[extropy-chat] Re: Overconfidence and meta-rationality

[Robin Hanson]

At 02:48 AM 3/21/2005, Eliezer S. Yudkowsky wrote:
>There's an art of sticking as close to the question as possible - arguing 
>about issues that stand in the closest possible inferential proximity to 
>the main question; trying to settle questions that, if we knew the answers 
>to them, would render more distant questions irrelevant. ...
>That's another reason why I don't trust the modesty argument.  It seems to 
>me that you can argue indefinitely over who's more rational, without ever 
>touching on the meat of a question.  ...
>If I am rational, then I should have decent reasons - Bayesian causes - 
>for believing as I do.  Once I have disgorged my reasons for believing 
>something, my rationality becomes much less inferentially relevant to 
>whether my belief is probably correct. ...
>Thus, I still think that people who disagree should, pragmatically, go on 
>arguing with each other about the matter of interest, instead of 
>immediately compromising based on a belief in the probable rationality of 
>the other.

>At 03:47 AM 3/21/2005, Hal Finney responded:
>That seems reasonable, and from what I understand, is consistent with
>Robin's results.  I read him as not so much saying that Bayesians "should"
>agree; but that they can't help agreeing.  That doesn't change the fact
>that the best way to aggregate their information may well be to argue
>the situation *as though* they strongly disagreed.  ...
>While doing this, though, I think mentally you would each be somewhat in
>the frame of mind of playing devil's advocate. ... As long as you're
>honest about it, that seems fine.

I agree with Hal.  You don't have to disagree in your heart to explore the 
different possible positions on an issue, and their strengths and weaknesses.




Robin Hanson  rhanson at gmu.edu  http://hanson.gmu.edu
Assistant Professor of Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-4444
703-993-2326  FAX: 703-993-2323