[ExI] The symbol grounding problem in strong AI

[Damien Broderick]

On 12/18/2009 9:36 AM, Gordon Swobe wrote:

> If programs drive your artificial neurons (and they do) then Searle rightfully challenges you to show how those programs that drive behavior can in some way constitute a mind, i.e., he challenges you to show that you have not merely invented weak AI, which he does not contest.

I see that Gordon ignored my previous post drawing attention to the 
Hopfield/Walter Freeman paradigms. I'll add this comment anyway: it is 
not at all clear to me that neurons and other organs and organelles are 
computational (especially in concert), even if their functions might be 
emulable by algorithms. Does a landslide calculate its path as it falls 
under gravity into a valley? Does the atmosphere perform a calculation 
as it help create the climate of the planet? I feel it's a serious error 
to think so, even though the reigning metaphors among physical 
scientists and programmers make it inevitable that this kind of metaphor 
or simile (it's not really a model) will be mistaken for an homology. I 
suspect that this is the key to whatever it is that puzzles Searle and 
his acolytes, which I agree is a real puzzle. I don't think the Chinese 
Room helps clarify it, however. I haven't read much Humberto Maturana 
and the Santiago theory of cognition but that might be one place to look 
for some handy hints.

Damien Broderick