[ExI] Bad Epistemology?

Tue Jul 17 02:24:36 UTC 2007

Hi Bryan,

Thanks for forwarding my questions to and discussing them with
your friend. I think his and your points quite telling, and helpful.

I admit to trying to focus as hard as I can on this book to the
exclusion of some other quite relevant material (e.g. scerir's
pointers). So I can't do more right now than carefully read
what you've written. Also, thanks for reading my questions
in the most positive light you could, given their awkward and
apparently self-contradictory claims concerning what an "object" is.

(I'm trying out the idea---while reading the book---that a
"thing" is a Kantian primitive, or a ding-an-sich, or some
damn stuff "out there", while an *object* may be should
be considered some kind of construct.  Just trying these
ideas out.  Trying to make sense of the book.   :-)

Lee

(P.S.  I take the liberty of quoting your entire message
below because I don't have time to edit it right now
and think quite highly of the whole thing.)

P.P.S.  The modesty of your friend 

>> > So... do you think that resolves anything?  Or have I just managed to
>> > restate already known facts while mucking up his original arguments?

is both charming and polite!  Sounds like a great guy.

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Bryan Bishop" <kanzure at gmail.com>
To: "Lee Corbin" <lcorbin at rawbw.com>; "ExI chat list" <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Monday, July 16, 2007 7:40 AM
Subject: Re: [ExI] Bad Epistemology?

> On 7/15/07, Lee Corbin <lcorbin at rawbw.com> wrote:
>> Is my epistemology really screwed up at a fundamental level?
> <tremendously irresponsible snip>
> 
> I sent off your email to a buddy of mine who gets to play with
> particle physicists daily, and so some interesting discussion
> developed. I would welcome anybody's comments, esp. the last part
> concerning quantum amplitudes applied to macroscopic systems.
> 
> Note the messages below are time descending, so starting at the bottom
> may eliminate unnecessary confusion.
> 
> On 7/16/07, Bryan Bishop <kanzure at gmail.com> wrote:
>> > Regarding number 3, I'm not so sure I agree with the statement that an
>> > object is a theoretical construct.  Perhaps this is being nitpicky, or
>> > alternatively it's a mistake in my understanding of an object (I think the
>> > latter is more likely).  But if we're willing to accept that quantum fields
>> > are real in any sense, then I think we are required to also believe in
>> > things like electrons (or whatever other name you might want to call them),
>> > which are the quanta of their respective fields.  A similar, but slightly
>> > weaker case could be made even for conglomerate objects like bayrons and
>> > mesons.
>>
>> When you look at some old stone in the garden, you see that stone, and
>> you have some thoughts and expectations, explanations, or call them
>> theories if you must- the stone will stay roughly the same, maybe some
>> layers of atoms and other particles will be stripped off, the photons
>> of the sun will heat it during the day, etc.
>>
>> However, as particle theorists peer into these structures, they find
>> that they so far have no smallest object to base their observations
>> on. Any object is a theoretical construct- our painted picture of what
>> we expect the complex of spacetime-mass to be doing. Like our stone in
>> the garden outside the house.
>>
>> Shine some photons on an object, and you will know (as your training
>> tells you) that some of the photons are not going back towards your
>> eyes. This effectively means that the mass that you are examining is
>> constantly interacting and changing- if we had very fine resolution of
>> photons we would see in very quick moments that parts of the object
>> are blind to us while others are more visible than ever before.
>>
>> Now ...
>>
>> >> 4. Objects as such---strictly speaking---do not reside in the
>> >>   mind. Nor do they reside in 3-space, any more than the
>> >>   number 6 resides in our minds or in space.
>>
>> You have to agree with that much. Our stone that we perceive when we
>> walk into the garden is mentally represented in our brain with firing
>> neurons that keep some persistent image in the visual cortexes. So,
>> our envisioned stone exists in the mind, but whatever system is
>> causing the interaction with the environment (through photons, the
>> wind, thermal motion- again photons, etc.) that we observe, that too
>> exists- not in our envisioned 3-space, which is our construct to play
>> with the universe, but rather whatever it is that is really "out
>> there".
>>
>> As for theories and ideas platonically existing: if by that he means
>> that two children can imagine some data structure somewhat similar,
>> then I would agree. The possibilities of the brain allow for similar
>> functionality, though we can never know if what I imagine matches
>> exactly what you imagine. Right?
>>
>> Re: objects and properties. Objects/systems have contexts, their
>> influence upon the world etc. You call it spacetime history (maybe
>> spacetimemass history, or add energy in there somehow), and I'd call
>> it the actions they take that modifies the rest of the universe.
>>
>> Quantum amplitudes- can they be applied to macroscopic systems somehow
>> and show that there is a quantum amplitude for my standing up at this
>> moment and running around with my arms in the air making long-tailed
>> macaque calls?
>>
>> - Bryan
>>
>> On 7/16/07, Kurtis Nishimura <kurtisn at gmail.com> wrote:
>> > I suppose I should read this in the mindset of a realist, right?  Okay...
>> > well even in that case, I have a few comments.
>> >
>> > Regarding number 3, I'm not so sure I agree with the statement that an
>> > object is a theoretical construct.  Perhaps this is being nitpicky, or
>> > alternatively it's a mistake in my understanding of an object (I think the
>> > latter is more likely).  But if we're willing to accept that quantum fields
>> > are real in any sense, then I think we are required to also believe in
>> > things like electrons (or whatever other name you might want to call them),
>> > which are the quanta of their respective fields.  A similar, but slightly
>> > weaker case could be made even for conglomerate objects like bayrons and
>> > mesons.
>> >
>> > I find number 4 a little bit baffling.  Again, maybe this is my own
>> > misunderstanding.  But how can you, on the one hand in 1 declare that the
>> > universe is made of real things, in 2 declare that space in the absence of
>> > fields has no meaning, and then on the other hand in 4 declare that objects
>> > do not exist in 3 space?  Is the distinction that when he says objects he
>> > really means "chair" and not "*a* chair," or "*that* chair?"  From reading
>> > 5, I don't think this is the case.
>> >
>> > I actually don't have much to say about number 5...
>> >
>> > But about that last bit.  I think the resolution to his problem of objects
>> > having properties can be resolved by simply looking at the history of an
>> > object.  This history may not be especially meaningful at a field theory
>> > level, as the locations and times of events may not be well defined.  But
>> > certainly on a macroscopic scale, in special relativity the entire
>> > space-time history of an object can be followed by examining its world line.
>> >  For example, while the container "has" a dozen eggs the eggs and the
>> > container will follow the same world line.  The property of being bought at
>> > the store last week indicates that the container's world line is tied to the
>> > purchaser's (and the seller's, and the money's that changed hands, etc...)
>> > in a very distinct way.
>> >
>> > Again, I stress this is part of the structure of macroscopic objects (i.e.,
>> > ones that display particle-like behavior rather than wave behavior).  This
>> > does not bother us in a field theory sense because in field theory the
>> > properties of each object are quite limited: mass, angular momentum, charge,
>> > etc.  Further, if you have two objects with identical properties they are
>> > completely indistiguishable in every sense.  One electron cannot be
>> > distinguished from another electron.  (For example, these two processes
>> > cannot be distinguished from one another:
>> > http://www.nscl.msu.edu/~nunes/ria1_files/slide0175_image330.jpg
>> > )
>> >
>> > The region in between field theory and the macroscopic world is more of a
>> > problem... so I avoid that for now and just admit that I need to learn more
>> > about the decoherence process before making any sort of claim on what
>> > happens in the middle ground.
>> >
>> > So... do you think that resolves anything?  Or have I just managed to
>> > restate already known facts while mucking up his original arguments?
>> >
>> > -Kurtis
> 
> - Bryan
>