[ExI] essentialism and/or continuity

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
Tue May 25 01:25:44 UTC 2010


On 24 May 2010 20:58, Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com> wrote:
> On 24 May 2010 10:01, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>> Your body (including your brain) is made up of different matter
>> compared to a few months ago, but you still feel you are the same
>> person. The soul has magically flitted from one body to another.
>
> To play the devil's advocate, everybody would feel he or she is the
> "same person" absolutely in any circumstance.

Not under any circumstances. I don't feel I am the same person as you,
but I feel that I am the same person as my self of a year ago. I also
would not feel I was the same person as an exact copy in the room with
me, and I would not feel I was the same person as my self of a year
ago if I could go back in time and meet him. It's difficult to come up
with a consistent philosophical account of selves.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



More information about the extropy-chat mailing list