[extropy-chat] Qualia Bet

[gts]

On Wed, 07 Dec 2005 23:18:05 -0500, Marc Geddes <marc.geddes at gmail.com>  
wrote:

> But as gts rightly pointed out, the fact we can only view Qualia  
> subjectively doesn't mean that Qualia are not objectively real.

Yes, and as you've argued, if qualia are objectively real then they must  
be real in a platonic sense, like numbers.

As I've argued here, in Lockean terms qualia should perhaps be considered  
real (primary) rather than secondary qualities of objects. Locke's primary  
qualities include the platonic idea of "number".

The problem of course is how it is that a secondary quality like color can  
be said to be objectively real in same sense as number or any other  
primary quality. Red objects reflect red light, so one might say that when  
we look at a red object, we are seeing every color it is *not*. In  
physical terms, a red object is anything *but* red. This is the kind of  
stumbling block that leads to the denial of objective qualia. The answer  
is that if redness exists objectively then it must exist platonically,  
like numbers, just as you say.

When we look at 5 red tomatoes, it is true to say not only that they are  
"objectively 5" but also that they are "objectively red".

> Are you familiar with Bertrand Russell's theory of 'Dual-aspect monism'  
> gts?

I found this definition of dual-aspect monism: "Neutral Monism. Also known  
as dual aspect monism. Espoused by Lewes in the 19th century. The argument  
runs that there is only one kind of stuff. Mind and body differ only in  
the arrangement of the stuff or in the perspective from which it is  
apprehended."

This is exactly what I meant when I wrote (to Dirk I think) that the  
difference between materialism and pan-psychism seems only to be a matter  
of perspective.

I don't (yet) understand what you mean by "seven-fold-aspect monism" but  
it looks like we've arrived at more or less the same conclusion.

I'm thinking also that we should dispense with the idea of the so-called  
"Cartesian Theater". The idea that we (or any robots we might design) must  
represent the external world internally with some "mental model" or  
"subjective movie" leads to an infinite regress. The little men inside our  
heads who watch those movies must also have movies inside their heads,  
etc...

Perhaps it's better to say that the mind really does experience the world  
*directly*. Red things look red because they really are red. Redness is  
not a mere pigment of our imagination.

This leads me also to think of objectivist epistemology. Have you compared  
your ideas to David Kelly's?

-gts