[ExI] The symbol grounding problem in strong AI

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/12/19 Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com>:
> On 12/18/2009 9:36 AM, Gordon Swobe wrote:
>
>> If programs drive your artificial neurons (and they do) then Searle
>> rightfully challenges you to show how those programs that drive behavior can
>> in some way constitute a mind, i.e., he challenges you to show that you have
>> not merely invented weak AI, which he does not contest.
>
> I see that Gordon ignored my previous post drawing attention to the
> Hopfield/Walter Freeman paradigms. I'll add this comment anyway: it is not
> at all clear to me that neurons and other organs and organelles are
> computational (especially in concert), even if their functions might be
> emulable by algorithms. Does a landslide calculate its path as it falls
> under gravity into a valley? Does the atmosphere perform a calculation as it
> help create the climate of the planet? I feel it's a serious error to think
> so, even though the reigning metaphors among physical scientists and
> programmers make it inevitable that this kind of metaphor or simile (it's
> not really a model) will be mistaken for an homology. I suspect that this is
> the key to whatever it is that puzzles Searle and his acolytes, which I
> agree is a real puzzle. I don't think the Chinese Room helps clarify it,
> however. I haven't read much Humberto Maturana and the Santiago theory of
> cognition but that might be one place to look for some handy hints.

Is a computer any more computational than a landslide? Both involve a
collection of physical parts transitioning from one configuration to
the next according to exactly the same laws of physics. The computer
program is just a mental aid, like a mnemonic or a map, which allows
the programmer to set up his collection of physical parts in such a
way that the series of configuration changes reliably leads to some
desired result. The symbol manipulation has no separate physical
existence but is something that resides in the Platonic realm, like a
mathematical theorem.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou