[extropy-chat] I keep asking myself...

Wed Apr 5 21:34:11 UTC 2006

I'm just going to try to clarify for my own understanding. If one accepts
that only the 'pattern' of information is necessary and sufficient for
establishing identity, then if I made a perfect copy of myself, would I not
expect a stream of experiences from both (or all) 'versions' simultaneously?

Not unless you hooked up inputs and outputs among all the copies.

>From the point in time of the copy you(plural) would be separate individuals
under most expected scenarios -- very analogous to identical twins
(triplets, etc)
except you would be identical in much of your NURTURE up to the moment
of copying.

Just like when some copies a computer program to another machine.
Most of the time the two copies don't even communicate with each other,
and if they do it is usually in a limited manner.  For such copies their
communication would likely be through normal (human) means of conversation
OR perhaps through new (computer network and data exchange) methods
that only work well (now) for computer based systems.

If I made many copies, would I effectively become a hive-mind? 

Almost certainly no.  (i.e., only if you specifically arranged for that and
it likely would NOT be the default.)

But if your answer is yes, then how can this be so? Given that the human
mind (as it is now) is incapable of *directly* accessing other minds. 

Part of the reason this would not (likely) be the default configuration.

Once digitized we made be able to add new capabilities, including new
communications and integration modules.

Would the bandwidth (direct mind access ability) of my own mind mysteriously
double if make a single perfect copy of myself? 

If you are measuring core bandwidth it probably would but just like multiple
computers typically CANNOT take advantage of multiple hardware platforms
to work together cooperatively that would be an "extra feature", perhaps not
available in "Version 1.0 Mind Upload Kit".

It doesn't seem like it should - because that would seem to imply an
instantaneou s and significant alteration to the physical arrangement of my
brain (which seems unlikely), but perhaps I'm wrong.

Assuming you kept the SAME (current) input/output configuration (or
a simulation of that) then you would not see these effects.

You are confusing the "copy" with a reconfiguration of the Input/Output
systems AND/or the Biological Operating Systems, or even extensions
to those current systems.

Herb Martin

  _____  

From: extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org
[mailto:extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org] On Behalf Of A B
Sent: Wednesday, April 05, 2006 3:14 PM
To: ExI chat list
Subject: Re: [extropy-chat] I keep asking myself...

Hi Ben,

I'm just going to try to clarify for my own understanding. If one accepts
that only the 'pattern' of information is necessary and sufficient for
establishing identity, then if I made a perfect copy of myself, would I not
expect a stream of experiences from both (or all) 'versions' simultaneously?
If I made many copies, would I effectively become a hive-mind? But if your
answer is yes, then how can this be so? Given that the human mind (as it is
now) is incapable of *directly* accessing other minds. Would the bandwidth
(direct mind access ability) of my own mind mysteriously double if make a
single perfect copy of myself? It doesn't seem like it should - because that
would seem to imply an instantaneou s and significant alteration to the
physical arrangement of my brain (which seems unlikely), but perhaps I'm
wrong.

Best Wishes,

Jeffrey Herrlich (I'm going to change the A B thing one of these days)  

ben <benboc at lineone.net> wrote:

From: A B :

> no one here seems to be addressing the basic rights of these 
> "copies". As a living, conscious being, I'm not sure it is ethically
> correct to force specific decisions and lifestyles on these "copies"
> as if they we re simply toys - devoid of basic rights that an 
> "original" version would presumably have. To me it seems there is 
> little difference between the value of an "original" and a "copied" 
> being; once it is created, it has every righ t to do with itself 
> whatever *it* wishes (short of harming any other being).

Sure, i agree totally about the rights of other people, but we're not
talking about other people. I'm imagining a copy - an EXACT copy - of
me. In other words, it's me (in my view. I know there are those who
would disagree with this 'patternist' view).
So 'imposing' any kind of behaviour on such a copy is a non-issue, any 
more than imposing it on yourself would be. I f you do force yourself to 
do anything, you have good reason (i hope!) to, and do it with your own 
full consent.
Granted, over time, these copies would inevitable diverge, and that's 
something to be considered. But personally, i wouldn't be averse to 
imposing some kind of mental constraint on myself in order to attain 
some pre-decided goal (such as sending a copy of myself to Pluto and 
back, then merging with my stay-at-home version), and be pretty much 
guaranteed that w e would still want to merge. I would certainly not be 
pleased if some authority tried to tell me that i wasn't allowed to put 
those kind of constraints on myself.

ben
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat

  _____  

New Yahoo! Messenger with Voice. Call
<http://us.rd.yahoo.com/mail_us/taglines/postman6/*http://us.rd.yahoo.com/ev
t=39663/*http://voice.yahoo.com> regular phones from your PC and save big.

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.extropy.org/pipermail/extropy-chat/attachments/20060405/25b7774d/attachment.html>