[extropy-chat] Death is irreversible v.1.0

Heartland velvet977 at hotmail.com
Tue May 9 02:27:41 UTC 2006


>Eric:
>>> So, can we restrict it somewhat and say that the mind object is
>>> composed of all of the neurons in a single body?
>
> Heartland:
>>But that wouldn't be correct. To say that mind is composed of neurons would be
>>analogous to a claim that flight is composed of plane's engines.

Eric:
> But I didn't say "mind is composed of neurons", I said "mind *object*
> is composed of [...] neurons".  I'm trying to use your terminology
> here.  You have made a distinction between mind (an activity) and mind
> object (the physical stuff involved in that activity).  I'm trying to
> figure out which physical stuff is important enough to warrant being
> included in the mind object.

Okay, I see what you were getting at. I think that the stuff that mind is made of 
looks more like electrons than neurons. And if we dig to the bottom of it, it is 
energy. (I refrained from using energy in the argument to avoid any more confusion, 
but, ultimately, a true argument should use energy.)



Eric:
> So, let's consider the entirety of all of the neurons in a body as a
> physical object, and call it the "nervous system".  We're excluding
> glial cells here, otherwise we'd have most of the mass of the brain,
> and that would keep brain object from being distinct enough from mind
> object to be useful.
> What relationship does "nervous system" have to "mind object"?>
> Is it a subset, a superset, do they intersect, or not?

"Nervous system" is a superset of "mind object."



Heartland:
>>If "two minds" operate "with a large portion of their constituent objects in
>>common, with a small amount of state that is unique to each instance," then, by
>>definition, they have become a single instance of a mind.

Eric:
> What if two mind objects start out as separate, then merge one percent
> of their hardware, so 99% of each mind is distinct, and 1% shared?
> Then we continue the merging until it is 99% shared and 1% distinct.
> This process must involve grey areas where it becomes difficult to
> talk about the separate identity of each of the mind objects.

Heartland:
>>It is not possible to merge two different minds into one instance, because the
>>merger process would inevitably reach a "critical" point when one mind would be
>>forced to "switch off/sacrifice" its own instance of subjective experience for
>>another.

Eric:
> That depends on how the merger process takes place.  Again, you're
> trying to describe a grey area with a binary distinction.  It just
> doesn't work.

Why?



Heartland:
>>>>Activity itself cannot be stored by information.

Eric:
>>> No, but sufficient information about an activity can be stored to
>>> continue the activity.

Heartland:
>>True, but that doesn't change the fact that activity *itself* cannot be stored in
>>information.

Eric:
> Activity is not information, but can be encoded in information.

Only *information about an activity* can be encoded in information, not that 
activity *itself.*



Eric:
> You're placing activity in the supreme position as the defining
> characteristic of mind, but you run headlong into the Planck interval
> argument again.  There is no activity between Planck intervals.

But there exists potential energy during PI that causes that activity to continue.


Eric:
> Activity is what we label as the change in information content over
> time.

And that "change" is what mind physically is.



Eric:
>>> The new instance continues the subjective experience
>>> which the old instance started.

Heartland:
>>Rather, it starts from the last state of the old instance and experiences an
>>illusion of continuity.

Eric:
> Ok, the old instance is dead.  The new instance only thinks it's a
> continuation of the old one.
> If we use the model of cryonics where the actual brain of a suspendee
> is revived as a biological entity, then the neurons that are involved
> in the new instance are the same as the neurons in the old instance.
> All that has happened is that we've slowed the activity of mind to a
> stop, then restarted it.

What actually happened was that all the energy that powered that activity has 
dissipated, causing irreversible end of an instance.



Eric:
> For a while it was stopped.  So what?

You will remain dead forever.

Thanks for the feedback, Eric.

S. 



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