[ExI] Zombie glutamate

Brent Allsop brent.allsop at canonizer.com
Sun Feb 22 18:40:29 UTC 2015

On 2/22/2015 11:06 AM, John Clark wrote:
> On Sun, Feb 22, 2015  Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at canonizer.com 
> <mailto:brent.allsop at canonizer.com>> wrote:
>     > There is something that is responsible for a redness quality.
>     And there is something detectably different, responsible for
>     greenness.
> I've already suggested what that difference might be, redness is 
> associated with one group of crosslinked memories (strawberries, 
> blood, sunsets, communists, conservative states) while greenness is 
> associated with a different group of crosslinked memories (leaves, 
> emeralds, seasickness, environmentalists).

To me there is LOTS of evidence that falsifies this view, so it in no 
way works in my model because it is so inconsistent with so much of what 
we know.  You can find examples (brain malfunctions, drug induced...) 
where all colors become completely disassociated with all the stuff you 
talk about, and exist completely independent of all of them.  Steven 
Lehar is an experienced psychonaught, and I bet he could take you 
through a drug trip that would prove to you what a greenness quality 
(and other qualities you've never experienced before), can exist not 
bound to any other information but the quality, itself.  You are 
thinking about compost qualia, and surely you must agree that all of 
this kind of bound together stuff can be isolated, separated, and fail, 
independently of the other, and reduced to an elemental level.  What you 
are doing is almost exactly what I point out, in the paper, when I say:  
" *some tend to think of the actual redness quality as being part of the 
strawberry being perceived, or worse, they think it is nothing real at 
all.  When they think of the term qualia, they think of everything bound 
to it, but the ***redness* quality.*"**

Also, you definition of qualia is so vague, it is of absolutely no use 
to a theoretician or scientist, because there is no way to prove if 
you're ill defined, whatever it is, could be, in physical terms. How, 
exactly, would you reproduce whatever you think redness is, artificially?

And just the fact that you think so much of what is obviously easy, you 
think is so impossible, and not approachable via science, is completely 
off putting.

Brent Allsop

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