A view on cryonics (was Re: [extropy-chat] Bad Forecasts!)

[Brett Paatsch]

Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:

> Brett Paatsch wrote:
>
> >
> >I don't think my identity is a matter of taste, its a matter of
> >fact. You as an other may present to me as a pattern but I
> >don't present to myself as a pattern.
> >
> >
> ### There are many categories of objects, whose identity is
> commonly interpreted in different ways: e.g. sculptures are
> treated as unique objects, but art prints can be produced in
> large series. Thus, for the art connoisseur, the copy of a famous
> sculpture is only a copy, but every print from the original artist's
> print series is an original. The identity of a bank account is
> defined by the routing and account numbers, not the physical
> location of the stored data. Thus, the concept of "identity" is
> in fact a whole slew of related but distinct concepts, with
> different properties and referents.

I've no problem with this but it doesn't seem relevant here. As
Slawomir Paliwoda says in his excellent post on Personal Identity,
"personal identity depends on a mind powered by the brain which is
a physical object, and like all other objects, it can and should be
subject to scientific investigation."

And ....  "once we agree that, in science,  there's only one correct
explanation for something at the exclusion of other theories, we can
say that there can only be one explanation/description of personal
identity that is true and all other theories are false."

> I accept that your (Brett Paatch's) identity is what you say, since
> this is what is produced by the processes in your brain (and my
> meta-rule for such definitions is that they are produced by the
> brains in a self-referential manner) . It's a fact, albeit a fact
> pertaining only to Brett Paatsch. Now, my own, Rafal's  identity
> is defined differently. It is also a fact. Although the definitions
> are different, they are not contradictory - they apply to different
> objects, just like the varied definitions of an "original" in the art
> world. Even though your definition of self is different from mine
>(not even analogous), I do not think you are mistaken - merely
> different.  Do you see the point?

Yes, I understand what your saying, but I think that you have
gone off on a tangent. You are taking us away from a discussion
on cryonics and of the obstacles cryonics would inevitably have
to overcome to be of interest to people like you and I. That is
people that currently have our sense of self located in our brains.

> I don't think you are mistaken, not mistaken about yourself,
> but you are mistaken where you believe me to be mistaken
> about myself.

I think you missed my point. You are currently located in
your brain just as I am. Your aspirations for cryonics will have
to deal with that.  A cryonics procedure that goes hunting
about the room to pick up astral travelling selves is unlike to
be of interest to either of us.

> In other words, you are a universalist, believing that a
> single definition of self (your own) is the only correct one
> ("all members of the species homo sapiens have their sense
> of self....."), while I am a pluralist, letting everyone decide
> where their own (and only their own) identities lie.

You've split my sentence in the middle when you quote me
above. I'd said "all members of the species homo sapiens have
their sense of self inherent in the structure of their cellular brain".
That is not me defining a self concept. That is me pointing out
that whatever our self concepts are they are *located* if we
are homo sapiens in our brain structure.

True and scientific statements can be made about "all members
of the species homo sapiens..." which picks up both you and I.

> You can conceive of others being different in their thinking
> from you, and yet not mistaken, can't you? I find it to be a
> useful ability.

Of course. But they can *also* be different AND mistaken.

> ----------------------------------------
>
> >But you ITs do postulate that you can exist as disembodied
> >information don't you?
> >
> ### What do you mean by "disembodied"?
.
> If you mean "functioning without any material substrate", then no,
> of course not.

Ok. So you think you would cease to exist as "you" while you exist
only as a dataset of information for building you at a later date?

Sort of cake - recipe -cake. While your a recipe your not a cake.

> ---------------------------
>
> >
> >>The IT belief is merely my *decision* to be satisfied with certain
> >>physically feasible states of  the world (future world states which
> >>contain sentient structures largely identical to my present mental
> >>setup, or structures derivable from this setup by volitional means),
> >>and to value all such states equally, whether the future structures
> >>appear by physical continuity with my current physical manifestation,
> >>or by means of information transfer. The only difference between
> >>you and me is that you are dissatisfied with states which contain
> >>only the IT-derived structures - so it's a matter of attitude, not a
> >>belief about material facts.
> >
> >I think the difference between us is that you think that you can in
> >some sense survive as a sort of disembodied pattern despite the
> >fact that all the cells that make you up are destroyed in order to
> >determine that pattern.
> >
> >
> >
> ### Let me ask you something: do you think that it could be in principle
> possible to analyze the material structure of your brain, and use the
> information to make a brain which would behave in a way consistent
> (similar enough) with you (e.g. identify pictures of your mother as "My
> mother", or on seeing things you like say it likes them, etc.etc.)?

It might be. In principle. It might be possible to create what Slawomir
Paliwoda calls a perfect clone.  I wouldn't think that perfect clone was
me. And I don't think that clone could be created because I don't think
the information to create it could be gathered to the requisite resolution
without destroying the original me in the process.

> If  you think this is principally impossible, you would need to give
> some physical explanation why.

You mean that to satisfy or to convince you I'd need to :-)

I might not need to for myself, particularly as I do agree with Slawomir
Paliwoda, in that I do not think that I would be my perfect clone.

This is not a nit picking point. People who believe that cryonics will
work, or that molecular nanotech can work, often offer the failure to
demonstrate that it can't to their knowledge as though that was
relevant evidence.

It isn't relevant evidence. What is missed out of that view is the
understanding that people who do understand stuff are not always
willing to spend the time trying to untangle the confused
misunderstandings of those who don't understand stuff.  This is
particularly the case when people have complicated religous
worldviews. Other people cannot justify the time to disprove
those worldviews. There is not payoff for doing so. The people
are not greatful for being disillusioned.  They don't offer to pay
for the service. They are more likely often to be resentful.

> But, if you agree that a sufficiently
> advanced technology could produce such a brain, then you
> cannot say we disagree about facts.

I can conceed the possibility, but I don't find it worth giving
a lot of thought too, given that I realise I would not be my
"perfect clone". And there are plenty of other 'facts' yet for
us to disagree over.

> Both you and me would agree that it is physically possible
> to make copies of our brains that would act similarly to the
> originals. The only difference is that I am sufficiently satisfied
> with/enthusiastic about the prospect of having such a copy
> in the future that I am willing to pay for cryonics (and yes, I
> even value this situation equally with "survival" by
> spatiotemporal continuity of cells), while a copy of you
> would not elicit sufficient interest from you.

I get what you are saying. But your right I wouldn't be sufficently
satisified or enthusiastic. To me you are excepting that you
will die (be materially decomposed and cease as a process) but
are taking consolation that something just like you will be
brought back to life (recomposed  and started as a process via
means which you conceed you do not in detail understand).

Your diverting limited resources from solving problems or
overcoming limits in your current you-process in order to endow
life to some future you-process. Even though the current and
future you-processes will not overlap in time.  Correct?

> -----------------------------------------
>
> >>A question of value, not fact.
> >>
> >>
> >
> >That I exist as a biological being is a fact. That you do probably
> >is also a fact.
> >
> >
> ### Oh, sure, both of us have biological sides. Yet, we also have
> IT-aspects, which I value, and you don't.

Right.

> ------------------------------
>
> >
> >Thats not a very scientific thing to say. How could you possible know
> >that all academic detractors views come purely form ignorance?
> >
> >
> ### I have not seen a single, coherent, scientific dismissal of
> cryonics, despite reading on the subject for some time. All of them are
> either silly one-liner quips ("you can't turn a hamburger into a cow"),
> or pure expressions of faith ("it simply can't work"). Never any
> numbers, any technical analysis.

In fairness, why should anyone want to provide numbers or technical
analysis? What is in it for them? To do that they'd have to take on a
burden at some opportunity cost of time.  If you had laid out numbers
and technical analysis in detail yourself then they might do you the service
of checking and perhaps correcting any errors etc.

>  Therefore, I am justified in treating
> scientific detractors of cryonics as ignorant, since if they knew any
> scientific arguments, they would have used them.

That is a non sequitor. People generally need a reason to do
work that your not paying then to do, they don't normally need a reason to
avoid working for nothing.

> ------------------------------------
>
> >How could you even be sure that you know who all the academic
> >detractors are?
> >
> ### I didn't use the universal quantifier. I only said "I can assure you
> that the confidence of academic detractors of cryonics comes purely from
> ignorance", which doesn't exclude the possibility that a few know what
> they are talking about it, but so far failed to publish it. But, if you
> know any single, published, peer-reviewed dismissal of cryonics, give me
> the link.

So far as I know the best to-date attempt to outline a procedure by which
cryonics might work is Merkle's Molecular Repair of the Brain. Unless he
has radically rewritten and restructured it, then I think you'd have to be a
pretty good friend of Merkle's to want to go to the trouble of trying to
critique it in its current form. The paper is structured so badly. I did
start
to try and constructively criticise it but found that to do so I would have
had to restructure and rewrite it first. As I didn't think the information
theoretic criteria of death was valid I wasn't willing to go to that much
trouble.

I have a copy of a 1993 Alcor publication called "Cryonics
Reaching for Tomorrow" 4th Edn. In it there is an Appendix B
written by Greg Fahy "primarily out of intellectual curiosity in
response to Dr Ralph Merkle's paper "The Molecular Repair
of the Brain" ".

Perhaps if Fahy wrote a "how to" paper on cryonics it might be good
enough for professionals to consider critiquing.

> -----------------------
>
> >If you do have a precise notion of how it could work step by step
> >then, if your notion is internally inconsistent I could possibly point
> >that out to you. If its not internally inconsistent and its step by
> >step - perhaps you'd have persuaded me.
> >
> >If you can't say what cryonics is for you, and outline a path at
> >least as good as Ralph Merkle in his paper then it might be that
> >I can't find an internal contradiction for you because your idea
> >is not developed enough to be demonstrably wrong.
> >
> >
> ### Well, here is how I imagine cryonics might work for me:
>
> Cryonic vitrification very soon after death (a few hours, hopefully a
> few minutes) will preserve the brain structure down to the level of
> synapses, with intact synaptic protein levels (which define the synaptic
> strength), and the levels of other proteins, including transcription
> factors in the nucleus, and most RNA and protein in the cytoplasm and
> the ECM.

Minutes vs hours? Death as determined how? Vitrification how? Down
to (and including the synapses I presume) - you'd want your memories.
To capture you personal synapse pattern you'd need nanoscale
resolution. As you know neurons are not nicely rounded cells like one
might find in a high school text book - they are more like tree or root
structures and the structure matters.  Proteins levels alone won't do
it you need to know where the proteins (and not just the proteins)
were when they were in their natural state.

>In other words, AFAIK the only things that are lost are the
> momentary concentrations of ions and the resulting short-time-frame
> electric excitation patterns, which are not important for long-term and
> medium term memories.
>
> After a period of storage, a laser tissue machining device coupled to a
> multi-head near-field scanning confocal microscope array will evaporate
> layers of tissue, while the surface will be washed with a mixture of
> antibody stains (with quantum-dot labeling) for every single molecular
> species identified in the decades of my suspension as being important
> for the behavioral manifestations of consciousness. This will allow 3-D
> reconstruction of the whole brain connection pattern including the
> synaptic strengths (not possible using the microtome because of tissue
> deformation, but doable using laser machining).

That evaporate layers of tissue at what temperature? How do you stop
the tissue below the surface layer from heating up and information getting
lost before you determine it?

3D reconstruction onto what substrate? Surely not the same sort of
organic substrate as originally - how would you put it together without
it decomposing. And if on some other substrate how would you translate
the infromation from the first substrate (unique info remember as memories
can't be templated out) onto another substrate?

> All the above steps use existing technologies, and reasonable extensions
> of them (e.g. the antibodies to all important molecules are not yet
> available, but will be once the molecules are cataloged).

You don't say how you will do important steps. You don't talk about
algorithms
for storing information, for translation that information into something
that
could be ported to another sunstrate.

Do you break the brain sized stating material down into smaller pieces?
How do you prevent loss of info due to cracking? How do you move
pieces around?

> Then a sufficiently powerful computer will construct a neural network
> replicating the connectivity pattern and the synaptic strengths, as well
> as the rules of modification of the synaptic strengths in the course of
> information processing, producing a device which will be behaviorally
> sufficiently similar to me as to satisfy my desires regarding future
> states of the world (to silence critics I don't even need to say that I
> have been "reincarnated" or "brought back to life", or "survived", or
> any such rigmarole - I only say that both I today and the device in the
> future are satisfied with this particular outcome, and consider the
> cryonics money well-spent).

> Does this describe a sufficiently developed idea?

No. It really, really doesn't. If you want numbers and technical analysis
in a critique (see your statement above) then you'd have to do a lot more
work yourself. And before you can put numbers on things you have to
do more than just name a few potential tools.  Merkle did some of the
necessary work (badly) in my view, but he missed a lot more.

> Do you know of any specific technical issues which would prevent it
> from working as advertised?

You haven't really engaged with *any* key "how to" engineering problems
at all. You'd need to do that in a much more detailed and structured way
in order to invite criticism. Granted that is virtually impossible to do in
an email.

> I could come up with some ballpark
> estimates of the file sizes, numbers of antibodies, speed of laser
> machining, but these are all mere technical details (nothing that would
> be unreasonably expensive or time-consuming, as far as I can tell).

"as far as I can tell" is a very big statement. Unless you wade into the
problem space with a serious engineering frame of mind you aren't even
starting to think about the sort of engineering problems that you'd have
to solve.

> Of course, unexpected
> developments in technology could make it easier (e.g. molecular
> nanotechnology), but would not impact the general feasibility of the plan.

And unappreciated complexity in the biology of the brain could make it
harder.

Brett Paatsch