[ExI] Quantum consciousness, quantum mysticism, and transhumanist engineering
William Flynn Wallace
foozler83 at gmail.com
Tue Mar 14 17:06:37 UTC 2017
It could be but meaning needs contrast, if EVERYTHING is conscious then the
observable results would be the same as if NOTHING was conscious, so I'd
have no hope in ever discovering which possibility is true. So it's
pointless to worry about consciousness. Worry about observable intelligent
John K Clark
Many psychologists think that our observable behavior originates in the
unconscious, travels through the conscious,and some of that becomes overt.
According to your paragraph above, consciousness can be a constant and so
irrelevant. That would be true only if there weren't an unconscious and no
variation in consciousness.
And if intelligence is equated with consciousness, then you could say that
all behavior is intelligent, and then intelligence becomes a constant.
So we need to delimit out terms. I don't think all behavior is
intelligent; some of it is almost purely emotional, some reflexive, and so
on. But I fully agree with you that intelligence is perhaps the most
important variable to study in certain areas. I also agree with you that
most of this stuff about consciousness is irrelevant, immaterial, and
incompetent (shades of Perry Mason).
On Tue, Mar 14, 2017 at 12:50 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>
> On 14 March 2017 at 14:54, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com> wrote:
>> Hi Stathis,
>> On 3/10/2017 2:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> I see no evidence that you understand the idea that with any possible
>> system, if you swap a part for another part that interacts with its
>> neighbours in the same way, the system as a whole will behave in the same
>> way. It is irrelevant what the system does or how complex it is. The
>> correct way to do the substitution is to make sure that the new part
>> interacts with the rest of the system in the same way as the original part
>> did, and you don't need to understand anything about what the system does
>> in order make this substitution.
>> OK, let me attempt, yet again, to convince you that I do fully understand
>> the idea that with any possible system, if you swap a part for another
>> part, that interacts with it's neighbors in the same way, the system as a
>> whole will behave in the same way. I completely agree with this, but the
>> way you do the substitution is erroneous, and you are corrupting the system
>> by always insisting you must be able to remove any way to compare one
>> quality to another, no matter where you theorized that it might be. For
>> example, let's assume, for a moment, your theory that redness is
>> "functional" as you claim.
>> I assert that if your theory is true, then there must be some "function"
>> that is the redness function, and there must be some other function that
>> must be detectably different that is the greenness function. Additionally,
>> since we can be aware of them at the same time, there must be something
>> that is binding these two functions enabling this composite qualitative
>> experience of redness and greenness, leading to the ability to verbalize
>> that they are qualitatively different.
>> Now, the error you make, is that you assert that you must always be able
>> to replace the redness function, with the greenness function, in a way that
>> it will always "behave in the same way" which you corrupting claim must be
>> that the now new two greenness qualities (the redness being substituted
>> with the greenness) are still different. In other words, no matter where
>> you put the comparison ability, you remove this ability, by asserting they
>> must be different, even though they are now the same.
>> If you include the ability of the system to behave the same, including
>> comparison of redness and greenness (whether they are material or
>> functional) so that it preserves the ability to say that redness is
>> different than greenness, only then can you consider it to be "behaving the
>> same" in a sufficient, non corrupted way, to explain qualitative conscious
>> comparison behavior and verbalization of such.
> But the comparison of redness and greenness, or anything else whatsoever
> that the system does, will necessarily occur provided only that the
> substituted part is behaviourally identical. "Behaviourally identical"
> means that it interacts with its neighbours in the same way - nothing else.
> Glutamate interacts with its neighbours by binding to the glutamate
> receptor, so if you replace all the glutamate in the brain with a
> quasi-glutamate that is chemically different but binds to glutamate
> receptors in the same way (and a few other things, such as diffuses in the
> synapse in the same way, is taken up by the presynaptic neuron in the same
> way) then the brain will behave in the same way. If the brain behaves in
> the same way then it will be able to distinguish red from green - and I can
> make this claim without knowing anything about how the brain actually
> distinguishes red from green. Now, I think you might be considering that
> glutamate may possess some special quality, being its redness function,
> that quasi-glutamate might lack, and therefore the brain with the
> quasi-glutamate will not be able to distinguish red from green. But the
> properties of glutamate we are interested in are the directly observable
> effects on neurons; redness is not such a property, since redness does not
> affect binding to glutamate receptors. If glutamate is responsible for
> redness it must be as a result of its effect on the system as a whole, and
> if quasi-glutamate binds to the receptors in the same way, it will also
> have this assumed redness-producing quality.
> Stathis Papaioannou
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
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