[ExI] Zombie Detector (was Re:Do digital computers feel?)
Brent Allsop
brent.allsop at gmail.com
Sun Jan 1 16:49:24 UTC 2017
Hi Jason,
Good question. Let me first ask you a question, then based on your
answer, I will be able to better answer your questions.
Let's say you duplicate a person, possibly with a Star Trek like
transporter. Except you make one minor change. You completely swap the
new persons redness knowledge with their greenness knowledge. I would
say you have still successfully transported them, that you have achieved
multiple-realizability and functionally they will be identical. But,
the new person represents knowledge of strawberries with a greenness
quality. Do these before and after people have "identical mental states"?
Brent
On 12/31/2016 4:44 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> Brent,
>
> Thank you, the video cleared it up for me then. So do you have no
> objection to multiple-realizability (the idea that different physical
> materials could in theory be used to construct minds that have
> identical mental states)?
>
> Jason
>
> On Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com
> <mailto:brent.allsop at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>
> Hi Jason,
>
> I'm just talking in simplified qualitative terms to make
> communication easier to model what is and isn't important. that
> is the only reason I used the term grue to represent all the 99
> million or whatever new colors that any particular tetrachromat
> can experience (surely they are not all the same).
>
> Also, when i say that glutamate has the redness quality and
> glycene has the grenness quality, this too, is just simplified. I
> am describing what it would be like in a hypothetical world that
> only has 3 colors - red (glutamate), green(glycene), and
> white(aspartate). (see:
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4&t=30s
> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4&t=30s>) I simply
> describe in that video that if there was such a world, how could
> the people in that world correctly see that in their simplified
> world that glutamate was the neural correlate of red (and not
> think it was white since glutamate reflects white light).
>
> Then once a person can understand how this general correct
> qualitative interpretation theory works in the simplified world,
> they can use the same proper qualitative interpretation of
> abstracted data, in the real world - to finally not be qualia
> blind and finally discover what really has all the redness
> qualities any one of us can experience.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Jason Resch <jasonresch at gmail.com
> <mailto:jasonresch at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at 4:15 PM, Brent Allsop
> <brent.allsop at gmail.com <mailto:brent.allsop at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> I, like most people, am a mere tetra chromate – I
> experience the world with 3 primary colors.But some people
> are tetrachromats, and do it with 4 primary colors.Let’s
> call this 4^th color “grue”.Obviously, all us tri chromats
> can hear the person say things like: “No that is Grue, not
> one of the primary colors, as you claim” and we can
> observe what is causing the 4^th primary color, including
> it’s neural correlate in their brains.In other words, like
> Frank Jackson’s brilliant color scientist raised in a
> black and what room, us trichromats can learn everything
> about grue, and see that it is not in our heads, but we
> can see when the neurarl correlate of grue is in the head
> of a tetrachromat.
>
> In other words, all of us normal trichromatic people are
> grue zombies.We can know and communicate everything about
> them.In fact, we might even be able to be trained to call
> the right things grue, just like the tetrachromat does,
> and lie about it, and convince everyone else that we might
> be a tetrachromat.(until you observe my brain)So, until we
> enhance our primary visual cortext and give it what has
> the grue color, we will never know how the tetrachromat
> qualitatively interprets the word “grue”.
>
> Now, some people think of a “p-zombie” as something that
> is atomically identical to us, but just doesn’t have the
> qualitative experience of consciousness – which of course
> is very absurd, and very different than the grue type of
> zombie, I am, who simply isn’t yet capable of producing
> the grue neural correlate in my brain.But I can represent
> grue with anything else that is in my brain, and talk
> about it as if it was grue, in a grue zombie way.
>
>
> But no new neurotransmitters are required to experience grue.
>
> Moreover, tretrachromats don't just see 1 new type of color,
> they can see 99 million new colors that us trichromats cannot
> see. This is because we can sense about 100 independent
> relative brightnesses for red green and blue colors, which
> allows 100x100x100 possible resulting colors (1 million
> colors). Tetrachromats get to see 100x100x100x100 or 100
> million colors.
>
> How can so many new colors come about if the neurocorolates
> are somehow dependent on specific chemicals in the brain?
> Tetrachromats don't have 100 times as many chemicals in their
> brain as trichromats have, yet they get to perceive 100 times
> as many qualia.
>
> Jason
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at 12:30 PM, Jason Resch
> <jasonresch at gmail.com <mailto:jasonresch at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> Reminds me a bit of "An Unfortunate Dualist":
>
> http://themindi.blogspot.com/2007/02/chapter-23-unfortunate-dualist.html
> <http://themindi.blogspot.com/2007/02/chapter-23-unfortunate-dualist.html>
>
> As to your puzzle, if Fred is unable to detect any
> effects from conscious people (including their
> reflections), then he should not be able to see his
> own reflection, but then he also shouldn't be able to
> hear his own thoughts either. Which might be your
> definition of a zombie, making him visible, etc.
> "Russell's reflection". However, Fred's own voice
> might still be heard if Fred's consciousness is an
> epiphenomenon, but I think practically speaking I
> think epiphenomenalism can be ruled out, together with
> the notion of p-zombies.
>
> See Daniel Dennett's "The Unimagined Preposterousness
> of Zombies":
> https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/unzombie.htm
> <https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/unzombie.htm>
>
> Dennett argues that "when philosophers claim that
> zombies are conceivable, they invariably
> underestimate the task of conception (or
> imagination), and end up imagining something that
> violates their own definition".^[3]
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-Dennett1991-3>
> ^[4]
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-Dennett1995-4>
> He coined the term "zimboes" – p-zombies that
> have second-order beliefs
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_logic> –
> to argue that the idea of a p-zombie is
> incoherent;^[12]
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-12>
> "Zimboes think^Z they are conscious, think^Z
> they have qualia, think^Z they suffer pains –
> they are just 'wrong' (according to this
> lamentable tradition), in ways that neither they
> nor we could ever discover!".^[4]
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-Dennett1995-4>
>
>
>
> I'm not sure, however, whether your thought experiment
> sheds any new light on the concepts of consciousness
> or zombies. It seems like it may be only a
> reformulation of the "Barber Paradox", where the self
> reflexivity is a "power to detect only
> non-consciousness things", aimed at one's own
> consciousness.
>
> Jason
>
> On Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at 11:13 AM, Stuart LaForge
> <avant at sollegro.com <mailto:avant at sollegro.com>> wrote:
>
> Jason Resch wrote:
> <Therefore, if the brain is a machine, and is
> finite, then an
> appropriately programmed computer can perfectly
> emulate any of its
> behaviors. Philosophers generally fall into one os
> three camps, on the
> question of consciousness and the computational
> theory of mind:
> Non-computable physicists [. . .]Weak AI
> proponents [. . .]
> Computationalists.
>
> Which camp do you consider yourself in?>
> -------------------------------------------
>
> As a general rule, I prefer not to go camping with
> philosophers as I
> prefer the rigor of science and mathematics. But
> if I must camp in that
> neck of the woods, I would set up my own camp. I
> would call it the
> Godelian camp after Kurt Godel. Since I am a
> scientist and not a
> philosopher, I will explain my views with a
> thought experiment instead of
> an argument.
>
> Imagine if you will a solipsist. Let's call him
> Fred. Fred is solopsist
> because he has every reason to believe he lives
> alone in a world of
> P-zombies.
>
> For the uninitiated, P-zombies are philosophical
> zombies. Horrid beings
> that talk, move, and act like normal folks but
> lack any real consciousness
> or self-awareness. They just go through the
> motions of being conscious but
> are not really so.
>
> So ever since Fred could remember, wherever he
> looked, all he could see
> were those pesky P-zombies. They were everywhere.
> He could talk to them,
> he could interact with them, and he even married
> one. And because they all
> act perfectly conscious, they would fool most
> anyone but certainly not
> Fred.
>
> This was because Fred had, whether you would
> regard it as a gift or curse,
> an unusual ability. He could always see and
> otherwise sense P-zombies but
> never normal folk. Normal folk were always
> invisible to him and he never
> could sense a single one. So he, being a perfect
> P-zombie detector, came
> to believe that he was the only normal person on a
> planet populated by
> P-zombies.
>
> Then one day by chance he happened to glance in a
> mirror . . .
>
> Does he see himself?
>
> I want to hear what the list has to say about this
> before I give my answer
> and my interpretation of what this means for
> strong AI and the
> computational theory of mind.
>
> Stuart LaForge
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> <mailto:extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
> <http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> <mailto:extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
> <http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> <mailto:extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
> <http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> <mailto:extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
> <http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org <mailto:extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
> <http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.extropy.org/pipermail/extropy-chat/attachments/20170101/ed04869d/attachment.html>
More information about the extropy-chat
mailing list