[ExI] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness
brent.allsop at comcast.net
Sun Nov 16 21:12:38 UTC 2008
We must be failing to communicate, you don't understand the mechanics of
what it is to incorrectly 'seem' within a representational model, or
Within a representational model, to seem is to have 'knowledge' that
doesn't accurately represent it's referent. In other words, if you have
an optical illusion that surrounds two instances of the same color with
two different colors, our brain can, based on the surrounding colors,
change it's representation of the same color light the eye is sensing.
In other words, even though the light coming in to our eye is the same,
because of the different surrounding colors, our eye represents these
same colors with different qualia. So, to say it 'seems' like they are
different colors says our brain is representing the same color with two
When you put a pencil half in a glass of water, and then look at it, it
'seems' to be bent. This means your knowledge of the pencil, in your
head, is bent, even though the real pencil it represents is not.
Even though the brain is using two different elements, with different
phenomenal qualities, to represent the same color light, this does not
mean that the phenomenal nature of these two different elements being
used to incorrectly represent the same light will ever change for anyone
at any time.
Does that make sense?
Damien Broderick wrote:
> At 07:18 PM 11/15/2008 -0700, Brent wrote:
>> First, whatever it is we discover that has this red phenomenal
>> property, the theory predicts, will reliably always produce the same
>> sensation no matter what mind it is in, no matter where in the visual
>> field it is, no matter when...
> If you start with a primitive as demonstrably false as that, your
> whole model collapses without further ado. But maybe you didn't really
> mean what you just claimed. If you did, that a look at some of the
> visual effects where context and perceptual codes create effed image
> constructs that *are perceived* as drastically different even though
> they are identical. For example:
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