[ExI] against Many Worlds QT

[Eschatoon Magic]

Interesting. Experiment should decide, as soon we can design
experiments to assess Everett's MWI vs.other interpretations of
quantum physics. In the meantime, all interpretations of quantum
physics consistent with experiment are, indeed, interpretations:
different labels, conceptual models and intuitive visualizations for
the same set of experimental results.

Without having studied this paper in detail I would hazard that the
references to things like "utilitarianism, or any other strategy, is
the unique rational way of optimizing the welfare of one’s own, and
other people’s, many future selves in a multiverse" seem a bit out of
place. The universe does not know, or care, of rationality, morality
and our welfare. It just does its own thing, and it is up to us to
find useful and workable models for its behaviour.

On Sun, May 17, 2009 at 8:51 PM, Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com> wrote:
> http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.0624
>
>
> One world versus many: the inadequacy of Everettian accounts of evolution,
> probability, and scientific confirmation
>
> Authors: <http://arxiv.org/find/quant-ph/1/au:+Kent_A/0/1/0/all/0/1>Adrian
> Kent
> (Submitted on 5 May 2009)
> Abstract: There is a compelling intellectual case for exploring whether
> purely unitary quantum theory defines a sensible and scientifically adequate
> theory, as Everett originally proposed. Many different and incompatible
> attempts to define a coherent Everettian quantum theory have been made over
> the past fifty years. However, no known version of the theory (unadorned by
> extra ad hoc postulates) can account for the appearance of probabilities and
> explain why the theory it was meant to replace, Copenhagen quantum theory,
> appears to be confirmed, or more generally why our evolutionary history
> appears to be Born-rule typical. This article reviews some ingenious and
> interesting recent attempts in this direction by Wallace, Greaves, Myrvold
> and others, and explains why they don't work. An account of one-world
> randomness, which appears scientifically satisfactory, and has no
> many-worlds analogue, is proposed. A fundamental obstacle to confirming
> many-worlds theories is illustrated by considering some toy many-worlds
> models. These models show that branch weights can exist without having any
> role in either rational decision-making or theory confirmation, and also
> that the latter two roles are logically separate. Wallace's proposed
> decision theoretic axioms for rational agents in a multiverse and claimed
> derivation of the Born rule are examined. It is argued that Wallace's
> strategy of axiomatizing a mathematically precise decision theory within a
> fuzzy Everettian quasiclassical ontology is incoherent. Moreover, Wallace's
> axioms are not constitutive of rationality either in Everettian quantum
> theory or in theories in which branchings and branch weights are precisely
> defined. In both cases, there exist coherent rational strategies that
> violate some of the axioms.
>
>
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-- 
Eschatoon Magic
http://cosmeng.org/index.php/Eschatoon
aka Giulio Prisco
http://cosmeng.org/index.php/Giulio_Prisco