[ExI] [Exl] Digital Consciousness

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sat, May 4, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Gordon <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> But this is an unreasonable claim. Even if it turns out to be true it
>> is an unreasonable claim, because you make it with the certainty of an
>> a priori proof.
>
> I don't claim absolute certainty about anything, but I do have an idea what
> consciousness is even if I don't understand the biological mechanisms that
> produce it. I also understand the architecture of digital computers well
> enough to look at them and see that whatever makes this thing I call
> consciousness, it sure does not look like a digital computer can do it.

But this is just an empty claim. I could equally well say that I
understand chemistry well enough to look at it and see that it cannot
possibly produce consciousness - and yet it does.

> (I'm careful to almost always preface "computer" with adjective "digital"
> because I do believe the brain can be understood as a type of computer. Just
> not a digital one.)
>
> More broadly, my arguments should be seen as a refutation of a certain
> theory in the philosophy of mind, namely the computational model. Lots of
> people think the way I do on these subjects. You just won't find many of
> them on ExI.

It's not really an argument though, it's just an expression of hunches
and prejudices. I've presented an argument which shows that
consciousness will be reproduced if brain behaviour is reproduced, but
you have not addressed it.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou