[ExI] simulation as an improvement over reality

Eugen Leitl eugen at leitl.org
Fri Dec 31 19:34:18 UTC 2010

On Fri, Dec 31, 2010 at 12:22:18PM -0600, Damien Broderick wrote:

> It's a non-Abelian proposition. It's intransitive. Yes, the copy  
> experiences self and world exactly as you do and is therefore *a*  you.  
> No, *you* here and now have no stake (other than empathy or envious  
> hatred) in that replica consciousness, certainly not to the extent that  
> you'd feel happy to be killed or locked in the cellar in order for that  
> other Ben to remain alive and free.

Two synchronized systems cannot experience a differing thought,
or perceive a different scene. If they are not synchronized, they're
two people. If there's only one copy, and there was no fork, there's
nobody left to complain about the road not taken.

Oh, and you people are way too sober. I'm several drinks ahead of
you. See if you can catch up!

Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
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