[ExI] The "Unreasonable" Effectiveness of Mathematics in theNatural Sciences

Lee Corbin lcorbin at rawbw.com
Mon Sep 29 03:00:23 UTC 2008

Stefano writes

> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> That's what working scientists do. They don't seek a metaphysical
>> justification for the scientific method; it's simply what works.
> Exactly. But there is also a more "philosophical" view of that:
> admitting postmodernly that there is no Platonic ground on which to
> assert the objective superiority of a worldview on another, what
> remains is a pseudo-Darwinian competition of worldviews, where some
> succeed and other simply get extinct when confronted to the former.
> Accordingly, there is no real need at the end of the day whether
> worldview A or worldview B is right if consistent advocates of
> worldview B are going to become rarer and rarer...

As much as I am appreciating (and learning from) the views that you
and Stathis have enunciated, I might add this one quibble to your
statement above.

The logic above seems to be to be of wide (too wide) applicability.
One might apply it, for example, to baby-eating. Whereas I very
strongly and adamantly disapprove of the murder of innocents,
(to remain in a non-emotive analytical vein), I do see a "real need
at the end of  the day whether worldview A (we can sanction
murder of innocents) or worldview B (we should not sanction it).

The same holds true for whether it is the Earth that goes around
the sun, or vice-versa. To me, it is *not* a matter of whose views
become rarer. If the Church had prevailed in the 1600s and 
successfully suppressed all over the world the view that the
Earth goes around the sun, then the Church would still be 


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