[ExI] What the France!?
hkeithhenson at gmail.com
Tue Apr 7 21:14:02 UTC 2009
On Tue, Apr 7, 2009 at 5:15 AM, painlord2k at libero.it
<painlord2k at libero.it> wrote:
> I expect they will do it again here if they become the majority. Then we
> will not have mass expulsions, only civil wars, mass exodus and mass killing
> (from both sides); I would like to avoid the latter, until we are able to
> avoid them, because I'm sure the ethnic Europeans would win, but I'm totally
> unsure what they would do after they win in Europe.
Mirco is politically incorrect but I suspect mostly correct otherwise.
If you have two identifiable human groups in contact with each other,
especially if they are intermixed, then if one group has a higher
population growth rate than the other, the high growth group will,
over time, replace the slower growing one. This is what happened in
"Traditional analyses of the conflict in Kosovo tend to focus on
nationalistic politics while scarcity issues are given short shrift or
ignored completely. The ethnic divide in Kosovo between Kosovar Serb
and Kosovar Muslim was typically the most prominent feature of media
reports and little if any attention was paid to the underlying causes
of the inter-communal conflict that culminated in the March 1999 US
led NATO air bombardment of Yugoslavia. The argument of this paper is
that in Kosovo, large demographic changes, the degradation of natural
resources, conflict over land-rights and unemployment caused by
industrial decline played significant roles in creating the poverty
and discontent that eventually led to the outbreak of hostilities.
In 1976 the Kosovo province of Yugoslavia had a per capita personal
income of 86 percent of the Yugoslav average and was steadily
increasing. By 1978 electricity and running water had reached all but
the remotest villages. Life expectancy had risen to 68 years and 95
percent of children were receiving elementary schooling. There was 1
doctor per 2009 people compared to 1 per 8527 in 1952. This caused a
rapid increase in the province's population growth rate and combined
with an over-dependence on heavy industry and increasing land
shortage/ degradation, Kosovo's unemployment rate went from 18.6 % in
1971 to 27.5% in 1981, 56% in 1989 and to 70% in 1995.
The Serb/Montenegrin proportion of Kosovo dropped from 50% in 1950, to
27.4 percent in 1961 to 10 percent in 1991. By 1999 there were two
million people living in Kosovo, a doubling since 1960. At an annual
growth rate of 2.1%, population growth exceeded economic growth and
was higher than that of many developing countries. The burden of added
population put a strain on the province's ability to maintain full
employment and to provide sufficient funds for such vital
infrastructure as schools and hospitals, etc.
Political and Social Consequences
>From 1981 onwards, discontent and anger resulting from unemployment
amongst the Kosovar population and perceived or real mistreatment of
increasingly marginalized Serbs led to virulent nationalist forces in
both ethnic groups. Discontent led to a rise in demonstrations and
riots and finally broke out into armed violence in 1995/6 and all-out
war beginning in 1998.
By 1980, at the time of Titos death, the population of Yugoslavia had
grown to 23 million from just over 15 million in 1950 without a
corresponding growth in GDP. It took almost a decade for the
contending forces in the country to find an outlet in violent
Seeing the conflict as purely political or ethnic is to see only the
symptom. There is a reluctance to see such conflicts as a result of
demographic expansion and natural resource limitations and overuse.
One advantage of pointing to the resulting scarcity as the key factor
is that a straightforward remedy is also implied. The simple (yet
practically impossible to achieve) remedy is to find a way to reduce
demands on resources to a sustainable level. Such an approach also
suggests an investigation into how population growth leading to ever
rising consumption seems a permanent feature of our political and
The implications of such an analysis are stark. The Balkans are only
one of many areas where underlying conditions of scarcity make for an
actual or potentially explosive situation. Not only is misery and
political tension increasing in many areas, but in an age of rapidly
expanding weapons of mass destruction, the international ramifications
of local conflicts seem to be spreading wider and wider."
The Kosovo experience may be Europe in miniature. Given that example,
we could probably calculate the number of years before say France has
The gradual population replacement of one group with another could
happen without violence provided the average population growth of an
area is lower than the area's economic growth. The reason is because
perception of a bleak future was (and is) the signal for the evolved
behavioral switch leading to war in the environment of evolutionary
adaptedness (EEA, Google the term). In the stone age "bleak future"
was based on game and berry availability. Now it is based on income
per capita, more particularly on trends in income per capita.
> After a war the fertility usually sky-rocket; if the war is prolonged, the
> fertility will continue to be high for long time. A billion of ethnic
> Europeans would not able to live only in Europe, and a youth bulge push for
> wars abroad.
I kind of doubt it. I think western cultures along with Japan and
China have probably made a transition to low population growth that's
unlikely to be reversed.
> Or, maybe, we will go to the way of the whites in South Africa and Zimbabwe.
> We will give up power and we will become a persecuted minority (and the
> society will collapse without a market oriented dominant minority).
You might be interested in this:
where Dr. Gregory Clark argues that Europeans, particularly the
English, underwent a long period of intense genetic selection for the
traits a "market oriented dominant minority" is noted for. It's not
that other races lack the traits, but that they are much more common
in the Europeans and other peoples who spent tens of generations in
settled stable agricultural societies. Those societies were both
Malthusian and Darwinian with very different selection pressures than
the selection pressures than humans had experienced previously.
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