[ExI] Destructive uploading.
kellycoinguy at gmail.com
Mon Sep 26 11:01:10 UTC 2011
On Fri, Sep 9, 2011 at 8:09 AM, Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com> wrote:
> On 7 September 2011 19:28, Kelly Anderson <kellycoinguy at gmail.com> wrote:
>> OK, so here's a scenario... suppose that I have my brain frozen (and
>> that this is not considered murder or suicide) and sliced into thin
>> segments, scanned and uploaded. Suppose further that this takes 6
>> months for whatever reason. I have not then experienced perfect
>> continuity, but rather more something like having been on a 6 month
>> vacation. So what I'm saying is the continuity includes continuous
>> interaction with my friends and relatives, etc.
> One experiences to some extent the passing of time during and after a
> period of sleep, but this is not the case with a deep coma, and would
> not be the case if your brain is restored to a status similar to that
> of, say, March 15, 2011. Such experience is that of somebody who
> simply travels in zero subjective time to a given point in the
>>If we continued conscious awareness when doubled, or tripled
>> if the process is non-destructive, which one are we aware of, or are we
>> aware in multiple places at the same time?
> As long as something is doubled, two entities immediately diverge,
> each perceiving retrospective continuity and individuality. In a
> non-destructive uploading scenario, B would describe it as moving from
> platform A to platform B, and leaving behind a copy, A as the
My point is that they are diverging from a similar base in my scheme.
Having diverged from a temporally proximate identical state, merging
them together again would be easier.
>> I completely disagree here. Merging a thread from an emulant back into
>> a wet ware brain would require that the emulant be based upon that
>> brain. Merging new neuronal connections from my emulant into your
>> brain would be VERY confusing because you store your concepts in a
>> different hologram within your brain than I do.
> Mmhhh. Brains change with time anyway. I assume that the brain of two
> twins at birth is way more similar than that of one of them will be
> after thirty years to its previous stage.
That's why my scheme would probably work best for reintegrating very
short bursts of independent streams of thought. Perhaps even only a
day, at first, could be reintegrated during the sleep states. Then
rediverge in the morning again.
>> So my assertion is that only an emulation of MY brain can be remerged
>> into my brain, at least easily. Do you understand my point? And this
>> may be something that only happens for a brief period of time before
>> we fully understand the brain enough to translate changes in my brain
>> to changes in yours... but that seems many orders of magnitude more
> Possibly. And as a byproduct you might also find a sure recipe to
> create Multiple Personality Disorders at will. :-)
This comment was the main reason to reply to such an old thread (sorry
about that, been real busy) Multiple Personality Disorder is generally
caused not by an excess of experience, but rather by severe abuse that
causes the conscious mind to retreat, allowing a second personality to
develop that faces the abuse in the place of the first personality. It
is a protective mechanism. If that second personality is unable to
sustain the further abuse inflicted, a third personality can develop
and so forth. Torture victims often develop alternative personalities
for just such a purpose.
If two threads of execution of brain emulators were just going through
daily life, MPD is very unlikely to be a side effect.
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