[extropy-chat] The Anticipation Dilemma (Personal Identity Paradox)
russell.wallace at gmail.com
Wed Apr 11 16:29:21 UTC 2007
On 4/11/07, Lee Corbin <lcorbin at rawbw.com> wrote:
> What we have reached is the uncomfortable conclusion that
> what happens to you (or happened to you) in the past is
> every bit as worthy of anticipation as events that are
> scheduled to happen in your future. This demolishes any
> rational or consistent use of *anticipation* that I have
> ever been able to formulate.
I don't see the problem. Consider the evolved function of anticipation: it's
to make us pay attention to things that are important _and that we can
influence_. In your scenario it makes sense for myself in October 8 2007 to
anticipate what will happen in October 9 999, because I can causally
influence it. For example, I can make sure my time machine's power supply is
fully charged so that I can get to October 9 999 on schedule. This causal
influence will have its due effect irrespective of the memory tampering, so
it's perfectly logical.
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