[extropy-chat] "Dead Time" of the Brain.
Heartland
velvet977 at hotmail.com
Mon May 1 03:22:53 UTC 2006
> Heartland wrote:
> "That illusion will happen as part of a
> verifiably different *instance* of mind process than the original instance of
> that
> same *type* of process. As people, we are instances, not types. That's the
> biggest
> misconception people bring to this kind of debate, namely, that people are
> types."
Jeffrey Herrlich:
"I don't think that Space/Time trajectory is sufficient to distinguish any specific
instance of mind-process from any other. The key to my objection here lies with the
necessary mind-*process*. As I pointed out in an old post, a vitrified brain
retains a Space/Time trajectory that is every bit as real and valid as a trajectory
followed by a living brain (A living brain and a vitrified brain are both "4-D").
While a brain is vitrified it is *not* conducting a mind-*process* at all. So, upon
very close examination, the "original" mind-process (original instance) *cannot* at
all be distinguished by Space/Time trajectory, from the "copied" mind-process
(copied instance) - it is the *same* brain. I realize this paragraph may be
difficult to follow, but I couldn't find a way to make it more straightforward."
The mistake in your reasoning is that you equated mind object with the brain object
and mind trajectory with brain trajectory. These objects and their trajectories
would be completely different even though similar by virtue of the same volume of
time and space they would occupy (but different locations within that volume). When
mind process stops, a trajectory of that mind stops while trajectory of the brain
might still be continuous for some time while trajectories of individual atoms
might be continuous forever. A total of 3 different trajectories parallel to time
axis.
The end of trajectory of original instance of mind process would not be the start
of a trajectory of future instance of mind process. The line would be not be
continuous along time axis. (Brain trajectory doesn't "connect" two mind
trajectories since the brain trajectory is altogether different one). There would
be 2 unconnected trajectories representing 2 different instances of a mind-type
object.
These 4-D trajectories would be sufficient in making all objects, including
multiple instances of the same type of object, verifiably distinguishable.
S.
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