[ExI] Bell's Inequality

[Stuart LaForge]

I previously wrote:
> I think I have been able to glean that you are taking
> the superdeterminism loop-hole and thus preserving local-determinism and
> perhaps realism. And you furthermore hope that, despite superdeterminism,
> your free will is somehow preserved by the entanglement process itself
> perhaps by entangling you with the particles. Am I reading you correctly
> here?

Adrian wrote:
<Pretty much.  It all depends on what the "you" that has free will is:
it would be in agreement with observations to assume some unobservable
spirit/soul/whatever that has free will and is determining the quantum
outcomes.  Free will is not itself observable, so using it to
constrain scientific theories doesn't work.>

But free will is clearly observable to someone exercising it or
deliberately not exercising it. You clearly know when you are watching a
particular television show because you want to as opposed because someone
else has the remote. Likewise an experimenter knows that she chose a
particular polarizer angle because she wanted to as opposed to flipping a
coin or being told to by someone else.

So whatever free will is, it has to somehow interact with the wave
equation, even in your scenario. So it would seem to reason that free will
is made of the same "substance" as the wave equation itself so math,
information, waves of probability amplitude, what have you. Plus I observe
that it can constrain experimental outcomes and thus think that it can
legitmately constrain scientific theories.

Adrian wrote:
<Specifically, I am proposing superdeterminism from the moment a
quantum transaction has finished, regardless of when the results are
observed (though it is certainly possible to talk about the collapse
of the information space of the results), but random chance is what
causes the transaction to take a particular outcome (out of the ones
it could have taken).>

So you are saying that the universe is superdeterministic at all times
except during those brief moments when quantum mechanical experiments are
being conducted by intelligent observers. And during those intervals alone
the universe, including the observers, suddenly becomes random but with
correlated outcomes? Hmmm. Aren't the laws of physics supposed to to be
the same for everybody no matter where or when?

Don't you believe in MWI? Don't you believe that all the outcomes happen
in their own Everett branches? At first blush, it seems that MWI fits
better with superdeterminism than Copehagen does. But then since that
subsumes the oberver's free will into the Universal Wave Function, it begs
the question of what the wave function and free will are made of.

Stuart LaForge