[extropy-chat] Death is irreversible v.1.0

[Heartland]

Heartland:
>>Mind object (or just "mind") - An object in time and space consisting of all
>>matter, but only that matter which is presently and actively involved in 
>>producing
>>the mind. It is a process consisting of chain of activity of matter and energy in
>>time and space.
>>
>>Brain object (or just "brain") - An object in time and space that consists of all
>>matter that currently does not make up mind object but is necessary to support 
>>its
>>existence.

Eric:
> These are curious definitions.  You've defined mind and brain as
> disjoint physical objects.  I would think that the physical objects
> that are involved in a mind would be a subset of the physical objects
> that we would ordinarily call a brain.

> On the other hand, you can say from these definitions that the entire
> body is part of the mind object, since all of it is in use supporting
> the activity of mind.  Without the heart to pump blood, the brain dies
> and mind ceases, so mind object must include the heart, and by
> extension the rest of the body.  Actually, by extension it includes
> the rest of the universe, so that means it's not a very useful
> definition.

According to the definition, mind consists of *only* that activity of matter which 
directly implements mind. That excludes heart or any other organ. The point of the 
definition is to delineate between relevant activity that creates mind and all 
other activities that indirectly support existence of that mind. There is the mind, 
and everything else that supports it is replaceable, therefore, not relevant to 
this analysis.

Eric:
> So, can we restrict it somewhat and say that the mind object is
> composed of all of the neurons in a single body?

But that wouldn't be correct. To say that mind is composed of neurons would be 
analogous to a claim that flight is composed of plane's engines.

Eric:
> It's still an odd definition, because thinking of the mind as a
> physical object rather than an activity is quite unconventional.  This
> particular point has been hashed about for a while in this thread, and
> I think it's (one of) the fundamental disagreement(s).

It's counterintuitive for anyone to imagine a mind as an "object." This is probably 
the main reason why it's so hard for me to convey these ideas. Maybe this will be 
helpful.

Mind is an activity. Now, any activity necessarily requires four things to exist. 
The first is matter. The second is energy. The third is space. And the fourth is 
time. In other words, any activity isn't something that is abstract and 
dimensionless. It is not just "matter and energy" but "matter and energy in time 
and space." And since activity consists of matter, it must have properties of 
matter, just like any object made of matter. Hence, "mind object" - an "object in 
time and space."


Heartland:
>>1. Instances of the same type are distinguishable.
>>1b. Instances are always isolated from different instances, including instances 
>>of
>>the same type. Two different instances cannot occupy same space and time.

Eric:
> You're not allowing any grey area here, where there really needs to be
> some.  Two minds could be operating with a large portion of their
> constituent objects in common, with a small amount of state that is
> unique to each instance.

If "two minds" operate "with a large portion of their constituent objects in 
common, with a small amount of state that is unique to each instance," then, by 
definition, they have become a single instance of a mind.

It is not possible to merge two different minds into one instance, because the 
merger process would inevitably reach a "critical" point when one mind would be 
forced to "switch off/sacrifice" its own instance of subjective experience for 
another.

Heartland:
>>2. Activity itself cannot be stored in information.

Eric:
> No, but sufficient information about an activity can be stored to
> continue the activity.

True, but that doesn't change the fact that activity *itself* cannot be stored in 
information.

Heartland:
>>Conclusion:
>>A new instance of that subjective experience is verifiably different from the old
>>one (4), so since (5), (1b), (2), the old instance experiences nothingness 
>>instead
>>of whatever the new instance experiences. Death is irreversible despite the
>>existence of any amount of information about the mind.

Eric:
> The old instance does not "experience nothingness".  It does not
> experience.

That's basically the point I'm trying to make. :) Old instance experiences 
nothingness <=> Old instance doesn't exist.

It's what cryonics patients "experience" at this time. According to my argument, 
this state will last forever.

> The new instance continues the subjective experience
> which the old instance started.

Rather, it starts from the last state of the old instance and experiences an 
illusion of continuity.

S.