[ExI] Destructive uploading.

[Florent Berthet]

2011/9/3 G. Livick <glivick at sbcglobal.net>

>  which mind contains the individual identity that goes forward, if the
> upload goes onto two computers at the same time?
>

Each time you copy your brain pattern somewhere (on a computer or on any
other substrate) you create a new individual entity, totally independent
from the previous ones. For example if I were to scan you during your sleep
and create a clone of you in an other room, you wouldn't "feel" or "share"
the thoughts of your clone, nor would you even be aware that there is a
clone. And your clone, when he'd wake up, would be all like "hey! what am I
doing here?! I was in my bed and now I'm here?" because he would be exactly
like you, with your memories and your sense of self. In fact, if we were to
move both of you in another room during your sleep, there would be no way
for either of you to know if you were the original or the clone. And if I
pointed a finger at one of you and said "you are the clone, we must destroy
you now", the response would be "hey, wait! I'm not the clone! I know it
because I remember going to bed! don't kill me!". Both of you would have the
same identity, therefore there is not one of you that is "more you" than the
other.


> If we don't survive as ourselves when making the transition from carbon to
> silicon, then there is no point to the exercise at all in terms of the
> dogma.
>

"Surviving as ourselves" is the key notion of the debate and this is the one
that is hard to grasp. What I was saying is that this problem is irrelevant
because there is no "real yourself" that is special and different from your
clones or uploads ; all of them are you. Let me explain this in several
ways:

All of these identities being identical, no identity would be more special
nor more "related to you" than the others. You can't say that one is the
"real you". Each one of you will think he's you, and each one of you will be
right. That's why the notions of "you" and "self" are slippery. If "me"
refers to my mere inner experience, then there can be several "me". But if
"me" refers to "the specific identity that I carried all my life, that is
linked to my body and that I would lose during a destructive uploading",
then, well, in fact there's no such thing.

What you are referring to as "yourself" is just an experience, a physical
phenomenon, it can be replicated anywhere. There is no special thing that
makes this experience the "true" one when it comes to defining if an upload
is still you or not. If, after a mind upload, you feel like you went from
your body to a computer simulation, then it's all that matters, you've
succeeded in transferring your mind, even if your consciousness was shut
down for a few moment, even if your previous shell had to be destroyed in
the process.

The reason why there isn't a specific thing that makes you the "real" you is
precisely because you are *only* defined by your identity, the identity IS
YOU. When you say "I", it is in fact your identity that reflects on itself,
giving you the illusion of self continuity. In fact, there is nothing more
to your sense of self than the pattern made by your brain. This pattern
doesn't belong to you, it can be replicated and modified, and it is actually
constantly modified in the body that you refer to as "my body" but which is
just a place where this pattern occurs. Copy this pattern elsewhere and
there will be another you. Your identity is just the phenomenon that occurs
each time a pattern similar to your brain is electrically active.

So, when you say "I want to survive through uploading", you are really
saying "I want the phenomenon of my consciousness to be able to run again on
another substrate". So it's really an altruistic act: you are not doing this
for you, but for a phenomenon that will feel like you. When you understand
that, your sense of self vanishes, and being egoistic doesn't even makes
sense anymore because you won't even profit from what you do: what you do
will benefit to a future being that will be similar to you but will be a
different physical experience.
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