[extropy-chat] Qualia Bet

[Marc Geddes]

gts wrote>>>

>Yes, and as you've argued, if qualia are objectively real then they must
be real in a platonic sense, like numbers.

Exactly so!

>I found this definition of dual-aspect monism: "Neutral Monism. Also known

as dual aspect monism. Espoused by Lewes in the 19th century. The argument
runs that there is only one kind of stuff. Mind and body differ only in
the arrangement of the stuff or in the perspective from which it is
apprehended."

You should read up on Neutral monism, because it's an incredibly subtle and
interesting philosophical theory.  It traces back to Baruch Spinoza and in
the 20th century it was espoused by heavy weight Bertrand Russell.  A modern
'heavy weight' supporter is philosopher David Chalmers.

Here's the entry on it from the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy:

"Neutral monism is a monistic metaphysic. It holds that ultimate reality is
all of one kind. To this extent neutral monism is in agreement with idealism
and materialism. What distinguishes neutral monism from its better known
monistic rivals is the claim that the intrinsic nature of ultimate reality
is neither mental nor physical. This negative claim also captures the idea
of neutrality: being intrinsically neither mental nor physical in nature
ultimate reality is said to be neutral between the two."
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/

The idea that there's only one sustance underlying everything, but it is
neither physical or mental in nature.  Instead this substance can manifest
itself in multiple forms i.e. properties.

See what David Chalmers has to say about this option in the context of a
possible solution the mind-body problem.  Check out his 'Type-F Monism' in
this paper:
http://consc.net/papers/nature.html


>This is exactly what I meant when I wrote (to Dirk I think) that the
difference between materialism and pan-psychism seems only to be a matter
of perspective.

Kind of.  But not quite.  If it really were the case that a description of
reality purely in terms of direct experience were logically equivalent to a
description of reality in terms of material objects, then it wouldn't really
make sense to say that there two seperate perspectives at all.  The theory
would reduce to what is known as 'Identity Theory' (or Reductive
physicalism).  Better to say that there's one more than one valid
perspective of reality and the two perspectives over-lap to a large degree
but are not totally equivalent.  The nature of the realtionship between the
different perspectives is an open question.

>I don't (yet) understand what you mean by "seven-fold-aspect monism" but
it looks like we've arrived at more or less the same conclusion.

See the definition of Neutral monism above:  There's one substance which can
take on the appearance of multiple properties.  'Seven-fold-aspect monism'
simply means I that think this substance appears as 7-different fundamental
properties (i.e there are 7-different fundamental perpsectives of reality
which one can take).

>This leads me also to think of objectivist epistemology. Have you compared

your ideas to David Kelly's?

Objectivism is a totally crack-pot philosophy.  I passed through an
Objectivist phase (lasting a year or so) but then realized that Rand was
just spewing ideological rants.  Everything she said has been argued far
better by other philosophers and most of her ideas are just plain flat wrong
anyway.  It's not worth wasting time on Kelly's ideas.

>Marc has not answered my question but I after thinking about his ideas and

combining them with my own I think I can offer an answer.

>In platonic terms, we understand each other when we speak about
mathematics because we are accessing the same objective information. You
see the same 5 that I see because there is only one 5 "out there". Five is
not merely an abstract pattern common to groups things of which there are
five (as Aristotle might say). Five exists in its own right, separate from
and and prior to any instances of five-ness in the world (as Plato would
say).

I subscribe to a weaker form of Platonism than that.  I agree that
mathematical entities are objectively real.  For instance I agree that '5'
exists in its own right.  But I wouldn't go so far as to say that it's
'seperate from and prior to any instances of five-ness in the world'.  I
would say that the existence of the entity '5' requires instances of
fiveness in the world but is not *reducible* to these instances.  That is to
say, I think the existence of the entity '5' is *built out of* concetre
instances of fiveness but also has a reality above and beyond these concrete
instances.  i.e I think the entity '5' has a material aspect *and* a
non-material aspect.  This is a subtle kind of platonism.

>If qualia exist in a platonic sense then there may be only one true
"green." The green quale may exist objectively, like the number 5, and be
a real primary quality of green objects rather than a Lockean secondary
quality. If so then we all see green the same way, at least in principle,
because we are accessing the same information.

>Are we in agreement here, Marc?


I half agree ;)  I wouldn't say that a 'green quale' is real primary quality
of green objects.  Instead I'd say that it's a real property of a  *possible
relationship* or *possible interaction* between green objects and conscious
observers.  The existence of the quale requires both (a) Physical Objects
and (b) Conscious observers.

But yes, I agree that quale has objective existence and could in principle
be fully communicated to others.  Of course there will be many different
kinds of 'Green Quale', expressing many different possible relationships
between green objects and conscious observers.



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