[extropy-chat] The Proactionary Principle: comments encouraged on almost-final version

[Max More]

I don't think your points are at all off-topic, Hal. (So long as this 
discussion doesn't displace constructive critiques of the Principle itself.)


At 01:38 PM 11/8/2005, Hal wrote:

>With regard to the Proactionary Principle, we are mostly looking not
>at corporate risk-taking, but at government and regulatory risk issues.

I do intend the ProP to apply in both private and governmental 
contexts, although the full-blown application of the Principle is 
indeed best suited to government and regulatory risk decisions.

>This article did not go into that specifically, but there has been much
>work in this area as well.  If anything, the risk environment is even
>worse in the regulatory field.  A businessman who takes a successful
>risk balances a significant reward against the possibility of failure,
>but a regulator gets little or no reward and faces only the penalties
>from failure.

Yes--the classic problem of Type I and Type II errors. (I discuss 
that in my chapter, "The Perils of Precaution".)


>On the other hand, if we could create mechanisms for a risk-neutral
>regulatory environment, my feeling is that this would go a long way
>towards achieving the goals of the Proactionary principle, even without
>explicit policy change.

The widespread affirmation of the Proactionary Principle (or 
something very similar) should make it much easier to get such 
mechanisms seriously considered and implemented. In addition, the 
ProP could serve as a touchstone by which to evaluate mechanisms 
proposed for that purpose. Especially relevant in this context is the 
second sub-principle:

2.      Use Objective Methods: Use a decision process that is 
objective, structured, and explicit. Evaluate risks and generate 
forecasts according to available science, not emotionally shaped 
perceptions; use explicit forecasting processes; fully disclose the 
forecasting procedure; ensure that the information and decision 
procedures are objective; rigorously structure the inputs to the 
forecasting procedure; reduce biases by selecting disinterested 
experts, by using the devil's advocate procedure with judgmental 
methods, and by using auditing procedures such as review panels.

However, now I look at this again, it seems to me that the text does 
not adequately express one of my major priorities: to specify the use 
of the most reliable, well-validated forecasting methods. This IS 
covered by "generate forecasts according to available science", but 
needs stating more clearly, I think. (The advisability of using such 
methods is the focus of my chapter on "The Wisdom of Structure", 
which immediately precedes the Proactionary Principle chapter.

To sum up on this particular point: It makes sense to me to push for 
adoption of the Proactionary Principle *at the same time as* working 
to implement risk-neutral mechanisms. They should reinforce and 
complement one another.


>Imagine, as a toy example, if regulators were allowed to profit from
>benefits created by new technologies they allow, while equally being
>penalized by harm those technologies might create.

I like the idea. But how, specifically, would you implement this in a 
politically feasible way? Wouldn't it also raise potential problems, 
such as turning the regulators' job into a highly profitable one, 
thereby spurring nepotism involving those who appoint the regulators? 
(This isn't meant as a dismissal of your suggestion, which I think 
should be further explored.)


>Overall, then, I agree that the Proactionary Principle is good policy.
>However, without addressing the details of how society evaluates and
>manages the risks of new technologies, any such policy faces obstacles to
>effective implementation.

You have my complete agreement! Strong public pressure for adoption 
of the ProP could have a highly beneficial effect on the regulatory 
environment, but its impact would be severely limited if not 
accompanied by structural and incentive mechanisms to shape behavior 
in accordance the Principle. It's probably easier to do this in 
business -- and there's an enormous literature on change management 
for this purpose [see 
<http://www.manyworlds.com/topic.aspx?topicid=T7270310264061>] -- 
although it's never *easy*. A good place to start would be with the 
economics of politics literature, and perhaps scanning the output of 
organizations such as the Cato Institute. (Suggestions welcome.) I 
know that the UK's Institute for Economic Affairs has published a 
fair bit of material on this, but probably more on the critical side 
rather than on how to reform regulators.


>  I would like to see support for such classic
>Extropian ideas as Idea Futures, Delphi forecasting, science courts,
>and other innovative mechanisms for more accurate forecast methodologies.
>This should be part of a general research effort towards evaluating how
>well different forecast mechanisms work, including traditional scenario
>based forecasts.

I see all this as part of the effort that naturally accompanies the 
Proactionary Principle. One of the next chapters I have to tackle is 
precisely on the relative reliability of various forecasting methods 
and how to choose between them. (That will be a tough one.)

>I also think it will be necessary to look in some detail
>at how policy recommendations are implemented at the regulatory level.
>The regulatory risk-reward balance needs to be substantially redesigned
>as part of any change towards a more risk-neutral policy stance.

As above, I couldn't agree more.

Onward!

Max


_______________________________________________________
Max More, Ph.D.
max at maxmore.com or more at extropy.org
http://www.maxmore.com
Strategic Philosopher
Chairman, Extropy Institute. http://www.extropy.org <more at extropy.org>
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