[ExI] Zombie Detector (was Re:Do digital computers feel?)
Brent Allsop
brent.allsop at gmail.com
Sun Jan 1 20:41:29 UTC 2017
Hi William,
Yay, I must be at least a little better at communicating, after so long,
as you guys (and more of you) are starting to ask great questions.
But, again, I must first ask you a question about what you mean by "the
perception part". As there are still multiple competing theories out
about what all perception includes, for which there hasn't yet been
sufficient evidence to falsify those theories for their supporters.
I'll give you an answer using my favorite "materialist" theory (happens
to be the simplest one that I know of), and how it will be verified or
falsified via demonstrable science using these effing of the ineffable
techniques, and if your theory is similar, my job will be done. If your
theory is different, I'll describe the much more complex way which the
theory will be verified / falsified by demonstrable science using this
same correct qualitative interpretation method.
We might as well start at the beginning of the perception process, for
completeness (and this will be required to see and prove what is the
neural correlate of redness in our brain). The perception of a
strawberry starts with the target of perception or the surface of the
strawberry having a set of physical qualities, (it's ability to reflect
something like 650 NM light) that we think of or interpret as being
"red". There is the causally downstream set of physical qualities which
are very different from the set of physical qualities the surface of the
strawberry has. This is the 650 NM light. Then, there is a translation
mechanism (the retina) which translate the physical qualities of the
light into a different set of physical qualities (the red and green
signal traveling down your optic nerve). Again, these are all very
different physical qualities, we think of, or interpret all of them as
if they were "red". The correctly functioning retina, is what correctly
translates one different set of physical qualities to the other, in a
way that allows us to abstract away from the particular different
physical representations, and think of both of them in a functionally
optimized way: "We think of or interpret all them all as if they were
all red". Note: if you add something in this causal perception Chanel,
such as a fMRI camera and video sensing system such as might be used to
target and perceived the quality of knowledge inside our brain, that
also represents what we think of as "red" or at this point the "redness"
(which will be inverted for the duplicated person). All these diverse
representations also will all have very different sets of physical
qualities we only think of as if they were all the same "red". Every
one of these sets of physical representations we all think of as being
"red" (or abstracted different physical representations we all think of
as ones and zeros in the computer portion of the channel) require a
correct qualitative translation mechanism that translates from one
physical set of qualities, to the next different one, in a way that
allows us to think of all of them in a simplified way - as if they were
all "red".
So far, in our duplicated person, we haven't changed anything yet. And
this much of the causal "Perception Chanel" is identical. There is
further neural processing, such as that required to recognize the edges
of the strawberry in the 2 two D representations of the strawberry
coming down our optical nerve. And there is the part that converts these
2D images into 3D voxel elements again representing the 3D strawberry
with a completely different set of physical qualities which are nothing
like any of the up channel physical qualities. Again, up until this
point things remain physically identical in our duplicated person. Now,
after all this neural processing, there is yet another final translation
mechanism in the perception Chanel which translates to yet another
completely different set of physical qualities. (Again, none of these
physical qualities, including the qualities of the surface of the
strawberry are anything like each other.) Where before the duplication,
the translation mechanism would translate to voxel knowledge of the
surface of the strawberry having a redness set of physical qualities we
can experience, while in the duplicate the final translation mechanism
translates to physical knowledge that has a set of physical qualities we
experience as having a greenness quality.
So, how this particular theory will be proven correct, or falsified for
everyone in competing theory camps, is via the weak stronger and
strongest form of effing the ineffable I've been describing and also
described in this video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4 and
via this method finding whatever the particular neural correlates are of
each of our redness and greenness... conscious experiences. This is the
"materialist" theory that falsifiably predicts that without the right
material, no redness. Other theories include "functionalist" theories,
and various other "emergent" theories (what seems to be the current
leading expert consensus set of theories because of the fallacious
neural substitution argument), "quantum" theories, "relational"
theories, "Higher order" theories, neither world "spiritual" or various
dualistic religious theories such as Cartesian dualism (these are the
naive most popular theories), even elimanativests theories with no
qualia at all, and lots more that are all much more complex and
problematic than this simple theory. One of these theories is about to
be proven true, while all the rest falsified, by simply correctly
interpreting the physical qualities representing what we are detecting
or "effing the ineffable".
Is your theory of what the conscious "perception part" is anything like
this materialist one? Which theory do you all bet is going to soon turn
out to be "The One"?
Brent Allsop
On 1/1/2017 10:04 AM, William Flynn Wallace wrote:
> For the most part, I don't belong in this discussion but I'd like to
> know the meaning of
>
> "You completely swap the new persons redness knowledge with their
> greenness knowledge."
>
> Are you talking about rewiring the optical sensory system or the
> perception part?
>
> bill w
>
> On Sun, Jan 1, 2017 at 10:49 AM, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com
> <mailto:brent.allsop at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>
> Hi Jason,
>
> Good question. Let me first ask you a question, then based on
> your answer, I will be able to better answer your questions.
>
>
> Let's say you duplicate a person, possibly with a Star Trek like
> transporter. Except you make one minor change. You completely
> swap the new persons redness knowledge with their greenness
> knowledge. I would say you have still successfully transported
> them, that you have achieved multiple-realizability and
> functionally they will be identical. But, the new person
> represents knowledge of strawberries with a greenness quality. Do
> these before and after people have "identical mental states"?
>
> Brent
>
>
> On 12/31/2016 4:44 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> Brent,
>>
>> Thank you, the video cleared it up for me then. So do you have no
>> objection to multiple-realizability (the idea that different
>> physical materials could in theory be used to construct minds
>> that have identical mental states)?
>>
>> Jason
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Brent Allsop
>> <brent.allsop at gmail.com <mailto:brent.allsop at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Hi Jason,
>>
>> I'm just talking in simplified qualitative terms to make
>> communication easier to model what is and isn't important.
>> that is the only reason I used the term grue to represent all
>> the 99 million or whatever new colors that any particular
>> tetrachromat can experience (surely they are not all the same).
>>
>> Also, when i say that glutamate has the redness quality and
>> glycene has the grenness quality, this too, is just
>> simplified. I am describing what it would be like in a
>> hypothetical world that only has 3 colors - red (glutamate),
>> green(glycene), and white(aspartate). (see:
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4&t=30s
>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4&t=30s>) I simply
>> describe in that video that if there was such a world, how
>> could the people in that world correctly see that in their
>> simplified world that glutamate was the neural correlate of
>> red (and not think it was white since glutamate reflects
>> white light).
>>
>> Then once a person can understand how this general correct
>> qualitative interpretation theory works in the simplified
>> world, they can use the same proper qualitative
>> interpretation of abstracted data, in the real world - to
>> finally not be qualia blind and finally discover what really
>> has all the redness qualities any one of us can experience.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Jason Resch
>> <jasonresch at gmail.com <mailto:jasonresch at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at 4:15 PM, Brent Allsop
>> <brent.allsop at gmail.com <mailto:brent.allsop at gmail.com>>
>> wrote:
>>
>> I, like most people, am a mere tetra chromate – I
>> experience the world with 3 primary colors.But some
>> people are tetrachromats, and do it with 4 primary
>> colors.Let’s call this 4^th color “grue”.Obviously,
>> all us tri chromats can hear the person say things
>> like: “No that is Grue, not one of the primary
>> colors, as you claim” and we can observe what is
>> causing the 4^th primary color, including it’s neural
>> correlate in their brains.In other words, like Frank
>> Jackson’s brilliant color scientist raised in a black
>> and what room, us trichromats can learn everything
>> about grue, and see that it is not in our heads, but
>> we can see when the neurarl correlate of grue is in
>> the head of a tetrachromat.
>>
>> In other words, all of us normal trichromatic people
>> are grue zombies.We can know and communicate
>> everything about them.In fact, we might even be able
>> to be trained to call the right things grue, just
>> like the tetrachromat does, and lie about it, and
>> convince everyone else that we might be a
>> tetrachromat.(until you observe my brain)So, until we
>> enhance our primary visual cortext and give it what
>> has the grue color, we will never know how the
>> tetrachromat qualitatively interprets the word “grue”.
>>
>> Now, some people think of a “p-zombie” as something
>> that is atomically identical to us, but just doesn’t
>> have the qualitative experience of consciousness –
>> which of course is very absurd, and very different
>> than the grue type of zombie, I am, who simply isn’t
>> yet capable of producing the grue neural correlate in
>> my brain.But I can represent grue with anything else
>> that is in my brain, and talk about it as if it was
>> grue, in a grue zombie way.
>>
>>
>> But no new neurotransmitters are required to experience grue.
>>
>> Moreover, tretrachromats don't just see 1 new type of
>> color, they can see 99 million new colors that us
>> trichromats cannot see. This is because we can sense
>> about 100 independent relative brightnesses for red green
>> and blue colors, which allows 100x100x100 possible
>> resulting colors (1 million colors). Tetrachromats get to
>> see 100x100x100x100 or 100 million colors.
>>
>> How can so many new colors come about if the
>> neurocorolates are somehow dependent on specific
>> chemicals in the brain? Tetrachromats don't have 100
>> times as many chemicals in their brain as trichromats
>> have, yet they get to perceive 100 times as many qualia.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at 12:30 PM, Jason Resch
>> <jasonresch at gmail.com <mailto:jasonresch at gmail.com>>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Reminds me a bit of "An Unfortunate Dualist":
>>
>> http://themindi.blogspot.com/2007/02/chapter-23-unfortunate-dualist.html
>> <http://themindi.blogspot.com/2007/02/chapter-23-unfortunate-dualist.html>
>>
>> As to your puzzle, if Fred is unable to detect
>> any effects from conscious people (including
>> their reflections), then he should not be able
>> to see his own reflection, but then he also
>> shouldn't be able to hear his own thoughts
>> either. Which might be your definition of a
>> zombie, making him visible, etc. "Russell's
>> reflection". However, Fred's own voice might
>> still be heard if Fred's consciousness is an
>> epiphenomenon, but I think practically speaking I
>> think epiphenomenalism can be ruled out, together
>> with the notion of p-zombies.
>>
>> See Daniel Dennett's "The Unimagined
>> Preposterousness of Zombies":
>> https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/unzombie.htm
>> <https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/unzombie.htm>
>>
>> Dennett argues that "when philosophers claim
>> that zombies are conceivable, they invariably
>> underestimate the task of conception (or
>> imagination), and end up imagining something
>> that violates their own definition".^[3]
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-Dennett1991-3>
>> ^[4]
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-Dennett1995-4>
>> He coined the term "zimboes" – p-zombies
>> that have second-order beliefs
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_logic> –
>> to argue that the idea of a p-zombie is
>> incoherent;^[12]
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-12>
>> "Zimboes think^Z they are conscious,
>> think^Z they have qualia, think^Z they
>> suffer pains – they are just 'wrong'
>> (according to this lamentable tradition), in
>> ways that neither they nor we could ever
>> discover!".^[4]
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-Dennett1995-4>
>>
>>
>>
>> I'm not sure, however, whether your thought
>> experiment sheds any new light on the concepts of
>> consciousness or zombies. It seems like it may be
>> only a reformulation of the "Barber Paradox",
>> where the self reflexivity is a "power to detect
>> only non-consciousness things", aimed at one's
>> own consciousness.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at 11:13 AM, Stuart LaForge
>> <avant at sollegro.com <mailto:avant at sollegro.com>>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Jason Resch wrote:
>> <Therefore, if the brain is a machine, and is
>> finite, then an
>> appropriately programmed computer can
>> perfectly emulate any of its
>> behaviors. Philosophers generally fall into
>> one os three camps, on the
>> question of consciousness and the
>> computational theory of mind:
>> Non-computable physicists [. . .]Weak AI
>> proponents [. . .]
>> Computationalists.
>>
>> Which camp do you consider yourself in?>
>> -------------------------------------------
>>
>> As a general rule, I prefer not to go camping
>> with philosophers as I
>> prefer the rigor of science and mathematics.
>> But if I must camp in that
>> neck of the woods, I would set up my own
>> camp. I would call it the
>> Godelian camp after Kurt Godel. Since I am a
>> scientist and not a
>> philosopher, I will explain my views with a
>> thought experiment instead of
>> an argument.
>>
>> Imagine if you will a solipsist. Let's call
>> him Fred. Fred is solopsist
>> because he has every reason to believe he
>> lives alone in a world of
>> P-zombies.
>>
>> For the uninitiated, P-zombies are
>> philosophical zombies. Horrid beings
>> that talk, move, and act like normal folks
>> but lack any real consciousness
>> or self-awareness. They just go through the
>> motions of being conscious but
>> are not really so.
>>
>> So ever since Fred could remember, wherever
>> he looked, all he could see
>> were those pesky P-zombies. They were
>> everywhere. He could talk to them,
>> he could interact with them, and he even
>> married one. And because they all
>> act perfectly conscious, they would fool most
>> anyone but certainly not
>> Fred.
>>
>> This was because Fred had, whether you would
>> regard it as a gift or curse,
>> an unusual ability. He could always see and
>> otherwise sense P-zombies but
>> never normal folk. Normal folk were always
>> invisible to him and he never
>> could sense a single one. So he, being a
>> perfect P-zombie detector, came
>> to believe that he was the only normal person
>> on a planet populated by
>> P-zombies.
>>
>> Then one day by chance he happened to glance
>> in a mirror . . .
>>
>> Does he see himself?
>>
>> I want to hear what the list has to say about
>> this before I give my answer
>> and my interpretation of what this means for
>> strong AI and the
>> computational theory of mind.
>>
>> Stuart LaForge
>>
>>
>>
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