[ExI] Quantum consciousness, quantum mysticism, and transhumanist engineering

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
Wed Mar 22 12:12:06 UTC 2017

On Wed., 22 Mar. 2017 at 8:22 pm, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>

> On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 11:50 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> But the comparison of redness and greenness, or anything else whatsoever
> that the system does, will necessarily occur provided only that the
> substituted part is behaviorally identical. "Behaviorally identical" means
> that it interacts with its neighbors in the same way - nothing else.
> Well, there you have it.  I'm guessing that you still can't see how this
> is what I've been trying to say all along.  You must include this
> comparison behavior when you do any type of neural substitution correctly.
> Not preserving this functionality in your theory is what makes it
> fallacious.  Can you not see that up until now, you've always nuro
> substituted out any theory I provided that included this ability?  You
> always twisted any theoretical system I was proposing, that preserves this
> ability to compare during the neuro substitution, in a way that always
> completely removed this comparison ability.  Go ahead, propose any
> qualitative theory that preserves this, then try a nuro substitution with
> it.
> If you provide a qualitative theory that include the necessary ability to
> compare red and green in your neuro substitutuion, you will be able to do a
> neural substitution from redness/greenness to purpleness/yellowness, in a
> way that both of them will behave the same honestly and accurately saying:
> "I know what red and green are like".  You will be able to do this again,
> to blackness and whiteness.  And again to oneness and zeroness.  All of
> them still correctly proclaiming: "I know what red and green is like for
> me."
> But, the only way to keep them "Behaviorally identical" is to keep each of
> these neural substituted conscious entities qualia blind and qualitatively
> isolated from each other - the way all of you still are. If you do the
> neural substitution in any way, such that the qualitative isolation is not
> preserved, the behavior will not be different saying things like: redness
> and greenness sure are different than purpleness and yellowness.  For
> example, you could add a qualitative memory system, so that the being could
> remember and compare what redness and greenness was like, before the
> qualitative substitution.
> It is also important to remember, that we are talking about a simple 2
> qualitative pixel element comparison system.  It's easy to preserve
> isolation with such a simple system, especially when you have a system your
> are substituting that only interacts with a few of it's neighbors.  If you
> have a qualitative system like we have, where you can compare any of the
> tens of thousands of qualitative pixel or voxel element with all of the
> others at the same time, preserving the isolation is much more difficult,
> but not impossible.  All of the tens of thousands of voxel elements must
> interact with all the others in some comparison enabling way - allowing the
> qualitative comparison of them all at the same time
> There is a scene in the British TV series "Humans" season 2 where one of
> the "Synths" that has become "conscious" recollects that life was very
> different before he become "conscious".   Once we are no longer qualia
> blind, we'll all demand that our TV shows be much less qualia blind, having
> them say things more like like: "My oneness and zeroness representations of
> red and green were sure qualitatively less than my new redness and
> greenness representations.  At least in Humans, you can see this
> qualitative recognition they have, on their faces, when they become
> conscious, and they walk outside for the first time.  If they were
> "behaving the same", they wouldn't have that astonished look on their face,
> after they walk outside, once they become qualitatively "conscious."

So, do you agree that if the substituted component interacts with its
neighbours normally then the whole system will be able to distinguish red
from green and normally? Or can you imagine a situation where the
substituted component interacts with its neighbours normally but the system
does *not* behave normally? If the latter, please explain, preferably with
an example not related to consciousness.

Stathis Papaioannou
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