[ExI] Digital Consciousness .

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 28/04/2013, at 6:03 AM, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at canonizer.com> wrote:

> On 4/27/2013 2:02 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> 
>> On 27/04/2013, at 3:46 AM, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at canonizer.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Hi Stathis,
>>> 
>>> <<<
>>> The argument does not assume any theory of consciousness. Of course,
>>> if the argument is valid and a theory predicts that computers cannot
>>> be conscious then that theory is wrong. What you have to do is show
>>> that either the premises of the argument are wrong or the reasoning is
>>> invalid.
>>> >>>
>>> 
>>> It’s frustrating that you can’t see any more than this from what I’m trying to say.  I have shown exactly how the argument is wrong and how the reasoning is invalid, in that             the argument is completely missing a set of very real theoretical possibilities.
>> 
>> An argument has premises, or assumptions, and a conclusion. If you challenge the argument you can challenge the premises or you can challenge the logical process by which the conclusion is reached. If the conclusion follows logically from the premises then the argument is VALID, whether or not the premises are true. If the argument is valid and the premises are true then the argument is said to be SOUND.
>> 
>> It would help if you could follow this and specify exactly where you see the problem, but it seems that you're not challenging the validity of the argument, but the truth of the premises. And the only premise is that the externally observable behaviour of the brain is computable. So, you must believe that the observable behaviour of the brain is NOT computable. In other words, there is something about the chemistry in the brain that cannot be modelled by a computer, no matter how good the model and no matter how powerful the computer. Is that what you believe?
> 
> I guess I fail to even understand why you think his fading / dancing quale paper is any kind of 'proof' that computers can be conscious.
> 
> Chalmers points out in that paper that there are two predicted possibilities when we do the neuro substitution experiment.  One is that there will be some kind of unavoidable fading quale, as you do the substitution one neuron at a time, and the other is that you will be able to find some way to replace all the neurons with abstracted representations of such, and that during the entire experience, you'll still experience all of the same phenomenal consciousness, no fading quale of any kind.  I guess, if you assume that it will be the latter as one of your premises, as Chalmers argues is only the most likely case, in his mind, then, yes, one might consider the rest to be a proof, and I would agree with that.  But even Chalmers admits there is a 25% chance, in his mind, that there will be some kind of fading quale or that Material Property Dualism (He calls it "type F monism") will be demonstrated to be true by science.  He more or less states this in that paper, and he told me the specific 25% number, personally.
> 
> Obviously, if science proves this fading quale to be the case, as predicted, it will be quite falsifying for anyone that thinks such has been proven not possible?  Do you not agree with this?

As I have explained, it is not fading qualia as such that is the problem. Qualia would fade and disappear with progressive brain damage. The problem is fading qualia that you cannot notice and that bring about no change in behaviour. Chalmers says this is one of the three possibilities, the other two being that the qualia do not fade and that the qualia fade, you notice but are unable to behave differently.

If the qualia fade but you there is no external evidence of this then by definition no scientific experiment will be able to show it. 

The more serious problem, however, is what it would mean if your qualia can fade and disappear without you noticing. Your visual cortex could be replaced with an artificial one you would declare that you could see normally, describe scenes normally, watch films and are laugh at the funny parts and be scared at the scary parts. Essentially, this would mean qualia do not exist, as they make neither a subjective or objective difference. Would you be happy with that conclusion?

Even weirder would be if your behaviour was unchanged but you did notice your qualia had changed. You would desperately be trying to tell everyone you were blind but your vocal cords would not obey you, and you would observe helplessly as they said everything was fine and describe perfectly things you could not see. Would you be happy with that conclusion?
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