[ExI] any exact copy of you is you + universe is infinite = you are guaranteed immortality

Damien Broderick thespike at satx.rr.com
Sun Jun 17 05:31:51 UTC 2007

At 03:07 PM 6/17/2007 +1000, Stathis wrote:

>from the observer's point of view, the particle will decay with 1/2 
>probability, the same probability as if there were only one world 
>with one outcome. I use the term "subjective probability" because it 
>is the probability the observer sees due to the fact that future 
>versions of himself will not be in telepathic communication, even 
>though he is aware that the uncertainty is an illusion and both 
>outcomes will definitely occur.

Presumably you mean "future versions of himself will not be in 
telepathic communication" *with each other*, rather than with him 
here & now prior to the splitting. But suppose he can sometimes (more 
often than chance expectation) achieve precognitive contact with one 
or more of his future states? QT seems to imply that if this is 
feasible--whether by psi or CTC wormhole or Cramer time communicator 
or whatever--there's no way of knowing *which* future outcome he will 
tap into. Yet by hypothesis his advance knowledge is accurate more 
often than it could be purely by chance. If such phenomena were 
observed (as I have reason to think they are--see my new book OUTSIDE 
THE GATES OF SCIENCE), does this undermine the absolute stochasticity 
of QT? Is the measure approach to MWI a way to circumvent such difficulties?

Damien Broderick

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