[ExI] putting the qual into qualia

[Michael LaTorra]

Thank you, John Clark, for posting Smullyan's piece "An Epistemological
Nightmare." I've treasured his writings ever since I first encountered his
volume titled "What Is the Name of this Book?"

Smullyan is indeed as mystic, self-described. But there is nothing
woolly-headed about his mysticism. For anyone interested in further
investigating this claim, I refer you to Smullyan's book "The Tao Is
Silent."

Best,
Michael LaTorra


On Tue, May 7, 2013 at 10:59 PM, John Clark <johnkclark at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Tue, May 7, 2013  Gordon <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> >> Gordon, suppose the fMRI said that you were in great pain, absolute
>>> agony, but you felt just fine, very happy and healthy;  who are you going
>>> to believe, the machine or your own direct experience?
>>>
>>
>> > I would believe my direct experience.
>>
>
> Smart move, therefore we can never be as certain of the qualia experienced
> by other people or by other computers as we are of ourselves because we
> only have direct experiance to our own qualia; Raymond Smullyan made that
> clear in his 1982 dialog "An Epistemological Nightmare". By the way,
> Smullyan is something of a mystic and before I started reading his
> wonderful and beautiful books I thought all mystics were fools, but now I
> just think that most mystics are fools:
>
> An Epistemological Nightmare
>
>
> Scene 1
>
> Frank is in the office of an eye doctor. The doctor holds up a book and
> asks "What color is it?" Frank answers, "Red." The doctor says, "Aha, just
> as I thought! Your whole color mechanism has gone out of kilter. But
> fortunately your condition is curable, and I will have you in perfect shape
> in a couple of weeks."
> Scene 2
>
> (A few weeks later.) Frank is in a laboratory in the home of an
> experimental epistemologist. (You will soon find out what that means!) The
> epistemologist holds up a book and also asks, "What color is this book?"
> Now, Frank has been earlier dismissed by the eye doctor as "cured."
> However, he is now of a very analytical and cautious temperament, and will
> not make any statement that can possibly be refuted. So Frank answers, "It
> seems red to me."
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Wrong!
>
> *Frank:*
>     I don't think you heard what I said. I merely said that it seems red
> to me.
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     I heard you, and you were wrong.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Let me get this clear; did you mean that I was wrong that this book is
> red, or that I was wrong that it seems red to me?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     I obviously couldn't have meant that you were wrong in that it is red,
> since you did not say that it is red. All you said was that it seems red to
> you, and it is this statement which is wrong.
>
> *Frank:*
>     But you can't say that the statement "It seems red to me" is wrong.
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     If I can't say it, how come I did?
>
> *Frank:*
>     I mean you can't mean it.
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Why not?
>
> *Frank:*
>     But surely I know what color the book seems to me!
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Again you are wrong.
>
> *Frank:*
>     But nobody knows better than I how things seem to me.
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     I am sorry, but again you are wrong.
>
> *Frank:*
>     But who knows better than I?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     I do.
>
> *Frank:*
>     But how could you have access to my private mental states?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Private mental states! Metaphysical hogwash! Look, I am a practical
> epistemologist. Metaphysical problems about "mind" versus "matter" arise
> only from epistemological confusions. Epistemology is the true foundation
> of philosophy. But the trouble with all past epistemologists is that they
> have been using wholly theoretical methods, and much of their discussion
> degenerates into mere word games. While other epistemologists have been
> solemnly arguing such questions as whether a man can be wrong when he
> asserts that he believes such and such, I have discovered how to settle
> such questions experimentally.
>
> *Frank:*
>     How could you possibly decide such things empirically?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     By reading a person's thoughts directly.
>
> *Frank:*
>     You mean you are telepathic?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Of course not. I simply did the one obvious thing which should be
> done, viz. I have constructed a brain-reading machine--known technically as
> a cerebroscope--that is operative right now in this room and is scanning
> every nerve cell in your brain. I thus can read your every sensation and
> thought, and it is a simple objective truth that this book does not seem
> red to you.
>
> *Frank (thoroughly subdued):*
>     Goodness gracious, I really could have sworn that the book seemed red
> to me; it sure seems that it seems read to me!
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     I'm sorry, but you are wrong again.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Really? It doesn't even seem that it seems red to me? It sure seems
> like it seems like it seems red to me!
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Wrong again! And no matter how many times you reiterate the phrase "it
> seems like" and follow it by "the book is red" you will be wrong.
>
> *Frank:*
>     This is fantastic! Suppose instead of the phrase "it seems like" I
> would say "I believe that." So let us start again at ground level. I
> retract the statement "It seems red to me" and instead I assert "I believe
> that this book is red." Is this statement true or false?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Just a moment while I scan the dials of the brain-reading machine--no,
> the statement is false.
>
> *Frank:*
>     And what about "I believe that I believe that the book is red"?
>
> *Epistemologist (consulting his dials):*
>     Also false. And again, no matter how many times you iterate "I
> believe," all these belief sentences are false.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Well, this has been a most enlightening experience. However, you must
> admit that it is a little hard on me to realize that I am entertaining
> infinitely many erroneous beliefs!
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Why do you say that your beliefs are erroneous?
>
> *Frank:*
>     But you have been telling me this all the while!
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     I most certainly have not!
>
> *Frank:*
>     Good God, I was prepared to admit all my errors, and now you tell me
> that my beliefs are not errors; what are you trying to do, drive me crazy?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Hey, take it easy! Please try to recall: When did I say or imply that
> any of your beliefs are erroneous?
>
> *Frank:*
>     Just simply recall the infinite sequence of sentences: (1) I believe
> this book is red; (2) I believe that I believe this book is red; and so
> forth. You told me that every one of those statements is false.
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     True.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Then how can you consistently maintain that my beliefs in all these
> false statements are not erroneous?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Because, as I told you, you don't believe any of them.
>
> *Frank:*
>     I think I see, yet I am not absolutely sure.
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Look, let me put it another way. Don't you see that the very falsity
> of each of the statements that you assert saves you from an erroneous
> belief in the preceding one? The first statement is, as I told you, false.
> Very well! Now the second statement is simply to the effect that you
> believe the first statement. If the second statement were true, then you
> would believe the first statement, and hence your belief about the first
> statement would indeed be in error. But fortunately the second statement is
> false, hence you don't really believe the first statement, so your belief
> in the first statement is not in error. Thus the falsity of the second
> statement implies you do not have an erroneous belief about the first; the
> falsity of the third likewise saves you from an erroneous belief about the
> second, etc.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Now I see perfectly! So none of my beliefs were erroneous, only the
> statements were erroneous.
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Exactly.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Most remarkable! Incidentally, what color is the book really?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     It is red.
>
> *Frank:*
>     What!
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Exactly! Of course the book is red. What's the matter with you, don't
> you have eyes?
>
> *Frank:*
>     But didn't I in effect keep saying that the book is red all along?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Of course not! You kept saying it seems red to you, it seems like it
> seems red to you, you believe it is red, you believe that you believe it is
> red, and so forth. Not once did you say that it is red. When I originally
> asked you "What color is the book?" if you had simply answered "red," this
> whole painful discussion would have been avoided.
> Scene 3
>
> Frank comes back several months later to the home of the epistemologist.
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     How delightful to see you! Please sit down.
>
> *Frank (seated):*
>     I have been thinking of our last discussion, and there is much I wish
> to clear up. To begin with, I discovered an inconsistency in some of the
> things you said.
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Delightful! I love inconsistencies. Pray tell!
>
> *Frank:*
>     Well, you claimed that although my belief sentences were false, I did
> not have any actual beliefs that are false. If you had not admitted that
> the book actually is red, you would have been consistent. But your very
> admission that the book is red, leads to an inconsistency.
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     How so?
>
> *Frank:*
>     Look, as you correctly pointed out, in each of my belief sentences "I
> believe it is red," "I believe that I believe it is red," the falsity of
> each one other than the first saves me from an erroneous belief in the
> proceeding one. However, you neglected to take into consideration the first
> sentence itself. The falsity of the first sentence "I believe it is red,"
> in conjunction with the fact that it is red, does imply that I do have a
> false belief.
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     I don't see why.
>
> *Frank:*
>     It is obvious! Since the sentence "I believe it is red" is false, then
> I in fact believe it is not red, and since it really is red, then I do have
> a false belief. So there!
>
> *Epistemologist (disappointed):*
>     I am sorry, but your proof obviously fails. Of course the falsity of
> the fact that you believe it is red implies that you don't believe it is
> red. But this does not mean that you believe it is not red!
>
> *Frank:*
>     But obviously I know that it either is red or it isn't, so if I don't
> believe it is, then I must believe that it isn't.
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Not at all. I believe that either Jupiter has life or it doesn't. But
> I neither believe that it does, nor do I believe that it doesn't. I have no
> evidence one way or the other.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Oh well, I guess you are right. But let us come to more important
> matters. I honestly find it impossible that I can be in error concerning my
> own beliefs.
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Must we go through this again? I have already patiently explained to
> you that you (in the sense of your beliefs, not your statements) are not in
> error.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Oh, all right then, I simply do not believe that even the statements
> are in error. Yes, according to the machine they are in error, but why
> should I trust the machine?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Whoever said you should trust the machine?
>
> *Frank:*
>     Well, should I trust the machine?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     That question involving the word "should" is out of my domain.
> However, if you like, I can refer you to a colleague who is an excellent
> moralist--he may be able to answer this for you.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Oh come on now, I obviously didn't mean "should" in a moralistic
> sense. I simply meant "Do I have any evidence that this machine is
> reliable?"
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Well, do you?
>
> *Frank:*
>     Don't ask me! What I mean is should you trust the machine?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Should I trust it? I have no idea, and I couldn't care less what I
> should do.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Oh, your moralistic hangup again. I mean, do you have evidence that
> the machine is reliable?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Well of course!
>
> *Frank:*
>     Then let's get down to brass tacks. What is your evidence?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     You hardly can expect that I can answer this for you in an hour, a
> day, or a week. If you wish to study this machine with me, we can do so,
> but I assure you this is a matter of several years. At the end of that
> time, however, you would certainly not have the slightest doubts about the
> reliability of the machine.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Well, possibly I could believe that it is reliable in the sense that
> its measurements are accurate, but then I would doubt that what it actually
> measures is very significant. It seems that all it measures is one's
> physiological states and activities.
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     But of course, what else would you expect it to measure?
>
> *Frank:*
>     I doubt that it measures my psychological states, my actual beliefs.
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Are we back to that again? The machine does measure those
> physiological states and processes that you call psychological states,
> beliefs, sensations, and so forth.
>
> *Frank:*
>     At this point I am becoming convinced that our entire difference is
> purely semantical. All right, I will grant that your machine does correctly
> measure beliefs in your sense of the word "belief," but I don't believe
> that it has any possibility of measuring beliefs in my sense of the word
> "believe." In other words I claim that our entire deadlock is simply due to
> the fact that you and I mean different things by the word "belief."
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Fortunately, the correctness of your claim can be decided
> experimentally. It so happens that I now have two brain-reading machines in
> my office, so I now direct one to your brain to find out what you mean by
> "believe" and now I direct the other to my own brain to find out what I
> mean by "believe," and now I shall compare the two readings. Nope, I'm
> sorry, but it turns out that we mean exactly the same thing by the word
> "believe."
>
> *Frank:*
>     Oh, hang your machine! Do you believe we mean the same thing by the
> word "believe"?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Do I believe it? Just a moment while I check with the machine. Yes, it
> turns out I do believe it.
>
> *Frank:*
>     My goodness, do you mean to say that you can't even tell me what you
> believe without consulting the machine?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Of course not.
>
> *Frank:*
>     But most people when asked what they believe simply tell you. Why do
> you, in order to find out your beliefs, go through the fantastically
> roundabout process of directing a thought-reading machine to your own brain
> and then finding out what you believe on the basis of the machine readings?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     What other scientific, objective way is there of finding out what I
> believe?
>
> *Frank:*
>     Oh, come now, why don't you just ask yourself?
>
> *Epistemologist (sadly):*
>     It doesn't work. Whenever I ask myself what I believe, I never get any
> answer!
>
> *Frank:*
>     Well, why don't you just state what you believe?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     How can I state what I believe before I know what I believe?
>
> *Frank:*
>     Oh, to hell with your knowledge of what you believe; surely you have
> some idea or belief as to what you believe, don't you?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Of course I have such a belief. But how do I find out what this belief
> is?
>
> *Frank:*
>     I am afraid we are getting into another infinite regress. Look, at
> this point I am honestly beginning to wonder whether you may be going
> crazy.
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Let me consult the machine. Yes, it turns out that I may be going
> crazy.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Good God, man, doesn't this frighten you?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Let me check! Yes, it turns out that it does frighten me.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Oh please, can't you forget this damned machine and just tell me
> whether you are frightened or not?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     I just told you that I am. However, I only learned of this from the
> machine.
>
> *Frank:*
>     I can see that it is utterly hopeless to wean you away from the
> machine. Very well, then, let us play along with the machine some more. Why
> don't you ask the machine whether your sanity can be saved?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Good idea! Yes, it turns out that it can be saved.
>
> *Frank:*
>     And how can it be saved?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     I don't know, I haven't asked the machine.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Well, for God's sake, ask it!
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Good idea. It turns out that...
>
> *Frank:*
>     It turns out what?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     It turns out that...
>
> *Frank:*
>     Come on now, it turns out what?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     This is the most fantastic thing I have ever come across! According to
> the machine the best thing I can do is to cease to trust the machine!
>
> *Frank:*
>     Good! What will you do about it?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     How do I know what I will do about it, I can't read the future?
>
> *Frank:*
>     I mean, what do you presently intend to do about it?
>
> *Epistemologist:*
>     Good question, let me consult the machine. According to the machine,
> my current intentions are in complete conflict. And I can see why! I am
> caught in a terrible paradox! If the machine is trustworthy, then I had
> better accept its suggestion to distrust it. But if I distrust it, then I
> also distrust its suggestion to distrust it, so I am really in a total
> quandary.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Look, I know of someone who I think might be really of help in this
> problem. I'll leave you for a while to consult him. Au revoir!
> Scene 4.
>
> (Later in the day at a psychiatrist's office.)
>
> *Frank:*
>     Doctor, I am terribly worried about a friend of mine. He calls himself
> an "experimental epistemologist."
>
> *Doctor:*
>     Oh, the experimental epistemologist. There is only one in the world. I
> know him well!
>
> *Frank:*
>     That is a relief. But do you realize that he has constructed a
> mind-reading device that he now directs to his own brain, and whenever one
> asks him what he thinks, believes, feels, is afraid of, and so on, he has
> to consult the machine first before answering? Don't you think this is
> pretty serious?
>
> *Doctor:*
>     Not as serious as it might seem. My prognosis for him is actually
> quite good.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Well, if you are a friend of his, couldn't you sort of keep an eye on
> him?
>
> *Doctor:*
>     I do see him quite frequently, and I do observe him much. However, I
> don't think he can be helped by so-called "psychiatric treatment." His
> problem is an unusual one, the sort that has to work itself out. And I
> believe it will.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Well, I hope your optimism is justified. At any rate I sure think I
> need some help at this point!
>
> *Doctor:*
>     How so?
>
> *Frank:*
>     My experiences with the epistemologist have been thoroughly unnerving!
> At this point I wonder if I may be going crazy; I can't even have
> confidence in how things appear to me. I think maybe you could be helpful
> here.
>
> *Doctor:*
>     I would be happy to but cannot for a while. For the next three months
> I am unbelievably overloaded with work. After that, unfortunately, I must
> go on a three-month vacation. So in six months come back and we can talk
> this over.
> Scene 5.
>
> (Same office, six months later.)
>
> *Doctor:*
>     Before we go into your problems, you will be happy to hear that your
> friend the epistemologist is now completely recovered.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Marvelous, how did it happen?
>
> *Doctor:*
>     Almost, as it were, by a stroke of fate--and yet his very mental
> activities were, so to speak, part of the "fate." What happened was this:
> For months after you last saw him, he went around worrying "should I trust
> the machine, shouldn't I trust the machine, should I, shouldn't I, should
> I, shouldn't I." (He decided to use the word "should" in your empirical
> sense.) He got nowhere! So he then decided to "formalize" the whole
> argument. He reviewed his study of symbolic logic, took the axioms of
> first-order logic, and added as nonlogical axioms certain relevant facts
> about the machine. Of course the resulting system was inconsistent--he
> formally proved that he should trust the machine if and only if he
> shouldn't, and hence that he both should and should not trust the machine.
> Now, as you may know, in a system based on classical logic (which is the
> logic he used), if one can prove so much as a single contradictory
> proposition, then one can prove any proposition, hence the whole system
> breaks down. So he decided to use a logic weaker than classical logic--a
> logic close to what is known as "minimal logic"--in which the proof of one
> contradiction does not necessarily entail the proof of every proposition.
> However, this system turned out too weak to decide the question of whether
> or not he should trust the machine. Then he had the following bright idea.
> Why not use classical logic in his system even though the resulting system
> is inconsistent? Is an inconsistent system necessarily useless? Not at all!
> Even though given any proposition, there exists a proof that it is true and
> another proof that it is false, it may be the case that for any such pair
> of proofs, one of them is simply more psychologically convincing than the
> other, so simply pick the proof you actually believe! Theoretically the
> idea turned out very well--the actual system he obtained really did have
> the property that given any such pair of proofs, one of them was always
> psychologically far more convincing than the other. Better yet, given any
> pair of contradictory propositions, all proofs of one were more convincing
> than any proof of the other. Indeed, anyone except the epistemologist could
> have used the system to decide whether the machine could be trusted. But
> with the epistemologist, what happened was this: He obtained one proof that
> he should trust the machine and another proof that he should not. Which
> proof was more convincing to him, which proof did he really "believe"? The
> only way he could find out was to consult the machine! But he realized that
> this would be begging the question, since his consulting the machine would
> be a tacit admission that he did in fact trust the machine. So he still
> remained in a quandary.
>
> *Frank:*
>     So how did he get out of it?
>
> *Doctor:*
>     Well, here is where fate kindly interceded. Due to his absolute
> absorption in the theory of this problem, which consumed about his every
> waking hour, he became for the first time in his life experimentally
> negligent. As a result, quite unknown to him, a few minor units of his
> machine blew out! Then, for the first time, the machine started giving
> contradictory information--not merely subtle paradoxes, but blatant
> contradictions. In particular, the machine one day claimed that the
> epistemologist believed a certain proposition and a few days later claimed
> he did not believe that proposition. And to add insult to injury, the
> machine claimed that he had not changed his belief in the last few days.
> This was enough to simply make him totally distrust the machine. Now he is
> fit as a fiddle.
>
> *Frank:*
>     This is certainly the most amazing thing I have ever heard! I guess
> the machine was really dangerous and unreliable all along.
>
> *Doctor:*
>     Oh, not at all; the machine used to be excellent before the
> epistemologist's experimental carelessness put it out of whack.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Well, surely when I knew it, it couldn't have been very reliable.
>
> *Doctor:*
>     Not so, Frank, and this brings us to your problem. I know about your
> entire conversation with the epistemologist--it was all tape-recorded.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Then surely you realize the machine could not have been right when it
> denied that I believed the book was red.
>
> *Doctor:*
>     Why not?
>
> *Frank:*
>     Good God, do I have to go through all this nightmare again? I can
> understand that a person can be wrong if he claims that a certain physical
> object has a certain property, but have you ever known a single case when a
> person can be mistaken when he claims to have or not have a certain
> sensation?
>
> *Doctor:*
>     Why, certainly! I once knew a Christian Scientist who had a raging
> toothache; he was frantically groaning and moaning all over the place. When
> asked whether a dentist might not cure him, he replied that there was
> nothing to be cured. Then he was asked, "But do you not feel pain?" He
> replied, "No, I do not feel pain; nobody feels pain, there is no such thing
> as pain, pain is only an illusion." So here is a case of a man who claimed
> not to feel pain, yet everyone present knew perfectly well that he did feel
> pain. I certainly don't believe he was lying, he was just simply mistaken.
>
> *Frank:*
>     Well, all right, in a case like that. But how can one be mistaken if
> one asserts his belief about the color of a book?
>
> *Doctor:*
>     I can assure you that without access to any machine, if I asked
> someone what color is this book, and he answered, "I believe it is red," I
> would be very doubtful that he really believed it. It seems to me that if
> he really believed it, he would answer, "It is red" and not "I believe it
> is red" or "It seems red to me." The very timidity of his response would be
> indicative of his doubts.
>
> *Frank:*
>     But why on earth should I have doubted that it was red?
>
> *Doctor:*
>     You should know that better than I. Let us see now, have you ever in
> the past had reason to doubt the accuracy of your sense perception?
>
> *Frank:*
>     Why, yes. A few weeks before visiting the epistemologist, I suffered
> from an eye disease, which did make me see colors falsely. But I was cured
> before my visit.
>
> *Doctor:*
>     Oh, so no wonder you doubted it was red! True enough, your eyes
> perceived the correct color of the book, but your earlier experience
> lingered in your mind and made it impossible for you to really believe it
> was red. So the machine was right!
>
> *Frank:*
>     Well, all right, but then why did I doubt that I believed it was true?
>
> *Doctor:*
>     Because you didn't believe it was true, and unconsciously you were
> smart enough to realize the fact. Besides, when one starts doubting one's
> own sense perceptions, the doubt spreads like an infection to higher and
> higher levels of abstraction until finally the whole belief system becomes
> one doubting mass of insecurity. I bet that if you went to the
> epistemologist's office now, and if the machine were repaired, and you now
> claimed that you believe the book is red, the machine would concur.
>
> No, Frank, the machine is--or, rather, was--a good one. The epistemologist
> learned much from it, but misused it when he applied it to his own brain.
> He really should have known better than to create such an unstable
> situation. The combination of his brain and the machine each scrutinizing
> and influencing the behavior of the other led to serious problems in
> feedback. Finally the whole system went into a cybernetic wobble. Something
> was bound to give sooner or later. Fortunately, it was the machine.
>
> *Frank:*
>     I see. One last question, though. How could the machine be trustworthy
> when it claimed to be untrustworthy?
>
> *Doctor:*
>     The machine never claimed to be untrustworthy, it only claimed that
> the epistemologist would be better off not trusting it. And the machine was
> right.
>
>
>   John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
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>
>
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