[ExI] Let's play What If.

[Dave Sill]

2010/10/28 John Clark <jonkc at bellsouth.net>

>
> On Oct 27, 2010, at 1:38 PM, Dave Sill wrote:
>
> That assumes a lot of things, primarily that the upload universe is
> indistinguishable from the real universe.
>
> That seems a reasonable assumption because from your point of view the
> computer simulating you can be infinitely fast. If there is a data
> processing crunch then the computer can just stop your simulation for a
> second or a minute or a millennium while it calculates exactly how that
> teacup you just dropped should shatter, when it figures it out then then it
> can start your simulation up again; from your viewpoint the computer was
> infinitely fast with its calculation it even if objectively it was as slow
> as an old Radio Shack TRS-80.
>

That's an argument for the feasibility of implementing a virtual universe
indistinguishable from the real universe--though not a terribly strong one.
Since the thought experiment didn't specify that either way, I won't argue
the point.

> Another is that no attempt is made, as part of the uploading process, to
> make the upload aware that it is, in fact, an upload. I consider
> that immorally deceptive.
>
> What you consider immoral is irrelevant, what Mr. Jupiter Brain considers
> immoral is not.
>

Mr. Jupiter Brain wasn't specified either. We know nothing about the motives
behind the entities doing the upload.

> I'd never agree to allow a non-destructive upload of myself without it
> being made clear to the upload immediately upon activation that that's what
> it is.
>
> If you are very very very lucky maybe someday Mr. Jupiter Brain will give
> you that choice, or at least pretend to give you that choice.
>

I'm assuming that the experiment is being conducted by benevolent,
trustworthy parties. If that's not true, all bets are off.

>  There would be only one conscious experience provided the two were
>> identical.
>>
>> How's that? You've got two independent instantiations running on
> completely different substrates and you don't think there are two different
> consciousnesses?
>
> No I don't think there are two different consciousnesses. The concept of
> position is not very meaningful when talking about consciousness, and what
> particular substrate a consciousness is running on is so unimportant that it
> often has no idea what it is. For thousands of years many thought the liver
> was the organ that generated consciousness, others thought the heart, and
> the ancient Egyptians carefully preserved every part of the body EXCEPT for
> the brain which they just threw away.
>

It's not just a difference of position. As you've pointed out above, the
clocks of the different substrates can run at different rates. And,
obviously, the "universes" available to each can be different--there's
nothing that says they all have to implement the same physics.

> Even if there were two uploads running in identical, synchronized virtual
> realities, there'd still be two different-but-identical  consciousnesses.
>
> Huh? If they are identical then how are they different?
>

If I have two identical apples in my hands, they're still two separate
apples, not one.

-Dave
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