[ExI] Theoretical Breakthrough? Was Re: Do digital computers feel?

William Flynn Wallace foozler83 at gmail.com
Wed Feb 22 14:55:33 UTC 2017


"if internal changes to a part produce no changes in the way that part
interacts with other parts then those internal changes make no change to
the overall behavior of the system."

 John K Clark

Part of anything, I assume.  For this to be true, I'd say that the
change(s) were made in some nonworking section of the thing (computer,
brain, AC), and I would then question why the change was made in the first
place.

bill w


On Tue, Feb 21, 2017 at 10:26 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
> On Wed., 22 Feb. 2017 at 2:45 pm, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Hi Stathis,
>>
>>
>> Dang, I really thought this iteration of the argument, if you fully
>> understood it, would at least have some effect on your insistence that the
>> neuro substitution argument is not completely flawed.
>>
>>
>> These statements of yours seem obviously completely wrong and indicate
>> you still don't fully understand what I'm trying to say about qualitative
>> discern-ability and how the binding neuron can't work the way you say
>> describe, and how it must behave in the way I say it needs to - to achieve
>> the necessary subjective or objective qualitative discern-ability
>> functionality:
>>
>> *"the hypothesis is self-contradictory, since if it were true it would
>> lead to a subject whose qualia could change in a gross way, but who would
>> never be able to notice the change." *
>>
>> and
>>
>> *"if you are right and qualia are due to a certain brain structure, then
>> qualia do not exist"*
>>
>>
>> Could you describe why you think these are in a little more detail, or
>> provide an example, as I don't see how anyone could think either of these
>> could be true?
>>
>>
>> And could you tell me if the most recent description of my qualitative
>> discern-ability theory had any effect, whatsoever, on the way you think
>> about the neuro substitution and the qualitative nature of consciousness?
>> Do you understand what I mean by objective and subjective qualitative
>> discern-ability are necessary given what we (I, sorry John) subjectively
>> experience of qualitative knowledge?  If you don't understand it, probably
>> nobody else will be able to understand it. :(  I guess we're not done,
>> after all.  Oh well, thanks for still not giving up on trying to understand
>> what I'm trying to say, and or helping me to better understand the way you
>> think.  I sure don't want to have to resort to just waiting for the
>> experimental neuroscientists to prove to us which of us closer to the true
>> theory of the qualitative nature of consciousness.
>>
>
> But there is NO experimental result that would make any difference to the
> argument. To give some emotional distance I have tried non-biological
> examples. If the power supply of your computer is replaced with a different
> power supply that produces exactly the same voltage and current, is it
> possible that your programs will run differently? If the cylinders in your
> car engine are replaced with cylinders of a different material with the
> same dimensions, density, melting point, and every other relevant physical
> parameter is it possible that your car will run differently?
>
> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2/21/2017 4:03 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 22 February 2017 at 08:56, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Hi all you thankfully very persistent, and patiently helpful people,
>>
>>
>> James is probably going to hate me for this, but I've again CCed him in
>> this conversation, as I again think that after dozens of more iterations
>> here since he was last CCed, we might have achieved a breakthrough (and
>> this time I'm more sure than the last 100 or so times I thought this! ;)
>> and I couldn't have done it without all your help.  If you guys think
>> you've told me your ever improving arguments too many times, James has
>> given me Stathis' nero substitution argument what seems to be hundreds of
>> times in ever improving ways over the span of many years.  Via James
>> continued prodding he helped me realize that from the subjective side, you
>> need to do something like distinguish redness from greenness, and on the
>> objective side, the same thing will appear to be something like
>> distinguishing between the qualitative nature of something physical like
>> (not, see below) glutamate and (not, see below) glycene neuro
>> transmitters.  On the subjective side, all we know of not glutamate, is
>> it's redness quality.  So thanks, everyone, for all your patient help over
>> so many years with all this.
>>
>> Perhaps there is a problem here with the way you are arguing. I think you
>> are proposing that glutamate has a redness quality (or if not glutamate,
>> some other structure in the brain). It is OK to propose this as a
>> hypothesis, but then in scientific discourse the hypothesis is challenged.
>> My challenge is that the hypothesis is self-contradictory, since if it were
>> true it would lead to a subject whose qualia could change in a gross way,
>> but who would never be able to notice the change. This is
>> self-contradictory because, whatever else we might say about qualia, being
>> able to notice our own qualia and notice when they change is a necessary
>> part of the qualia deal; if you get rid of this aspect of qualia then you
>> may as well say that qualia do not exist. In other words, if you are right
>> and qualia are due to a certain brain structure, then qualia do not exist.
>> You say below that functionalism leads to the "hard problem" of
>> consciousness, which you don't like. I don't see how it leads to the "hard
>> problem" any more than structure-specific qualia, but even if it does,
>> that's just too bad - because structure-specific qualia leads to the
>> elimination of the qualia that you and I know we have. This argument is
>> independent of any particular details of brain function; it could have
>> validly been made in a bygone era before the existence of neurons was even
>> suspected.
>>
>>
>> Oh, and I've CCed the brilliant Steven Lehar, as I think he'll get a kick
>> out of this.  He was the first person that helped me understand how all
>> this knowledge in the brain stuff could work back in the 80s.  He may have
>> some better proposed theories about what qualitative not glutamate and not
>> glycene may be, including what the binding neuron could be.  Steve, for
>> more context, you may want to watch this 15 minute video to know what I
>> mean by the simplified theoretical world that only has 3 colors:
>> redness(glutamate) grenness(glycene) and whitness(aspartate):
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4 where I describe how to eff
>> the ineffable in the simplest (as far as I know) possible theoretical way.
>>
>>
>> "*The most certain way to succeed is always to try just one more time.*"
>> Thomas A. Edison
>>
>>
>> Ben is definitely getting close with this realization he described below,
>> but he doesn't quite have it all.  The external behavior, that is the
>> ability to verbally report (as in outside the black box behavior)
>> qualitative differences inside the black box is possible and important too.
>>
>> So, let me more rigorously define what I mean by qualitative
>> discern-ability function (which includes something that could lead to
>> verbal report ability).  To reproduce qualitative discern-ability in any
>> theoretical testable way, there needs to be at least 2 qualitative
>> representation of knowledge or knowing.  When you talk to me, you should
>> use simple words like glutamate(redness) and glycene(greenness) to
>> represent this objective and subjective qualitative functionality
>> representing knowledge (because I'm not too smart, and need a simplified
>> (though evidently this particular example theory is already falsified in
>> some people's minds) way to comprehend this kind of qualitative theory).
>> But when you talk to Ben and John, Ben describes it this way:
>>
>> *<<<<*
>> *Not some/thing/. *
>>
>> *I don't think knowledge is a 'thing', it's a process. As John K Clark
>> would put it, knowledge isn't a noun, it's more like a verb or an
>> adjective. This means that there is no such thing as 'a knowledge', but
>> there is such a thing as 'knowing'. *
>>
>> *More conventionally put, knowledge (and experience) is an
>> information-process. *
>>
>> *So your statement above could be reworded: "If you know something, there
>> must be an information process that is that knowing". *
>> *>>>>*
>>
>> So, for others I'll call it "not glutamate".  Ben should take "not
>> glutamate" to be a process of knowing redness, at least until the neuro
>> scientists falsify his particular theory.  And "Not glycene" is the process
>> of knowing greenness.  It must be possible to know what qualitative
>> distinguishable functionality is with this, on the detectable objective
>> side, and it is important to have the ability to tell the qualitative
>> difference between redness and greenness on the subjective side.  This
>> qualitative discern-ability of the knowledge process is what gives the
>> system the ability to objectively distinguish between knowledge of
>> strawberries and knowledge of leaves (and to verbally report qualitative
>> difference).  For Ben, the redness functionality is the process of knowing
>> redness which is objectively detect-ably different than the process of
>> knowing greenness.  This can be true, even if it isn't possible to truly
>> eff the difference -  John would probably say you must change from Ben or
>> John to know all the subtle differences between redness and greenness, and
>> you must become Brent, to fully detect Brent's redness and greenness.
>> While this particular theory is harder, it's not objectively detect-ably
>> impossible.
>>
>> And finally, you need a third function which can be testibly proposed to
>> be some kind of binding system or maybe a binding neuron.   Or maybe, if
>> you must maybe call it a binding - not a neuron.  Whatever it is test-ably
>> theoretically proposed to be, it is the ability for the system to be aware
>> of and report, or fire, only when at least 2 different objective and
>> subjective things are qualitatively different.  It has the ability to
>> combine simple or elemental qualia to produce the diversely complex
>> composite qualia or conscious knowledge required for powerful natural
>> intelligence.
>>
>> I'm not quite sure what Stathis and James, or anyone that champions
>> "functionality" based qualia because of the neuro substitutuion argument,
>> should think of "not glutamate" as.  They will always assert that it will
>> "arise" some place at some "functional" level, outside of wherever you
>> propose to do the physical substitution test.  They have a little trick
>> that will always enable them to neuro substitute out any proposed physical
>> theoretical claim of qualitative and physical discern-ability, no matter
>> where you propose to test for it in the system.  As far as I can see, the
>> only possibility they have is that it "arises" in some impossible to
>> objectively detect (else they will swap it out using this little trick)
>> "magic" or inconceivably "hard" way.
>>
>> Stathis gave me the idea of how to describe and point out this little
>> trick, when he used a glutamate receptor, combined with glutamate, to keep
>> the "binding neuron from functioning the same" before and after
>> substituting glutamate (and it's glutamate receptor) with glycene (and it's
>> glycene receptor).
>>
>> So, you can start with a system that is detecting the qualitative
>> difference between not glutamate and not glycene and the binding neuron is
>> firing, indicating they are different.  When Stathis does the neural
>> substitutuion of not glutamate (and a not glutamate receptor) with not
>> glycene (and a not glycene receptor), even though you now have not glycene
>> chemically reacting in both of the input synapses of the binding neuron, it
>> is incorrectly doing the "same observable behavior" and reporting that they
>> are different, even though they are both the same not glycene (and not
>> glycene receptor).  The problem is, if this is true, you have removed the
>> necessary functional ability of the system to fire correctly and report
>> qualitative discernment of not glutamate and not glycene.  If you preserve
>> the necessary qualitative discernible functionality (and the ability to
>> verbally report such) with your theory, the system must report the
>> qualitative difference between not glutamate and not glycene.  Hence this
>> little "trick" is a functional fallacy since it is removing the very
>> qualitative discern-ability you need from the system, no matter where you
>> propose it might testably physically resides.  No matter what you theorize
>> that not glutamate and not glycene may be, and how it might be physically
>> distinguished, Stathis and James will attempt to use some physical trick
>> like not glutamate receptors and not glycene receptors to remove the
>> necessary objective qualitative discern-ability of the system - resulting
>> in all the "hard" problems and the removal of any objective ability to
>> detect or discern it.
>>
>> Now, if you can preserve the correct qualitative discern-ability
>> function, theoretically possibly by physically or chemically coupling the
>> two synapses in some way giving the binding neuron's ability to be aware of
>> when one synapse has the reference quality key like not glycene
>> functionality and the lock like not glycene receptor functionality and the
>> other synapse has either the same or the not glutamate and a not glutamate
>> receptor, so the system can be aware of, and correctly report whether they
>> lock and key like functionality are qualitatively different, then notice
>> that by preserving the qualitative discern-ability  function and firing
>> correctly when they are different, and not firing when they are the same
>> the "hard" problems go away - and you can now objectively detect not
>> glutamate, and distinguish this from not glycene and there by objectively
>> eff the ineffable - if science is able to prove your proposed not glutamate
>> and not glycene, to be the real reliable for everyone and every subjective
>> computer thing.  Proving which theory is THE ONE, will be left to the
>> experimental neuroscientists, who will be able to finally know how to
>> effingly test for this stuff, once they understand this qualitative theory,
>> how to properly qualitatively interpret what they are observing, to know
>> how to not be qualia blind as most of them now do simply because they are
>> miss interpreting the abstracted information about what they are observing,
>> and be able to eff the ineffable.  I bet this will happen relatively
>> rapidly, once experimentalists understand this kind of qualitative discern
>> ability theory, and how to properly qualitatively interpret what they are
>> observing.
>>
>>
>> So, does this help?  Any questions? Do we need to keep going?  Is there
>> any simpler way to describe any of this kind of qualitative discern-ability
>> theory so that more neuro scientists can more easily relate to it?
>>
>>
>> Brent Allsop
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2/20/2017 1:59 PM, Ben wrote:
>>
>> John K Clark wrote:
>>
>> "if internal changes to a part produce no changes in the way that part
>> interacts with other parts then they make no change to the overall
>> behaviour of the system"
>>
>> Aha, I think I see now where the difference of opinion lies.
>>
>> He can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think Brent is of the opinion that
>> it /does/ matter what goes on inside the black boxes of interacting parts,
>> whereas the rest of us don't, as long as the interactions remain the same.
>>
>> I hope I'm right, because this suddenly makes sense of what Brent has
>> been saying.
>>
>> Not that it's correct, I think it's profoundly incorrect, and I think
>> there are very good logical and empirical reasons for thinking this, but at
>> least it's understandable now.
>>
>> Thanks, John.
>>
>>
>> Ben Zaiboc
>> _______________________________________________
>> extropy-chat mailing list
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>
>>
>>
>> On 17 February 2017 at 16:04, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Hi Stathis,
>>
>> You obviously know more than I know about how neuro transmitters work.
>> Thanks for helping me to better understand this type of stuff.
>>
>>
>> As I said, if what you say is true, then it merely falsifies the
>> prediction that glutamate is what performs the redness quality we
>> experience.
>>
>> It falsifies the theory that *any* particular substrate or physics is
>> necessary for the redness quality, or any other quale. The general argument
>> is this:
>>
>> A. The brain is a system made of parts.
>> B. Each part interacts with neighbouring parts.
>> C. If you replace one part with a different part that interacts with its
>> neighbours in the same way, then the system as a whole will behave in the
>> same way.
>> D. If the part you replaced were essential for qualia, then the qualia
>> would change but the behaviour would not.
>> E. Think about what it would mean if (D) were true.
>>
>> Note that this does not say anything about whether qualia can be detected
>> - only that qualia cannot be due to a particular substrate or physics.
>>
>> That is why I always resort to talking about the "simplified theoretical
>> world".  In the simplified world, there are only 3 colors: red, green and
>> white.  And in that simplified world, glutamate has the redness quality,
>> glycene has the greenness quality, aspartate that has the whiteness
>> quality, and it is one neuron that binds them all together, so you can be
>> aware of them all at once.  And for Ben's sake: in this simplified world
>> there are "red and green signals in the optic nerve" that can be easily
>> inverted.
>>
>>
>> The goal is to make a very hard topic a little more simple.  If one can
>> understand the qualitative theory I'm trying to describe, and how neuro
>> substitutuion works with no "hard" problems, and how people in such a
>> simplified world can "eff the ineffable" by properly qualitatively
>> interpreting abstracted observation knowledge - then they should be able to
>> apply the same qualitative theory in the more complex real world.  All that
>> is required is to test for, and find, experimentally, in the real world,
>> what it is that takes the place of glutamate, glycene, aspartate, and the
>> single neuron binding system.  That job is for the experimentalists to do,
>> once they understand how to test for it by no longer being qualia blind (by
>> miss interpreting abstracted observation information as they all do now)
>> and effing the ineffable by interpreting what they are observing,
>> qualitatively correctly.
>>
>>
>> Ben, I don't know if it will help, but I describe the "simplified
>> theoretical world" in more detail, in this talk:
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4 .  But it may not help if
>> you believe there are not elemental qualities out of which our brain builds
>> or paints composite qualitative experiences with.  It sounds like you and
>> John Clark agree on this?  Do you also, like John, believe that effing the
>> ineffable is impossible, and thereby, qualia will forever not be
>> approachable via objective or sharable science?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2/15/2017 8:23 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Wed., 15 Feb. 2017 at 4:48 pm, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Hi Stathis,
>>
>>
>> Thanks for expressing all this so concisely. I hope I can be as concise
>> so we can make progress with this.  I think the key point in our
>> misunderstanding is captured by you with this:
>>
>> On 2/14/2017 5:02 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> You're missing the point when you talk about "qualitative
>> representation". *Observable behaviour* is the only thing necessary to
>> consider in order to replicate *observable behaviour*. The argument is that
>> if you ignore qualia and just replicate *observable behaviour* then the
>> qualia will also necessarily be replicated. I gave an example of this which
>> I believe is clear (tell me if not) with the glutamate/glycine swap.
>>
>>
>> Yes, your answer was very clear.  I agree with most of what you are
>> saying, but we both believe that the other is missing the point.  You first
>> want to focus on: "If you ignore qualia and just replicate *observable
>> behavior* then the qualia will also necessarily be replicated."  But even
>> if I do agree with this, from how I see things, it is still missing or
>> removing some important functionality.  In the past you never want to move
>> beyond this, because or until this has been settled.  The problem is, I
>> can't point out the required functionality being removed, until you first
>> understand and agree with some other things in the qualitative theory.  So,
>> this time, could you move beyond that, at least for a bit and digest this
>> initial description, then given that understanding (if you agree), I'll be
>> able to point out the reasons I can't yet accept this functionalist way of
>> doing neuro substitution.
>>
>> Let's start on the subjective side of things, again, with our simple 3
>> element system.  The system is experiencing both redness and greenness as a
>> unified composite qualitative experience.  So, there are two qualitative
>> representations of knowledge and there is a 3rd part of the system that is
>> binding the two different representations into one composite experience.
>> The fact that the system is aware of both of these qualitative
>> representations at the same time, is the critical base functionality on
>> which the comparison system is derived - outputting an indicator that could
>> lead to one saying they are consciously aware that they are qualitatively
>> the same or not.
>>
>> So, given that we subjectively know that, would you agree with the
>> following?  There must be something that is performing the functionality of
>> the redness experience, and there is something that is performing the
>> functionality of the greenness, and there is a 3rd element that is
>> performing the function of binding these two representations of information
>> together to make a composite experience - enabling the 3rd
>> awareness/comparison neuron to indicate whether they are the same or not.
>>
>> You seem loath to want to go there, instead, first, wanting to first
>> focus on: "If you ignore qualia and just replicate *observable behavior*
>> then the qualia will also necessarily be replicated."  But this ignoring of
>> qualia is the problem, and you end up removing the most important parts of
>> the functionality we want to observe as we neuro substitute.
>>
>> Let's compare this subjective way of observing things to the objective
>> way of observing things, and for the time being assume it is glutamate that
>> has or performs the redness experience functionality, and it is glycene
>> that performs the greenness experience functionality.  Given that, with
>> subjective observation, we would experience a redness detector and with
>> objective observation we would see a glutamate detector.  So, what the 3rd
>> part of the system (we are assuming it is a single neuron for simplicity's
>> sake) is basically an objective and subjective comparison system -
>> outputting an indicator as to whether the two representations of knowledge
>> are functioning the same or not.  This functionality derived from the way
>> it binds together awareness of the two representations of knowledge to make
>> one composite qualitative experience.
>>
>> Now, when you say you replace glutamate with glycene, and you replace the
>> glutamate receptor with a glycene receptor, then assert that the comparison
>> neuron will behave the same, you are removing the important comparison
>> functionality, or simply falsifying the theory that it is only glutamate
>> that reliably performs the redness function (if so, necessitating that it
>> be something else, yet to be discovered, that is reliably performing the
>> redness functionality we know so well).  Both representations of knowledge
>> are now the same qualitative glycene (or the greenness functionality), yet
>> you are asserting that the output is still indicating that the two are
>> different.  This removal of the correct functionality as you do the neuro
>> substitution, is why I can't accept your line of reasoning, along with it
>> being the source of all the "hard" problems.
>>
>>
>> I started answering point by point but I think it is best to just respond
>> to this point, because it seems that you are ignoring what
>> neurotransmitters actually do. Neurotransmitters are small molecules that
>> are released from the presynaptic neuron and bind to the appropriate
>> receptor on the postsynaptic neuron. Receptors are proteins in the cell
>> membrane which have special sites to which neurotransmitters attach
>> non-covalently (without forming a permanent chemical bond), sometimes
>> described as being analogous to a lock and key mechanism. As a result of
>> this interaction the receptor protein is pulled into a different shape,
>> leading to a cascade of events in the neuron. With so-called ionotropic
>> receptors the binding of the neurotransmitter opens up channels in the
>> receptor allowing ions to move into and out of the neuron: sodium,
>> potassium or calcium ions. Since ions are charged entities, this changes
>> the voltage across the cell membrane, which can then change the shape of
>> transmembrane proteins called voltage-gated ion channels, which can then
>> cause a spike in voltage to propagates down the axon of the neuron, and
>> ultimately to cause neurotransmitter release at the end of the axon,
>> triggering the next neuron in the chain.
>>
>> Now, if we swap glutamate for glycine in this setup it won't work -
>> glycine will not bind to the glutamate receptors. If we swap the glutamate
>> receptors for glycine receptors it won't work - glutamate will not bind to
>> glycine receptors. But if we swap glutamate for glycine and glutamate
>> receptors for glycine receptors, and the glycine receptors otherwise have
>> similar properties to the glutamate receptors (open similar ion channels
>> when glycine binds), then the neuron will behave in the same way in regard
>> to when it will fire, and hence all the downstream neurons and the muscles
>> will behave in the same way, and the subject will behave in the same way.
>> "The subject will behave in the same way" means, among other things, that
>> the subject will say in a before/after comparison that the strawberries
>> look red to him in exactly the same way as they did before. If you don't
>> agree with this, then please point out where in the detailed chain of
>> events I have described I have missed something and explain how the
>> glutamate/glycine swap (leaving everything else in the brain the same) can
>> possibly lead to the subject saying that his qualia have changed.
>>
>> If you assume the qualia experience functionality will arise or emerge in
>> some other way or some other abstracted level, then it is this other
>> abstracted location of qualia that can't be ignored, and must be able to be
>> reliably compared via composite awareness.  I am talking about doing a
>> neuro substitution at this level, with the required qualia comparison
>> functionality, not the level you are talking about, where the qualia being
>> compared is being removed.  If you are going to claim that a comparison
>> functionality can be constructed out of this simplistic lower level (I
>> don't see how this could be done), then provide at least one theoretically
>> possible description of such (as I have done with glutamate, glycene, and a
>> binder neuron to make a composite experience), and with that, whatever it
>> is, it will be obvious what happens, and why, as the neural substitution
>> occurs.
>>
>> If you do the neural substitutuion on a system that, instead of ignoring
>> and removing qualia comparison, you provide any testable theoretical method
>> of really doing the function of qualitative comparison, it can be obvious
>> what is going on during the neural substitution.  Let's do this by having
>> two sets of such identical 3 element qualitative comparison systems, one
>> that doesn't change and is for constant reference comparison purposes, and
>> the other one is the one we will perform the neuro substitution on.  We
>> will bind these two systems with the same provided binding system in a meta
>> comparison functioning system which will monitor and compare all the
>> qualities, as the neural substitution takes place on one of the systems, so
>> you can prove to everyone, both objectively and subjectively, exactly what
>> it is going on, and why both of the 3 element systems are always
>> indicating: "It is red" even though one is the qualia invert of the other
>> after one of the neuro substitution steps.  If you duplicate all this
>> *observable behavior*, including the meta awareness of what is going on
>> with both systems, there will be no hard problems when it is neuro
>> substituted since you are not removing the most important *observable
>> behavior*.
>>
>> Does that help?
>>
>>
>> Brent Allsop
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
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>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
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