[extropy-chat] Death is irreversible v.1.0

[Eric Messick]

Eric:
>> So, can we restrict it somewhat and say that the mind object is
>> composed of all of the neurons in a single body?

Heartland:
>But that wouldn't be correct. To say that mind is composed of neurons would be 
>analogous to a claim that flight is composed of plane's engines.

But I didn't say "mind is composed of neurons", I said "mind *object*
is composed of [...] neurons".  I'm trying to use your terminology
here.  You have made a distinction between mind (an activity) and mind
object (the physical stuff involved in that activity).  I'm trying to
figure out which physical stuff is important enough to warrant being
included in the mind object.

So, let's consider the entirety of all of the neurons in a body as a
physical object, and call it the "nervous system".  We're excluding
glial cells here, otherwise we'd have most of the mass of the brain,
and that would keep brain object from being distinct enough from mind
object to be useful.

What relationship does "nervous system" have to "mind object"?

Is it a subset, a superset, do they intersect, or not?

>[...]
>If "two minds" operate "with a large portion of their constituent objects in 
>common, with a small amount of state that is unique to each instance," then, by 
>definition, they have become a single instance of a mind.

What if two mind objects start out as separate, then merge one percent
of their hardware, so 99% of each mind is distinct, and 1% shared?
Then we continue the merging until it is 99% shared and 1% distinct.
This process must involve grey areas where it becomes difficult to
talk about the separate identity of each of the mind objects.

>It is not possible to merge two different minds into one instance, because the 
>merger process would inevitably reach a "critical" point when one mind would be 
>forced to "switch off/sacrifice" its own instance of subjective experience for 
>another.

That depends on how the merger process takes place.  Again, you're
trying to describe a grey area with a binary distinction.  It just
doesn't work.

>> No, but sufficient information about an activity can be stored to
>> continue the activity.
>
>True, but that doesn't change the fact that activity *itself* cannot be stored in 
>information.

Activity is not information, but can be encoded in information.

You're placing activity in the supreme position as the defining
characteristic of mind, but you run headlong into the Planck interval
argument again.  There is no activity between Planck intervals.
Activity is what we label as the change in information content over
time.  Activity can be slowed, stopped, and resumed.  It's only a
question of how long the delay is.

>> The old instance does not "experience nothingness".  It does not
>> experience.
>
>That's basically the point I'm trying to make. :) Old instance experiences 
>nothingness <=> Old instance doesn't exist.
>
>It's what cryonics patients "experience" at this time. According to my argument, 
>this state will last forever.
>
>> The new instance continues the subjective experience
>> which the old instance started.
>
>Rather, it starts from the last state of the old instance and experiences an 
>illusion of continuity.

Ok, the old instance is dead.  The new instance only thinks it's a
continuation of the old one.

If we use the model of cryonics where the actual brain of a suspendee
is revived as a biological entity, then the neurons that are involved
in the new instance are the same as the neurons in the old instance.
All that has happened is that we've slowed the activity of mind to a
stop, then restarted it.

For a while it was stopped.  So what?

Back to Planck:  For a while between Planck intervals it was stopped.
Again, so what?  No one cares at that time scale.  There is no bright
line where this description changes fundamentally.  Why should anyone
care at the new time scale?

We can track in 4 space the trajectories of all of the atoms involved
in the mind object through the suspension period.  They slow down,
they speed up.  Their identity does not change.

The activity of those atoms does not stop, it only slows.

At what point is the atomic activity no longer sufficient to maintain
the continuity of the mind object?

-eric