[ExI] Zombie glutamate

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sunday, February 15, 2015, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at canonizer.com>
wrote:

>  On 2/14/2015 6:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, February 15, 2015, John Clark <johnkclark at gmail.com
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','johnkclark at gmail.com');>> wrote:
>
>>  On Sat, Feb 14, 2015  Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>    > What you can prove is that IF a being is conscious THEN its
>>> functional equivalent would also be conscious.
>>>
>>
>>  But the only being I can prove to be conscious is myself, and
>> unfortunately that proof is available to nobody but me.
>>
>
>  Indeed, but the statement Imade is still valid. It means you can open
> a brain prosthesis business with the guarantee that if you look after the
> technical aspects, any consciousness that was there will be preserved. Of
> course, if there wasn't any consciousness there to start with there won't
> be any afterwards either, but that is consistent with the guarantee.
>
>
> Anyone want to bet that you guys forgot the YET, and that it will be
> "proven" in less than 10 years and that there will be a near 99% of all
> expert consensus that it has been "proven" as powerfully as evolution, or
> any other such now agree on scientific "fact", as predicted science will
> verify in the paper?
>

Yes, I'd be happy to bet. How much?


> Stathis, would you not agree that the word red, has nothing to do with a
> redness quality, other than it has interpretation hardware somewhere
> interpereting it as if it was redness, or back to the real "functional
> isomorph" or whatever?  In other words, certainly you agree that zombie
> informaiton is a real thing.  So why could you not completely reproduce a
> system that can beahve in any way you desire, yet still, by definition,
> since it is operating on zombie information (does not have the same salty
> or red quale) yet as long as it has the correct interpretation hardware, it
> can still map or model, anything you want.
>

Yes, in theory there could be a system that interprets redness but does not
experience redness. But if the system did experience redness and a part of
it was changed for a functional isomorph then it would still claim to
experience redness and actually experience redness. The example I gave
before was a physically different but chemically identical form of
glutamate. It's an experiment that we could actually do today. What do you
expect would happen? How would you interpret the results?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou
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