[ExI] Quantum consciousness, quantum mysticism, and transhumanist engineering

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
Wed Apr 5 05:24:20 UTC 2017


On Wed, 5 Apr 2017 at 7:47 am, Colin Hales <col.hales at gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, Apr 3, 2017 at 3:46 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> On Apr 2, 2017 22:46, "Stathis Papaioannou" <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
> It is not obvious that a computation about nature can be conscious, but
> neither is it obvious that it cannot.
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
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>
> On 3 April 2017 at 14:17, Will Steinberg <steinberg.will at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Apr 2, 2017 22:46, "Stathis Papaioannou" <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
> It is not obvious that a computation about nature can be conscious, but
> neither is it obvious that it cannot.
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
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>
> All the 'computations about nature' that have ever been and will ever be
> discussed in this list were *designed by conscious beings*, also known as
> consciousness.
>
> You're making the same mistake as the Chinese Room, which is neglecting
> the fact that someone had to build the room itself.
>
>
>
> Are you implying that it would make a difference how the entity whose
> consciousness was in question was made? For example, consider three
> identical robots, one made by humans, the second by weird aliens, the third
> thrown together from spare parts by a tornado: would you expect that they
> would have different consciousnesses?
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
>
> No. Of course, in identically constructed robots, each consciousness would
> have different contents and individuate each robot. But the robots would
> have their consciousness originate in the same kind of physics (the same
> kind of matter arranged and behaving in the  same kinds of ways). It's the
> essential kind of physics of it that matters. In 'being' that, and only
> that kind, arranged in the same way, that makes it 'like something' to be
> that matter. In my case, as you probably know, that physics is the EM field
> system. Dorian Aur would have it originate only from ions in a cellular
> context. I would have it originate using electrons in an inorganic context.
> ... And the quantum mechanics comes along for the ride. An EM field account
> of consciousness is also a quantum mechanical account of consciousness. But
> ... I digress.
>

I see the way you think, but if consciousness is dependent on a particular
substrate or process, it would lead to the problems pointed out in
Chalmers' "Fading Qualia" argument: decoupling of consciousness from brain
activity and behaviour.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou
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