[ExI] Zombie glutamate

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
Sun Feb 15 05:42:00 UTC 2015

On Sunday, February 15, 2015, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at canonizer.com>

>  On 2/14/2015 6:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Sunday, February 15, 2015, John Clark <johnkclark at gmail.com
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','johnkclark at gmail.com');>> wrote:
>>  On Sat, Feb 14, 2015  Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>>    > What you can prove is that IF a being is conscious THEN its
>>> functional equivalent would also be conscious.
>>  But the only being I can prove to be conscious is myself, and
>> unfortunately that proof is available to nobody but me.
>  Indeed, but the statement Imade is still valid. It means you can open
> a brain prosthesis business with the guarantee that if you look after the
> technical aspects, any consciousness that was there will be preserved. Of
> course, if there wasn't any consciousness there to start with there won't
> be any afterwards either, but that is consistent with the guarantee.
> Anyone want to bet that you guys forgot the YET, and that it will be
> "proven" in less than 10 years and that there will be a near 99% of all
> expert consensus that it has been "proven" as powerfully as evolution, or
> any other such now agree on scientific "fact", as predicted science will
> verify in the paper?

Yes, I'd be happy to bet. How much?

> Stathis, would you not agree that the word red, has nothing to do with a
> redness quality, other than it has interpretation hardware somewhere
> interpereting it as if it was redness, or back to the real "functional
> isomorph" or whatever?  In other words, certainly you agree that zombie
> informaiton is a real thing.  So why could you not completely reproduce a
> system that can beahve in any way you desire, yet still, by definition,
> since it is operating on zombie information (does not have the same salty
> or red quale) yet as long as it has the correct interpretation hardware, it
> can still map or model, anything you want.

Yes, in theory there could be a system that interprets redness but does not
experience redness. But if the system did experience redness and a part of
it was changed for a functional isomorph then it would still claim to
experience redness and actually experience redness. The example I gave
before was a physically different but chemically identical form of
glutamate. It's an experiment that we could actually do today. What do you
expect would happen? How would you interpret the results?

Stathis Papaioannou
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