[extropy-chat] The Anticipation Dilemma (Personal Identity Paradox)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 4/12/07, Russell Wallace <russell.wallace at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On 4/11/07, Lee Corbin <lcorbin at rawbw.com> wrote:
> >
> > What we have reached is the uncomfortable conclusion that
> > what happens to you (or happened to you) in the past is
> > every bit as worthy of anticipation as events that are
> > scheduled to happen in your future. This demolishes any
> > rational or consistent use of *anticipation* that I have
> > ever been able to formulate.
>
>
> I don't see the problem. Consider the evolved function of anticipation:
> it's to make us pay attention to things that are important _and that we can
> influence_. In your scenario it makes sense for myself in October 8 2007 to
> anticipate what will happen in October 9 999, because I can causally
> influence it. For example, I can make sure my time machine's power supply is
> fully charged so that I can get to October 9 999 on schedule. This causal
> influence will have its due effect irrespective of the memory tampering, so
> it's perfectly logical.
>

You can causally influence events, but they won't appear in your subjective
future. It's like being able to causally influence the feelings of a
stranger.

Stathis Papaioannou

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