cataloged).

Then a sufficiently powerful computer will construct a neural network 
replicating the connectivity pattern and the synaptic strengths, as well 
as the rules of modification of the synaptic strengths in the course of 
information processing, producing a device which will be behaviorally 
sufficiently similar to me as to satisfy my desires regarding future 
states of the world (to silence critics I don't even need to say that I 
have been "reincarnated" or "brought back to life", or "survived", or 
any such rigmarole - I only say that both I today and the device in the 
future are satisfied with this particular outcome, and consider the 
cryonics money well-spent).

Does this describe a sufficiently developed idea? Do you know of any 
specific technical issues which would prevent it from working as 
advertised? I could come up with some ballpark estimates of the file 
sizes, numbers of antibodies, speed of laser machining, but these are 
all mere technical details (nothing that would be unreasonably expensive 
or time-consuming, as far as I can tell). Of course, unexpected 
developments in technology could make it easier (e.g. molecular 
nanotechnology), but would not impact the general feasibility of the plan.

Rafal