[extropy-chat] qualia

[gts]

On Wed, 23 Nov 2005 14:32:26 -0500, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 23, 2005 at 02:03:10PM -0500, gts wrote:
>> This is a good discussion of the qualia problem in the philosophy of  
>> mind:
>>
>> What is it like to be a bat?
>> http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/Nagel_Bat.html
>
> I don't see a single lost equation in that desert of text. I don't see
> any neuroscience citations

Neuroscience falls under the general rubric of *physicalism* referenced  
several times in the article.

It seems physicalism can tell us nothing about the subject. It cannot tell  
us what is like to be a bat, or what it is like for Brent to see the color  
red.

"If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must  
themselves be given a physical account. But when we examine their  
subjective character it seems that such a result is impossible. The reason  
is that every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single  
point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory  
[i.e., any argument from neuroscience] will abandon that point of view."

Correct me if you like, Brent, but your theory seems to be physicalist, at  
least in so much as it seems to reject mind-body dualism. And as Nagel  
states here, "If physicalism is to be defended, phenomenological features  
must themselves be given a physical account." This what we've been asking  
you to do.

> Them philosophers are totally bat-guano.

:) But empirical science seems just as lost here.

-gts