[ExI] Let's play What If.

[John Clark]

On Oct 27, 2010, at 1:38 PM, Dave Sill wrote:
> 
> That assumes a lot of things, primarily that the upload universe is indistinguishable from the real universe.

That seems a reasonable assumption because from your point of view the computer simulating you can be infinitely fast. If there is a data processing crunch then the computer can just stop your simulation for a second or a minute or a millennium while it calculates exactly how that teacup you just dropped should shatter, when it figures it out then then it can start your simulation up again; from your viewpoint the computer was infinitely fast with its calculation it even if objectively it was as slow as an old Radio Shack TRS-80. 

> Another is that no attempt is made, as part of the uploading process, to make the upload aware that it is, in fact, an upload. I consider that immorally deceptive.

What you consider immoral is irrelevant, what Mr. Jupiter Brain considers immoral is not. 

> I'd never agree to allow a non-destructive upload of myself without it being made clear to the upload immediately upon activation that that's what it is.

If you are very very very lucky maybe someday Mr. Jupiter Brain will give you that choice, or at least pretend to give you that choice.
> 
>> 
>> There would be only one conscious experience provided the two were identical.
> 
> 
> How's that? You've got two independent instantiations running on completely different substrates and you don't think there are two different consciousnesses?

No I don't think there are two different consciousnesses. The concept of position is not very meaningful when talking about consciousness, and what particular substrate a consciousness is running on is so unimportant that it often has no idea what it is. For thousands of years many thought the liver was the organ that generated consciousness, others thought the heart, and the ancient Egyptians carefully preserved every part of the body EXCEPT for the brain which they just threw away.    

> Even if there were two uploads running in identical, synchronized virtual realities, there'd still be two different-but-identical  consciousnesses.

Huh? If they are identical then how are they different?

  John K Clark



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