[extropy-chat] qualia

[Eugen Leitl]

On Wed, Nov 23, 2005 at 02:47:14PM -0500, gts wrote:

> Neuroscience falls under the general rubric of *physicalism* referenced  
> several times in the article.

Oh, it is so easy to deny reality
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/trey-ellis/the-right-hasnt-cornered_b_7876.html
anything that doesn't kill you immediately doesn't obviously exist.
Nyah, nyah, I don't see you. Ksht.
 
> It seems physicalism can tell us nothing about the subject. It cannot tell  

Right. Empirical science is totally useless, agreed. All that pesky knowledge, and the
artifact trappings. Burn them all, I say. Smash them, and go back to nature.
Naked, with a pointy stick, in the Serengeti.

> us what is like to be a bat, or what it is like for Brent to see the color  
> red.

It is relatively easy to make you feel how to like to be a bat, by gradually turning
you into a bat (such a technology will eventually exist). Unfortunately, by turning
you back into a human you will no longer remember, unless you'd settle for some fake
memories (or decide to remain a bat a priori). But then, taking mind-altering drugs 
is much easier, so why bother?
 
> "If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must  
> themselves be given a physical account. But when we examine their  
> subjective character it seems that such a result is impossible. The reason  

What does this suppose to mean? If my denial of reality is to be defended,
I can be burned at a stake with a cherubic, subjective smile on my lips? 

> is that every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single  
> point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory  
> [i.e., any argument from neuroscience] will abandon that point of view."

I think my other shoe is a hippo. It seems, my other foot has abandoned
that point of view, and is now objectively missing.
 
> Correct me if you like, Brent, but your theory seems to be physicalist, at  
> least in so much as it seems to reject mind-body dualism. And as Nagel  

I emphatically refoot the shoe-sandal dualism as physicalist in its toe-nailture.
Pedo-oral inserts <muffled mumble>

> states here, "If physicalism is to be defended, phenomenological features  
> must themselves be given a physical account." This what we've been asking  
> you to do.
> 
> >Them philosophers are totally bat-guano.
> 
> :) But empirical science seems just as lost here.

No, empirical science has no trouble tickling your brain to evoke all
kind of interesting experiences.

Can telling fancy stories do such stupid tricks?

Thought not.

-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
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