[ExI] Quantum consciousness, quantum mysticism, and transhumanist engineering

Brent Allsop brent.allsop at gmail.com
Wed Mar 22 09:21:23 UTC 2017

On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 11:50 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>

> But the comparison of redness and greenness, or anything else whatsoever
> that the system does, will necessarily occur provided only that the
> substituted part is behaviorally identical. "Behaviorally identical" means
> that it interacts with its neighbors in the same way - nothing else.

Well, there you have it.  I'm guessing that you still can't see how this is
what I've been trying to say all along.  You must include this comparison
behavior when you do any type of neural substitution correctly.  Not
preserving this functionality in your theory is what makes it fallacious.
Can you not see that up until now, you've always nuro substituted out any
theory I provided that included this ability?  You always twisted any
theoretical system I was proposing, that preserves this ability to compare
during the neuro substitution, in a way that always completely removed this
comparison ability.  Go ahead, propose any qualitative theory that
preserves this, then try a nuro substitution with it.

If you provide a qualitative theory that include the necessary ability to
compare red and green in your neuro substitutuion, you will be able to do a
neural substitution from redness/greenness to purpleness/yellowness, in a
way that both of them will behave the same honestly and accurately saying:
"I know what red and green are like".  You will be able to do this again,
to blackness and whiteness.  And again to oneness and zeroness.  All of
them still correctly proclaiming: "I know what red and green is like for

But, the only way to keep them "Behaviorally identical" is to keep each of
these neural substituted conscious entities qualia blind and qualitatively
isolated from each other - the way all of you still are. If you do the
neural substitution in any way, such that the qualitative isolation is not
preserved, the behavior will not be different saying things like: redness
and greenness sure are different than purpleness and yellowness.  For
example, you could add a qualitative memory system, so that the being could
remember and compare what redness and greenness was like, before the
qualitative substitution.

It is also important to remember, that we are talking about a simple 2
qualitative pixel element comparison system.  It's easy to preserve
isolation with such a simple system, especially when you have a system your
are substituting that only interacts with a few of it's neighbors.  If you
have a qualitative system like we have, where you can compare any of the
tens of thousands of qualitative pixel or voxel element with all of the
others at the same time, preserving the isolation is much more difficult,
but not impossible.  All of the tens of thousands of voxel elements must
interact with all the others in some comparison enabling way - allowing the
qualitative comparison of them all at the same time

There is a scene in the British TV series "Humans" season 2 where one of
the "Synths" that has become "conscious" recollects that life was very
different before he become "conscious".   Once we are no longer qualia
blind, we'll all demand that our TV shows be much less qualia blind, having
them say things more like like: "My oneness and zeroness representations of
red and green were sure qualitatively less than my new redness and
greenness representations.  At least in Humans, you can see this
qualitative recognition they have, on their faces, when they become
conscious, and they walk outside for the first time.  If they were
"behaving the same", they wouldn't have that astonished look on their face,
after they walk outside, once they become qualitatively "conscious."

Brent Allsop
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