[ExI] Problems with Platonia again

Lee Corbin lcorbin at rawbw.com
Fri Sep 26 05:59:10 UTC 2008


Mike writes

> This sounds very similar to what I wrote on Sept 16 in QT & SR thread:
> [...] is there any difference in
> Platonia from our observation of moment t1 to moment t2?  is there a
> way to distinguish the moment t'2 ?  How do we know at t3 that some of
> our peers didn't actually experience t'2?  If that's a perfectly valid
> transition of states, why not observer t1, t'1, t3, t'3 ?  Maybe
> people who observe life this way (upconverted from a lower definition)
> have a difficult time understanding those who perceive t1, t2, t3, t4
> (non-interlaced)  Likewise there may be observers capable of
> comfortable perceiving t1, t2+t'2, t3 (even numbered moments
> simultaneously "in stereo" from two universes)  [...]

Ah. Yes. Now perhaps we supply the same (rather empty)
answer. Platonia may consist of 10^20 identical snapshots
of the apple making contact with Newton's head, and only
two or three of each instant of it circling his head around and
around. In other words, apply the "measure" answer.

> Stathis continued:
>> The upshot of all this is that in a multiverse, your consciousness can
>> flit about passing through all physical copies with the right sort of
>> subjective content. The only thing that stops you experiencing
>> extremely weird shifts from moment to moment must be that such shifts
>> are of very low measure: there just aren't that many versions of you
>> in the multiverse where you observe a fire-breathing dragon where
>> previously your memory tells you there was a keyboard. If this
>> explanation fails, then I would take that as evidence in favour of a
>> single, finite universe.

Oh, Stathis had said what I'm saying already. Somehow it didn't
connect until your post.

> I ask why there need need be any detection of shifts at all.  If the
> state of your memory is included in these discrete moments, then you
> can't rely on your belief in a memory for continuity.

Yes, that's exactly right! Well, maybe the Platonians have
an answer to that too, but it doesn't seem to affect my take
on all this. For with me, physical law comes first, and then
patterns emerge (in constrained ways) so that personal
experience is way down (?) on the conceptual ladder.
I mean, it's a consequence, not a basic tenat.

Lee

>  Suppose each
> frame of your favorite movie were scattered before you as an
> unsequenced collection.  You may be able to recognize a scene
> 'belonging' near the beginning or end of the movie.  There is no
> reason that collection had to be ordered the way you remember it.  I
> may have watched the whole thing in reverse order.  Perhaps it made
> very little sense to me, or perhaps that's how I always watch movies
> and the relationships between characters was refolding rather than
> unfolding.  Perhaps my attention is split with another project 50% of
> the time and that I only care about 15 of 30 frames per second such
> that I don't even notice their reorganization (or complete
> disappearance) within statistically insignificant series.  How much is
> significant?  If exactly every even frame is perfectly ordered, but
> every odd frame has a possibility of being either missing or swapped
> with it's nearest odd neighbor - do I notice?  Maybe not if the shift
> is equally proportioned throughout the film.  Is it the uniquely
> ordered disturbance that catches our attention, or the uniquely
> disordered disturbance that catches our attention?




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