[ExI] Quantum consciousness, quantum mysticism, and transhumanist engineering
bbenzai at yahoo.com
Sun Mar 26 11:48:36 UTC 2017
Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com> wrote:
>I think you have it right, about what is the crux of the matter. What
internal operations are important to include as necessary for
And the answer to that is 'none'. Internal operations are irrelevant, as
long as external behaviour remains the same.
> two people behaving the same, saying something is 'red' could be
modified to be inverted from each other. One person's redness could be
engineered to be more like another's greenness.
Perhaps, but the point is that we could never know if this was the case,
not even in principle. And neither could the subjects of this experiment.
> So, it's critical to try to find effing of the ineffable ways to know
what is really going on qualitative experience wise, in people's brains,
compared to our own.
That sentence makes no sense. "What is really going on" and "Qualitative
experience" are different kinds of thing. And that's why this 'possing
the impossible' is not possible.
> With a simplistic system that we normally think of neuro
substituting, no matter what or how you do it, you can reproduce large
flat screen TV like functionality. But, if you do it incorrectly, you
can lose the ability for the lower left most pixel to interact with the
upper right most pixel, so that you can tell if any of them are miss
behaving or broken.
Yes, indeed. What you're describing is an incomplete substitution that
doesn't actually give the same outputs for the same inputs. You talk
about connections, but nobody is suggesting breaking any connections, so
there's no reason why the same associations would not occur. The only
reason that interactions would be lost is if the interface of the new
part was different to the old. And all along, we're talking about
systems that preserve this interface exactly. So as long as that
cortical column preserves all its connections with the rest of the
brain, and implements exactly the same behaviour in terms of
inputs/outputs, then it must be a 'correct' substitution.
Think of it this way: How many different ways could you write a function
that calculated the number of bricks needed to build a house, given a
standard set of inputs such as size of house, size of bricks, etc.?
If you were a builder, and wanted to use such a function, would you care
in the slightest how it works, as long as it gives the correct answer?
Would you prefer one over the other, if they all produced exactly the
same result, were exactly as easy to use, and took exactly the same time
to run, cost the same, ran on the same computers, etc.?
I suspect you wouldn't.
> Stathis, and so many other brilliant people, can't get beyond: "But
you *cannot* substitute a component preserving its interactions with its
neighbors and end up changing the qualitative experience of redness and
Do you think there might be a good reason for this?
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