[ExI] any exact copy of you is you + universe is infinite = you are guaranteed immortality

John K Clark jonkc at att.net
Sun Jun 17 15:38:16 UTC 2007

 "Eliezer S. Yudkowsky" <sentience at pobox.com>

> This, to me, suggests that I am confused, not that

> I have successfully described the way things are; 


I think your confusion comes from 2 areas:


1) The ambiguous nature of probability. Is it an intrinsic part of something or just a measure of our ignorance? If Copenhagen is right then something is frequent because it is probable and probability is a fundamental aspect of the universe. If Many Worlds is right then something is probable because it is frequent and probability is not unique but depends on the amount of ignorance of the observer. If you discount Many Worlds then there is only one chance in 10 million of ever making those trillion copies of you so you should expect not to win the lottery.


2) If I make an exact copy of you and run Eliezer 2 in parallel and in complete synchronization with Eliezer 1  for an hour and then merge them back together again your subjective experience has not doubled, it has not changed a bit. If Eliezer 2 is ALMOST the same as Eliezer 1 then when I merge the two of you your subjective experience will have almost not changed. 


 John K Clark 
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