[ExI] simulation as an improvement over reality

Damien Broderick thespike at satx.rr.com
Fri Dec 31 18:22:18 UTC 2010

On 12/31/2010 11:21 AM, Ben Zaiboc wrote:

> a copy of you*is a you*, exactly as a copy of Beethoven's 5th is Beethoven's 5th.  The copy will be experiencing being you.  How could it possibly be otherwise?

Dear dog in Himmel! NOBODY HAS EVER DENIED THIS! An exact copy of you 
MUST experience himself as you. That's not the problem. The real issue 
nobody ever seems to answer was posed by Stuart:

"you should be
alright with your long lost twin brother showing up, locking you in the 
and assuming your identity. Or cheating death by brainwashing someone 
else into
honestly believing they are you."

You'd be okay with that, Ben? You'd be mollified by the report that the 
Benified twin or brainwashee was a really, really good copy of you? 
You'd hand over your savings, house, spouse, children to this 
as-perfect-as-possible substitute, and sit quietly in the cellar knowing 
that "you" were having a really great time?

I don't think so.

It's a non-Abelian proposition. It's intransitive. Yes, the copy 
experiences self and world exactly as you do and is therefore *a*  you. 
No, *you* here and now have no stake (other than empathy or envious 
hatred) in that replica consciousness, certainly not to the extent that 
you'd feel happy to be killed or locked in the cellar in order for that 
other Ben to remain alive and free.

Damien Broderick

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