[ExI] Digital Consciousness .

Eugen Leitl eugen at leitl.org
Wed Apr 24 08:16:17 UTC 2013


On Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 12:07:08AM -0700, Gordon wrote:
> Eugen,
> 
> >Ok, how I measure intentionality? I need to make sure
> >I succeeded, after all.
> >Do animals have intentionality? Primates, rodents, fruit
> >flies, nematodes, bacteria, viruses?
> 
> 
> You certainly know you have intentionality. 

No, as a matter of fact I don't.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/ is useless, it's
not even wrong. About every sentence of it makes my skin crawl.

"Power"? Measured in Watts, or what? "minds", well, how 
perfectly circular. "to be about" is meaningless. "Or to stand for"
that's likely to meant represent. "things, properties"
ok, maybe. "Stands of affairs", is meaningless.
"The word itself, which is of medieval Scholastic origin,"
ah, so they admit it's useless.  "was rehabilitated by the
philosopher" -- no, this it not how it works, sorry.
"‘Intentionality’ is a philosopher's word." -- allright,
so we can stop there. They say it's useless.

> You know it as surely as you can see these words. 

I don't care about me, I care about an objective measurement
process. So that you can know, and not guess.

> You're justified in thinking that other beings like you also have it. 

No, I don't, unless it's an objectively measurable property.
How do I know which beings are "like me"?

> As we go down the food chain, things are not so clear. 

See, something is fishy with your concept of consciosness.

If we look at at as ability to process information, suddenly
we're starting to get somewhere.

> I happen to think that most mammals have it, but probably not some less complex organisms. But that is irrelevant.  

I happen to think that even instantiated viruses can
process information, and certainly single cells and
bacteria can. And that's immensely relevant, because
it's measurable, and we're looking at merely different
scales.
 
> >> If by computational neuroscientists you mean cognitive scientists, I believe they are following a false model. The computational model of mind is, I think, wrong. 
> 
> > No, I definitely do not mind mere cognitive scientists, I mean computational
> > neuroscientists.
> 
> Before I answer your next question below, please explain to me how you differentiate cognitive scientists from computational neuroscientists. As I understand it, cognitive science is based in the computational model of mind. Paul and Patrick Churchland come to mind as adherents, along with Daniel Dennett. Wouldn't it be nice if the brain/mind were like a computer? So they think.

If they don't measure and run code they're not computational
scientists. In fact, they're not scientists at all. They're
probably philosophers, or worse.

> .  
> 
> >Why do you think the model is false? How do you know it's wrong,
> >if the output is behaviour matching control?

See, you're evading simple questions which are designed to show
where you're being inconsistent and instead engage into obfuscation.
This is not the way to generate knowledge. It's a way to self-delusion.

Remeber, you're the easiest person to fool.



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