[ExI] Some new angle about AI

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
Fri Jan 8 16:27:56 UTC 2010

2010/1/9 Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com>:
> 2010/1/8 Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>:
>> He explicitly says that a machine could fully reproduce the function
>> of a brain but fail to reproduce the consciousness of the brain.
> I suspect a few list members have stopped by now to follow this
> thread, and I am reading it myself on and off, but I really wonder: am
> I really the only one who thinks this to be a contradiction in terms,
> not allowing any sensible answer? Or that mystical concepts of
> "coscience" do not bear close inspection in the first place, so making
> any debate on the possibility of emulation on systems different from
> organic brains rather moot?

At first glance it looks coherent. I really would like to know before
installing such a machine in my head to replace my failing neurons
whether my consciousness, whatever it is, will remain intact. It can
be demonstrated to my satisfaction that the machine will function
exactly the same as brain tissue, but is that enough? I want a
*guarantee* that I'll feel just the same after the procedure. I think
that guarantee can be provided by considering the absurd consequences
should it actually be the case that brain function and consciousness
are separable.

Stathis Papaioannou

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